

SOCIAL AND  
INTERNATIONAL IDEALS



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# SOCIAL AND INTERNATIONAL IDEALS

BEING STUDIES IN PATRIOTISM

BY

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'THE PHILOSOPHICAL THEORY OF THE STATE'

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## PREFACE

THIS is a book about the enduring conditions of peace, and the production of an atmosphere unfavourable to war in the future; but it is not a book about the ending of the present war, or about diplomatic arrangements for providing directly against its recurrence. Its thesis is in a word that the nature of our patriotism is what creates the peaceful or the warlike atmosphere; and that the nature of our patriotism is displayed and operates primarily through the degree in which rights are organised within the social and political community. This is its operation; but what it ultimately depends on is our conception, whether implicit or explicit, of the good we chiefly desire, and whether it lies in the things which diminish by sharing or those which have the opposite character. The warlike atmosphere means disease within the State; the healthy State, however strong, is non-militant in temper. Such is Plato's diagnosis; I hold it to be eternal truth. The philosophical theory of the State, so far as it has been diverted from this path, has missed its goal; but it has not been so far diverted from it as under the influence of resentment many are assuming to-day.

The greater part of these studies deal therefore with purely social problems. They were not written in view of war complications, and may seem irrelevant

to them. My point in bringing them together is to display the organising power which belongs to a belief in the supreme values—beauty, truth, kindness, for example—and how a conception of life which has them for its good is not unpractical, but in its unbiassed many-sidedness of working is the most effective and practical purpose the world has seen or can conceive.

It is a life like this, I suggest, which is the only sound and solid foundation for the will to peace. For no other will is directed to peace for its own sake, and no other, therefore, is proof against new combinations, new temptations, new alarms. To increase the number of persons who value things in this way, and to adapt political forms to the expression of their will, is, I suggest, the only infallible road, however long, to the immense diminution, if not to the abolition of war. Perhaps only to its immense diminution; for war means after all that there are things which man values more than his life or the life of others. And while this is so—and could we wish it to be otherwise?—can war be abolished absolutely and in principle? For, although the highest values are not competitive and cannot set men fighting, you can never be sure that mistakes as to the conditions of their attainment may not do so.

Our view of patriotism is not quite familiar, and seems to me much profounder and more pregnant than that commonly current. In their patriotism, their feeling for the community, Hegel tells us, people are apt to follow their custom of being generous before they are just, and excuse themselves by a potential romantic magnanimity for a lack of prosaic everyday loyalty to the commonwealth. But it is this latter, the sense of daily duty, which is real

patriotism—the foundation and seed-plot of the formèr. This ought we to have done, and not to leave the other undone.

My point is throughout, then, that the really important thing is also the thing open to all of us ; the amelioration of the social spirit and social detail here where we live ; and that this is the principal ground on which the victory of all humanity is to be won, because it alone can furnish a solid foundation on which extended unities of will can be built up. I shall recur to the reasons for this in the conclusion. But I repeat here that the essential thing in all international agreements is the quality and real aim of the will that sustains them ; and that throughout great communities and systems of these, this will can only be in stable harmony in so far as it possesses that outlook on life which takes the supreme values as its criterion and embodies them in a well-ordered community.

All the papers except the concluding essay have been previously published ;—fourteen of them (I.-XI. (3)) in the *Charity Organisation Review*, one (XII.) in the *International Journal of Ethics*, and one (XIII.) in the *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society*. I have to thank in every case the proprietors of these journals for permission to reprint them.

BERNARD BOSANQUET.



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## I

### THE TEACHING OF PATRIOTISM <sup>1</sup>

I PRESUME that the first necessity in teaching a subject is to set our own ideas in order. And an attempt in this direction is what I have principally in mind this evening. The technique of teaching I must leave to those who have made it their special duty. But it has occurred to me that certain passages from great writers to which I shall call your attention might conceivably be made useful in the actual work of schools. That, however, is not for me to say.

1. First, then, as to the current ideas of patriotism.

I remember a distinguished naval officer observing to me: "Of course, patriotism should be taught in all the schools." My response was not too eager, because I did not feel sure what he might mean by patriotism. I have since noted with pleasure that he has taken as an example of patriotism the arduous and courageous work of an elementary school-teacher in remote and thinly populated districts of our colonies, offering to them a well-merited meed of praise. It seems, therefore, that I was too sceptical, and that his conception of the patriot's temper was not militant or self-seeking, but large and sound.

But again, in conversation with a very well-known

<sup>1</sup> Address given in 1911.

soldier, it occurred to me to remark upon the high qualities which, as he had just told me, were becoming necessary for the simplest work of the private in the ranks—qualities as high as those which in previous warfare had been demanded of an officer—and it seemed to me that this raising of the standard might have an important influence on our future attitude to war. We could make, I thought, and should be obliged to make, a better use of such men than as food for powder at a shilling a day. Here I did not gain my point. The officer responded that no man could be too good to die for his country. True, of course, but if it is fine to die for a cause, it is finer, perhaps, to live for one.

Not that I disparage the old traditional patriotism—the *dulce et decorum est pro patria mori*. We have it already in Homer conjoined with a wonderful elevation of mind, when Hector, threatened with adverse omens, brushes aside the superstition with the answer: "The one best omen is to be fighting for your country." *Faced in the spirit of the civilised man*, death is no doubt a splendid test of character.

They were mere chance remarks, of course; but so far, I think, my sailor had deeper notions than my soldier.

Then, again, the "patriot" in politics has not always been a creditable figure. Hear what one of the wisest and truest-hearted of Englishmen had to say about them. "Patriotism having become one of our topics, Johnson suddenly uttered, in a strong, determined tone, an apophthegm at which many will start, 'Patriotism is the last refuge of a scoundrel.' . . . I maintained that certainly all patriots were not scoundrels. Being urged (not by Johnson) to name one exception, I mentioned an eminent person. But

Johnson argued that his political honesty might be only apparent." (Of course, this has to do with the mixed faction that took the name of "patriots" when in opposition against Sir Robert Walpole.)

Well, then, evidently we have in patriotism an immense natural force and magic traditional watch-word which you may appeal to with less or more justice and common sense, and which is easily made capital of by foolish or unscrupulous politicians. The question is how to deal with this great force so as to keep it alive against coldness and pessimism while making it a serviceable spring of good life instead of a source of brainless and often fraudulent clamour, or at best a dangerous fanaticism.

2. Patriotism, we have said, is an immense natural force, a magical spell. It rests, I suppose, mainly on three things: your family and kindred—the tie of blood—which extends to the nation as a whole; your home—the actual place and land with which you have ties of custom and affection; and, what includes these two and more, your whole power and means of acting upon the world—language, ideas, modes of life, social habits.

Broadly speaking, the limit of a country or nation is the limit of a common experience, such that the people share the same mind and feeling, and can understand each other's ways of living and make allowance for each other so that the same laws and institutions are acceptable and workable for all of them. It is not race; it is a *de facto* problem. You have extreme cases, of course, in England and Ireland or India, Germany and Alsace-Lorraine. In what degree have they this common experience, and what institutions correspond to the amount of it they have? And so with the British Empire in general.

And, of course, there are cases of freemasonry going outside what is clearly a nation, say England. There is a freemasonry between, perhaps, the most prosperous classes of all countries, and again between the wage-earners of all or many countries. They are tending to make common cause independent of nationality, and a very good thing too. And it would be madness to construe patriotism in such a way as to set it in antagonism to these results of a common civilisation and common problems. We want them, I take it, to increase and multiply. We want men to come together more and more on any sound and genuine basis of sympathy.

All places that the eye of heaven visits  
Are to the wise man ports and happy havens,

and still more so, I suppose, to the wage-earner who has a good trade in his hands, unless there is a labour exclusion policy.

We can see, then, from all these exceptions and limits to the sense of common life on which patriotism rests that it must be intelligent if it is to be useful and not a source of conflict. It is really stronger and stronger as we learn to appreciate our inheritance—*e.g.* our literature; but it is an increasing danger unless, while it grows stronger, it also grows wiser.

3. So it is all-important *how* you care for your country.

Compare it with the case of the family—*i.e.* consider that your family is to your country as your country to mankind.

The family is just such another problem. Some people will tell you that the family is the root of all morality and civilisation; and others will tell you that it is the root of all selfishness and narrowness

and jobbery. And I should say beyond a doubt they are both of them right. The family may be the nursery of manhood (including womanhood) and citizenship, or their grave. It all depends on *how* you care for it—that is, whether your family affection is influenced by a true standard of what makes life worth living; whether what you desire for the members of your family is a life worth living; and whether, if you mean to desire that, you know how to desire it. For the great thing in life is that we have to *learn* what to desire and how to desire.

Well, then, your family may either unite you with your country or may cut you off from it. And just so your country may either unite you with mankind or cut you off from it. It all depends on whether your love of country is penetrated with a just sense of what makes life worth living.

I will take two fundamental points and illustrate them by passages from great writers.

First, your love of country is not to be presented in the light of a yearning for occasional acts of heroism, but as a daily sober loyalty; the recognition that the working centre and purpose of life lies in our duty to our fellow-citizens and in the law-abiding citizen spirit. Here is the passage in which Plato represents the citizen loyalty of Socrates, when he rejects the proposal of his friends that he should escape from the prison and evade the sentence of the law. You may think that if you were asked some of the questions which he imagines himself asked you would answer more critically than he did. Well, no one could be a sharper critic than Socrates. But when his own civic loyalty is in question he accepts the social order with a generous largeness of spirit.

"See now, if we depart from this prison without the city's leave, are we or are we not doing wrong to some one, and that some one whom least of all we ought to wrong?"

I do not understand.

Look at it in this way. Suppose, when we are on the point of running away, or whatever you call it, from this prison; the laws and the genius of our city were to stand before us and ask us, "Tell me, Socrates, what it is that you intend to do? Are you not intending, by this action which you take in hand, to destroy us the laws and the entire commonwealth so far as in you lies? Or do you imagine that any community can continue to exist and not be overturned, in which the judgments of the law courts have no force, but are invalidated and undone by the action of individuals?" What are we to answer, my friends, to such and suchlike arguments? A man who was a barrister would find a good deal to say on behalf of this ordinance, which we are trying to annul, which ordains that judicial decisions shall take effect. Or are we to answer them that our reason is that the city did wrong to us, and did not decide our trial justly; is that to be our reply?

"Yes, that is so, Socrates."

But what if the laws make answer, "But, Socrates, was not that just the covenant between us and you, that you would abide by the sentence which the commonwealth should pronounce?" If we were to stare at them when they said this, perhaps they would continue, "Pray, Socrates, do not stare at us when we speak, but answer our question, especially as you are in the habit of asking and answering questions. Come now, what fault do you find with us and with the commonwealth that justifies you in going about to destroy us? Were not we the authors of your being, and by our means your father took your mother to wife and you became their child? Have you any fault to find with those of us which preside over marriages, that they are not good laws?" I have no fault to find,



I should reply. "Well, and after you were born, what about the laws of nurture and education, according to which you, like others, were educated? Were they not good laws, those of us which deal with those matters, and which enjoined upon your father to educate you in art and literature and in bodily serviceableness?" They were good laws, I should make answer. "Well, and after you were born and bred and educated, can you maintain in the first place that you are not our offspring and our servant, both you and your progenitors? And if this is so, do you think there is equality of rights between you and us, and it is just for you to retaliate upon us whatever we go about to inflict upon you? And whereas against your father you had no such equal right as to retaliate what he might do to you, to chide again when chidden, to strike again when struck, or any such disobedience; yet shall you have such a licence against your country and the laws that if we go about to put you to death, believing it to be just, you will endeavour to retaliate so far as in you lies, by undoing the laws and your country, and will you maintain that in thus acting you are acting right, you who so sincerely are a professor of morality? Or are you so clever, that you cannot understand, that far above your father and mother and all your progenitors there is a more precious and august and diviner thing, that is, your country, a thing held in greater esteem both among the gods and among all intelligent men; and that you ought to reverence her and give way and bow before her when she is angry much more than to your father; and you must either gain excuse or perform what she commands; and you must suffer in silence what she orders you to suffer, though it be stripes or imprisonment; and if she sends you to the war, to wounds or to death, you must do it, and it is right; and you must not yield, nor give back, nor leave your place in the ranks; but in war and in the law court and everywhere else you must perform what your state and your country shall command

if you are not excused by her in the way prescribed. But to use force is an unholy thing against your mother or your father, and very much more so against your country?" What are we to say to this, my friend? Do the laws speak the truth or not?

That is one thing; true patriotism is the law-abiding spirit; the recognition that to fail in normal citizen duty is so far as in you lies to make war upon and undo the society and the State to which we belong.

And then comes more positively the problem what it is that particularly forms the guide and standard of patriotism; what it is that, if we desire it, will keep straight our other desires; and if we set our hearts on it, like the kingdom of God and His righteousness, then all other things will be added unto us.

I wish to put before you at some length the passage in which a great philosopher answers this question. I speak of Fichte's addresses to the German nation<sup>1</sup> at the time, after Jena, 1806, when Prussia was actually under the heel of Napoleon. The foundation of the great University of Berlin, now perhaps the world's premier University, followed within five years of Fichte's addresses in connection with his plan for establishing it, and he himself was the first Rector or Principal. The plan of general education which he refers to represents on the whole the impression made on his mind by the work of Pestalozzi, but culminating, of course, in the Universities.

Fichte's *Works*, vii. p. 265.—A country that has lost its independence has lost therewith the power of inter-

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<sup>1</sup> See p. 317 below for an explanation and defence of taking my description of patriotism from Fichte.

vening. in the stream of time, and independently determining its course. So long as it remains in this condition its destiny and its very chronology are measured off by the foreign Power that rules its fate ; and from henceforth it has not even a history of its own, but reckons its years according to the incidents and epochs of foreign peoples and kingdoms. There is but one condition on which it can emerge from its present state, in which the whole existing world is withdrawn from its operation. And this is, that a new world should be created, which should initiate a new period of history, the property of its creator. . . . And if there is to be a world so created, the instrument of a new ego and a new age for a generation that has lost its former ego and its former history and universe, it would be the duty of a broad interpretation of this possible epoch to indicate what that world could be.

Now I, in my position, maintain that there is such a world. And it is the aim of these addresses to demonstrate to you its reality and its true possessor, and to designate the means of its creation.

P. 274.—The result then is, that the remedy, which I have promised to indicate, consists in the formation of a new personality, such as has previously perhaps been present in individuals, but never certainly as the self of the whole and of the nation. And this means the education of the people, whose former life has been extinguished and become the accident of an alien history, into a life completely new, such as either will remain its own exclusive possession, or, should it pass from them to others, will continue whole and undiminished,<sup>1</sup> though subjected to infinite subdivision. In one word, it is a complete alteration of the existing educational system which I propose as the only means of maintaining the German nation in existence.

P. 276.—. . . That which was lacking in the old educa-

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<sup>1</sup> Observe the reference here to the supremacy of those values which are not diminished by being shared.

tion was the power of penetrating to the roots of vital action and emotion. This is what the new education has to bring to the completion of the old ; and, whereas the previous educational system at the outside educated some faculty *in* the man, this will have for its task to educate the man as a whole, and to make its culture no longer a something that the learner has, but rather a constituent factor of his personality.

Moreover, this previous education, limited as it was, was applied only to a very small minority, who, therefore, were termed the educated class. But the great majority, on whom, strictly speaking, the commonwealth is based, were almost wholly neglected by the educational art and abandoned to blind accident. It is our intention, by means of the new education, to form the Germans into a unity which shall be inspired and animated throughout all its members by this single aim. For if, once again, we were to permit the separation between an educated and an uneducated class, this latter would for certain fall away and be lost to us. Nothing, therefore, remains for us but to apply the new education absolutely without exception to every creature that is German, so that it may not be the culture of a class, but the culture of the nation absolutely as such and of all sections of it without exception. Thus all difference of classes, which other grounds may tend to perpetuate, will in the province of culture absolutely vanish and disappear ; and in this way there will arise among us *not* an education of the *people*, but a characteristically German culture of the *nation*.

P. 283.—Further, man can only will what he loves ; love is the sole, but yet the infallible, stimulus of his will and of all his vital activity and movement. The statesmanship of the past, even in educating the social man, presupposed, as a rule, secure and without exception, that every one loved and willed his own sensuous well-being ; and with this natural desire it associated artificially

through hope and fear the good will which it aimed at producing, the interest for the common weal. Needless to say that in presence of such an educational method the man, who had in externals become a harmless or useful citizen remained, nevertheless, inwardly a worthless man. For this is the very meaning of worthlessness, that a man cares only for his sensuous comfort, and has no motives but hope and fear for it, whether in a present or in a future life.

Putting this out of sight, we have already seen that such a method is useless for our purpose. Hope and fear act not in our favour, but against us, and sensuous self-love can in no way be drawn to our advantage. We are, therefore, downright compelled by necessity to try to produce good men, since it is only in such that the German nation can continue to exist, while so far as the men are bad it must be absorbed into an alien population. [The more selfish classes were accepting office under Napoleon.]

We, therefore, have the task of replacing that self-love, to which we can no longer attach any purpose serviceable to the country, by another love which is directed immediately and absolutely to the good for its own sake. And this we have to plant and establish in the characters of all whom we mean to count members of our nation.

In the Germany of to-day,<sup>1</sup> after the lapse of over a century, many of these anticipations have been fulfilled ; others, again, have not. But then is it not in a large measure true that the cares of this world and the deceitfulness of riches and the lust of other things entering in, are in the Germany that we know in a great measure choking the word and making it unfruitful ? What we see there, however, as among ourselves, is no doubt a struggle of ideas and purposes, and it is not courteous or indeed possible to pass judgment on the patriotism of a

<sup>1</sup> 1911.

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great neighbouring nation. We have enough to pass judgment on if we look at home.

But enough has been said to elucidate the point I want to make, which is this. No patriotism and no politics are trustworthy unless they are kept sweet and clean by a real and fundamental love for the things that are not diminished by being shared—such as kindness, beauty, truth. It may seem an unpractical standard, but it is really the most practical of all. Nothing else will lead you straight and liberate you from class interests at home and from national selfishness abroad. The whole mind, the individual's and the nation's, is a system of ideas and purposes; and if the leading ideas are false, narrow, and bitter, the rest of the system is necessarily poisoned and distorted. The guardians or garrison of Mansoul, Plato said, are to build their fort "in music"—that is to say, in the universal love and appreciation of the highest values of life. Is this unpractical? But just consider one only of a hundred consequences. Think of the economic effect if all consumption were guided by intelligent desires.

4. Have we got away from "the teaching of patriotism"? I think not. Let us draw out one or two results.

Let us think of the question of national strength in contrast with military predominance.

Of course it is the duty of a nation, as of an individual, to be strong. It is more than a mere precaution or insurance; it is part of an individual's manhood and development, and it is part of a nation's dignity. In a very imperfect and uncertain world it is necessary to be prepared to repel force by force, and at times to support by the *ultima ratio* a good cause that is endangered. No one has more sternly insisted

on the duty of a State to be strong than have Plato and Fichte, two of the greatest idealists of the world.

Now, of course, all the question of armaments and military service is a very special and difficult question, and I have not the least intention of entering upon it in detail. All I say is this : you have to distinguish between the demands of manhood, with national dignity and security, and the lust of military predominance and interference.

And the way to be sure of keeping straight is to cherish a patriotism which really and sincerely desires for your country the best things in life, and others only as a means to them. Because then we shall ask ourselves in every doubtful decision, "Is this that is proposed really necessary for the promotion of the best life by means of my country and her dependencies?" Or is it an outcome of jealousy and selfishness and the desire to play a conspicuous military part? Of course, the problems will always be difficult and complicated. But if we approach them, and instruct our experts to approach them, in that spirit, we shall at least always keep our heads, and the main lines of our policy will be sane and not aggressive, though the nation will be formidable to aggressors.

It would perhaps border too closely on politics if I were to discuss in the same light the conditions of national wealth. But perhaps I may fairly suggest that there is a heavy presumption against any patriotism which holds the prosperity of one country to be a disadvantage to another. Only a real devotion to the values of which I have spoken can keep our judgment straight in this respect. The reason is, that it puts us in the attitude of welcoming the co-operation and even the competition of other nations in the sphere of truth and beauty and social im-

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provement; and having adopted this attitude in respect of the things which we value most highly, we are not disposed to be jealous and suspicious about other kinds of success. We believe that as a principle it is sound to say that civilised nations at least are contributors to a common good, and their success is our success.

5. We may go on to apply these ideas to the connection between patriotism and our duty to humanity.

We know that patriotism and humanitarianism are apt to be thought antagonistic. And the reason of this is interesting. For the fact is, humanitarianism is not a very distinct idea. It has two sources which are not in agreement.

Firstly, humanity as a fact, the existence of mankind, is no doubt a much wider fact than our country, and commands our attention and our good will. But then, as a mere fact, it gives us little or no guidance and tells us little or nothing of what is desirable to be done. The best for all these people, certainly; but what is the best? This is a perplexity, for, secondly, humanity as a *quality*, either as = culture or as = a sensitiveness to the claims of mankind, is a very rare quality, and least of all common to all the human race. A great proportion of the human race lead lives which give us no guidance as to what is desirable for mankind. We cannot get any common purpose out of them, and say "this is the humanity we have to realise."

So one notices perhaps something weak-kneed in humanitarianism. It wants to set up against patriotism the common good of mankind. But there is not very much that it can set up on this basis. For the fact is, that the *quality* of humanity—whether culture or humaneness—is rather to be discovered in the life

of the great civilised nations, with all their faults, than in what is common to the life of all men.

No doubt you may have a horrible exploiting patriotism which is in conflict with the few simple things which we can say about our duty to mankind as such ; I mean common honesty and kindness and justice. Then no doubt the humanitarian is right.

But I think he soon comes to the end of what he has to say, for after all our ideal of man is not taken from the mass of mankind.

So we are brought back to this. *Practically*, if we belong to one of the great civilised nations, our highest sense of humanity is drawn from our own national culture and kindness, only tempered by a respect and sense of justice for the masses of mankind. Thus in our best humanitarianism we do not really discover a duty to mankind that is beyond, much less in conflict with, our patriotism. Our nation, after all, remains our instrument for doing service to humanity and our main source of the ideal of humanity itself. We may be ready to learn, of course, from the other civilised nations, and also to gather hints from the backward races themselves. The noble savage is not altogether a fiction. But in the main our duty to mankind will be dictated by that sort of patriotism which values above all things kindness, truth, and beauty, and this cannot be in conflict with whatever services are possible to actual mankind. Only we cannot say that in serving actual mankind in the mass as it exists we are devoting ourselves *ipso facto* to the highest humanity we know. Therefore it is our nation which is our clue and ideal, even in the service of man, and therefore again it is doubly important here that our patriotism should be of the purest kind. Nothing else will save us from turning

our humanitarianism into exploitation. As an African chief said, "First the missionary, then the trader, then the gunboat, and then—*oh Lord!*"

So then a true patriotism is in the first place a daily and sober loyalty, which recognises the root of our moral being in the citizen spirit and citizen duty ; and in the second place is a love for our country as an instrument and embodiment of truth, beauty, and kindness, or, in the largest and profoundest sense of the word, of religion. And this, I say, is the most practical of ideals. The dominant question in all practice is, What is worth having and at what price ? And no one can answer this rightly unless his mind is occupied by a sound and clear conception of what is really best. I am positively convinced that it is a mistake to suppose such a habit of mind to be unpractical in commerce and industry. On the contrary, it is the basis of disinterested judgment and the antidote to fanaticism and partisan bias and blind self-deception, all of which moods are disastrous in great affairs. What millions of money and oceans of inefficiency a true love of health and beauty in our towns might have saved us—yes, and in the country too ! Yet if we had cared more for truth and knowledge we should have had all these ideas about kindness and beauty. They all come from the Greeks. I give you a single sentence, an expansion of Aristotle, by one of his disciples of his own day, which contains the whole doctrine in a nutshell. "So whatever choice or distribution of worldly resources, whether of bodily qualities or of wealth or of friends or of other goods, will be most helpful toward the contemplation of God ; that is the best and that is the most beautiful standard of organisation ; and whatever arrangement, whether by defect or by excess, hinders men from

glorifying God and enjoying Him, that arrangement is bad."

6. One word of suggestion as to our own condition in respect of those matters to which true patriotism is devoted. What grounds has our patriotism for hope? What is the explanation of our frequent pessimism about ourselves, and the disparagement which we acquiesce in on the part of foreigners? I was a few days ago in the company of several men, students of great distinction, one of them a very learned foreigner who knows England well. The conversation turned upon culture, and two things struck me as interesting apart, and as forming a most significant combination.

It seemed to be the European opinion, and to be pretty well admitted by the English, that English culture is defective, and more especially—and this you may see any day in our own newspapers and in the most friendly and sympathetic Continental literature—that the English mind is fundamentally lacking in *logical* capacity.

That was one thing, and the other thing was that politics and culture had no intrinsic connection.<sup>1</sup> That appears to be the Continental view, and admitted on the whole at least by the English specialists.

Now what struck me at once was this, that this disconnection of important spheres was in the first place extraordinarily unfavourable to a reasonable estimate of the British mind and attitude, and in the next place was in itself, at bottom, a gross piece of Philistinism, and absolutely opposed to the funda-

<sup>1</sup> This seems opposed to what we have heard so much of lately, the State-drill aspect of "Kultur." But when I was talking of politics, I was referring to the study and practice of "self-government," and what struck me was that between this and the liberal arts no connection was seen by the scholars in question.

mental notions of culture, as we draw them, say, from the Greeks. The disconnection of things is in itself a Philistine and pessimistic doctrine. No doubt *de minimis non curat lex*, and we may applaud a successful specialism up to a certain point. We all think it rather fun, and perhaps sound in a limited sense, when some one sings—

Il y a dans la nature, il y a de belles choses,  
De rossignols oisifs, de paresseuses roses,  
De poètes rêveurs, et de musiciens,  
Qui s'inquiètent peu d'être bons citoyens.

But if you press it home, it is—is it not?—the depth of prose and Philistinism. Read it beside Homer or Dante or Milton, and it becomes either a pretty little joke or a poisonous fallacy.

But it is this untrue doctrine which is largely responsible for the unfavourable estimate of the English mind. Our unquestioned achievements are, I suppose, in two directions : in poetry and in politics ; and what we primarily care about are poetry, politics, and religion where the two come together. When people deny logical capacity to the English mind I always take a distinction. I say, Yes, distaste amounting to incapacity for formal logic, if you please.<sup>1</sup> Leave that to others. But for concrete logic, the creative spirit of things, what is really the common basis of politics and poetry, I am convinced there is not, and never has been, a national mind more highly endowed than the English. I point to the great organised institutions which have sprung unaided from the brain of our wage-earning class. I ask if the civilised world can show a practical logic

<sup>1</sup> This is a concession for the sake of argument. I suppose Mr. Bertrand Russell and his friends hold their own to-day with any formal logicians in the world.

to match them. In a word, then, our patriotism may rightly claim, I am convinced, an unequalled capacity for the higher logic and for the higher culture, as rooted, after the manner of the Greeks, in the genius of organisation and a connected view and feeling of the world.

But this is not all ; and it is true, I think, that there is something wrong. We have been too comfortable, too self-satisfied. Our culture is not worthy of our capacity. We have not been thrown back upon our bare faith in spiritual things, such as Fichte gives utterance to, as the sole condition of survival. We pay in lack of mobility for our tranquillity and security. We have not, at least the middle class has not, understood and believed in education. Our old reputation in arms and in wealth has stood in our way and given an isolated and selfish aspect to our patriotism which really misrepresents it. It has been difficult for us to realise that " one good custom may corrupt the world," and that to develop our capacities we must study in more schools than one.

So then a true and pure patriotism is what above all things we need, and there is no race that has for it a greater capacity. But it is not to be got without pains and labour.

## II

### ATOMISM IN HISTORY<sup>1</sup>

1. I SUPPOSE that the interest which brings us together in this room, and which animates the work of the School whose session we are opening, may be described in the widest sense as a sociological interest. To what methods, to what general course of ideas, we are pledged by this description of our interest is a further question, which I propose this evening—certainly not to determine, hardly even to discuss, but, perhaps, to illustrate.

Many of us are aware that within the great University of Paris, and echoing throughout the whole system of primary, secondary, and superior education in France, a controversy is proceeding in which sociology figures on the one side as the hero of reform, on the other as the incubus and evil genius of true national culture. Many problems, almost all problems, affecting the deeper aspects of learning and education are at issue in this dispute. To all of these we have, I think, in England analogous problems to-day; none, perhaps, exactly the same. It would therefore not be becoming in me, nor indeed at all within my competence, to take sides sharply in internal con-

<sup>1</sup> An address delivered to the London School of Sociology and Social Economics, 1911.

troversies affecting the details of the educational system, examinations, diplomas, degrees, as organised by our great neighbour. My effort will be, while here and there not concealing my sympathies, rather to indicate and touch the nerve of certain questions of method and ideal which must and do raise themselves also for us in shapes determined by our own development.

The issue is one of historical, philosophical, and educational method and ideal. We will try to describe and understand it in order to draw suggestion from it ; not to take sides on the whole.

2. I will state as the point of departure the difficult question, which must have occurred in the simplest form to all those of us whose education took place a long time ago, What is history ? Perhaps it took what is now stigmatised as the childish shape, " Is history a science or an art ? " We must all of us have observed—I owe the observation to my old teacher, W. L. Newman, of Balliol—that the professional or literary historian, the man who writes a narrative of the remote past, is in a peculiar position. He is soon superseded ; for touching but a few points in a vast fabric of life, he soon has to yield to deeper and more complex researches. Now our first resource perhaps is to prefer to him the contemporary historian, who in a sense can never be superseded, being himself a document, a part of all that he has met. A narrative of the remote past is to the work of the contemporary writer—it was Mr. Newman's remark to me—" as moonlight unto sunlight, and as water unto wine." Thucydides, Clarendon, the *Mémoires de Retz*, can never cease to be read, when Grote and Macaulay, and even their better-furnished successors, have met the champion who is to overthrow them. " It's

pretty much our myth, isn't it ? " a very competent friend once said to me, of the most recent English history. It expresses, that is, the view of the past which interests and fascinates us at the moment. It has points of kinship with the glorious lie which Plato desired to have taught to the citizens of his Republic.

What does the narrative historian really give you ? I can furnish no short answer.<sup>1</sup> A suggestion which attracted me for a time was that he brings to your notice in an orderly way a number of documents and achievements of intense human interest, the connection and interpretation of which must always be in some degree doubtful, but in each of which, as a whole, the spirit of humanity speaks to your spirit.

And I still think there is something in this view. But of course it is obvious that the contemporary narrative is in a thousand ways undermined and "pulverised" (to use a term which will recur) by later knowledge. Till the historical day of judgment, when the archives of nations shall be opened, the truth will not be known of the astonishing events which are happening to-day.

3. So then we come to a further stage. *Is* there at all such a thing as history ? Or is it destined to be absorbed into science, and to consist on the one hand in formulæ of evolution, on the other hand in social and economic detail embodied in enormous manuals, rather of the type of encyclopædias than of narratives, and also, of course, in collections of documents like the great Corpora of Inscriptions ? I imagine that the manual and the Corpus have come to stay ; and that for narrative history the co-operative work will play a great part in the future. The narrative is, I

<sup>1</sup> See, e.g., Mr. Bradley's *Presuppositions of Critical History*.

think, to some extent threatened. It is becoming more and more purely provisional.

With this shape of the problem, viz. "Can there be history?" including the former "What is history?" we enter upon our immediate theme.

4. In 1898 there appeared in an English translation, with a preface by Professor York Powell, the *Introduction to the Study of History*, by MM. Langlois and Seignobos, both of them Professors in the Faculty of Letters at the Sorbonne, the leading institution of the University of Paris, possessing by tradition a lofty rank as the exponent of French culture, and also, as I understand, decisive powers in the preparation and selection of the *personnel* of the secondary education of France.

This book, by a chance which stands me in good stead to-day, it fell to me to review. And I remember well the conflicting impressions which the treatise left upon my mind. I saw, of course, that I was confronted with a breadth and depth of learning, not merely to which I had myself no claim, but such as I had scarcely been aware of before as existing in the world of letters. The book, known no doubt to most of my hearers, is in the main an explanation of the processes introductory to the composition of history—the processes of ascertaining the existence and the contents of documents, and when that is ascertained, the process of criticism by which the true metal of historic fact is to be separated from the errors, the bias and other defective elements due to the compilers of documents. To these several processes are assigned special titles, *e.g.* Heuristic, and special provinces of work, and they present themselves as severally of enormous magnitude. There is also a treatment of the construction of history from the

results of documents so prepared. I will venture to cite a few sentences from my notice of this work written at the time, 1898, and therefore unbiassed by the more recent controversy to which I shall later draw your attention :

“The first two books deal with the discovery of documents and with the analytic operations of external and internal criticism by which an aggregate of trustworthy facts is elicited from the statements of authors. In this discussion there is embodied much valuable detail with reference to the accessibility of documents as they now exist, and the means which are being taken, and which should be taken, to improve it. The problem of division of labour as between the critical scholar and the constructive historian also presents itself; and what is said on this subject should be carefully weighed by students who are choosing their life-work. It is shrewdly pointed out how the intending historian may find himself fixed for life to the work of preliminary criticism, if he has not chosen his subject with due reference to the state of the documents. When the statements of authors have been criticised and interpreted, and reduced by this analysis to a ‘powder of facts’—it is the writers’ own metaphor—there begins the work of re-moulding this powder into coherent knowledge. . . . The account of the constructive process, which forms the third book, is more theoretical than the first two books, and although full of suggestion, may seem to the English reader not altogether convincing. It is perhaps incidental to every detailed work on method that the different parts of what ought to be a unity appear to be divorced from one another by too long an interval. Here, for instance, the arch-historian, to whom the final construction of

the fabric is to be entrusted, may seem to be too far from his documents. The proposed method has something of the same unreal air which clings to Bacon's Theory of Induction. We can follow M. Langlois' contention that history cannot be written from documents which the historian has to put into a condition in which they can be used ; but M. Seignobos' more extreme version of this principle, when he says that ' historical work cannot be done with documents,' challenges the observation that, after all, an historian ought surely to live with the actual relics of the life which he desires to reproduce. The valuable warnings which the authors have given to the interpreters of documents seem to us to become mere mechanism if dissociated from a devoted personal study of the documents themselves. There is, for example, a footnote about Demosthenes and Aristophanes which sounds to us, we must confess, a little external and uncritical. The question of personal study becomes still more urgent when we ask ourselves, ' What is a document ? ' Our authors do not ignore the study of civilisation in other sources than books and papers, but the impression left upon the reader's mind is, as it seems to us, that ' writing on paper ' is the only kind of serious historical document, and that this is valuable to history solely for the ' facts ' which can be elicited from it. There is something beneath this way of looking at the matter which is connected with the writers' obviously hostile attitude to the connection of history with ' meta-physical hypotheses ' such as the notion of the spirit of a people, and we wonder a little how their analysis would deal with such a document as the Parthenon. Like them, but still more strongly, Mr. York Powell reveals the desire to identify history with a branch of

science. M. Seignobos is well aware of the rocks ahead on this course, since he clearly sees that science can deal only with generalities, and he points out the difficulties which arise from the hybrid nature of history as partly science and partly narrative. But yet the reader cannot dismiss from his mind the question whether history, as here understood, will not be better realised by manuals which deal in encyclopædic fashion with the various sides of life, than by connected narratives such as tell the story of a nation. And it is not wholly reassuring to learn that 'histories still have a reason for existence even after the multiplication of methodical manuals.' We suspect that a fundamental problem as to the precise delimitation of 'history' will soon be raised by the 'scientific' line which our authors are adopting."

Perhaps I ought to confess that the Appendices, describing the change then recently effected in the French method of historical education, in the sense of the authors' view, led me to remark that we here see a true historical education at work. I am inclined to-day to think that that piece of courtesy may have been rash.

5. The peculiar characteristics of this treatise, apart from the great mass of valuable warning which it certainly contains, lie, then, in three kindred doctrines with their corollaries :

i. The doctrine of the pulverisation of documents into facts, with its corollaries of an immense mechanical subdivision of labour, and with the great importance attached to the method of "slips," "fiches," the bits of card or paper on which you note the facts or references which are the dust to which you reduce your documents. It is a very natural and necessary method—I remember using it in 1868 to get up my

Herodotus for Greats, by W. L. Newman's advice. But, of course, it risks the loss of context, and I have known the suggestion made in an English controversy that some of the slips must have fallen under the table.

Let me give an instance on each side—one of the bathos which accompanies these methodic regulations, another of the important bearing which may attach to the most apparently trivial researches. The first is a footnote in this book which the later controversialists do not allow to be forgotten. The point is that pictorial monuments are not always literal representations. "Mediæval miniatures show us persons lying in bed with crowns on their heads; this is to symbolise their royal rank; the painter did not mean that they wore their crowns to sleep in" (p. 151). A platitude like this argues ill for the critical spirit.

The second case is not from this book, but from a memoir of Leopold Delisle—I reproduce it from memory. The leaden seals of the Popes' bulls have a circle of dots round the margin, and, on the effigies of Peter and Paul which form the device, the beard of Peter is also represented by dots. To count these dots, how futile! one might say. But it seems that for each Pope the number of these dots is fixed, and constitutes a precaution against forgery; in one case, seventy-three dots in all, twenty-eight in Peter's beard, is the right number. A bull whose seal has the wrong number is forged. This brings you across very important matters; the danger of forgery of such documents, and the care used in the Papal chancelleries to avert it. I have no doubt at all that the knowledge of facts obtained by the minute subdivision of labour which the authors inculcate is something relatively new and very marvellous,

and may have on any point the most important bearings.

ii. A strong individualistic animus, I was about to say, but it really is rather an atomic animus; for the individual as the author of ideas and interpreter of phenomena, as the bearer of mind, is rather what it slurs over. It is a doctrine reconcilable with belief in collective action, though not with belief in the mind or soul of a people. It is really a doctrine of the hard fact. Your bedrock is the particular hard fact, and the individual or group *qua* hard fact. The genius of a race or nation, for instance, is entirely denied to exist (p. 290). Professor York Powell does not go so far.

iii. The equivocal verdict as to whether there can be history, depending on the failure to distinguish clearly between history and science, and also on the extreme uncertainty revealed in the region of historical evidence. Narrative history, the suggestion is, is the story of events which happen only once and which greatly affect evolution, while Science deals with laws and causes and general facts. I am inclined to think that you got a better distinction by considering History as the treatment of what has human interest, while Science deals with nature abstracted from man. Then you would have to admit an element of philosophy in dealing with those human interests which are not mere events—which by the other division would fall to Science.

This book then represents for us what Carlyle would have called the victorious analysis of 1898, with a revolution in the same sense which has since been further pursued in the highest educational and cultural centre of France. From the authors' own account, together with the more recent controversy,

one gathers that what happened amounted to this. A diploma called a *Diplôme d'Études Supérieures*, involving a thesis on the new method, had recently been made a *sine qua non* of the *agrégation*—the examination which admits to the highest posts in the whole of the secondary education, and is held and prepared for under the supervision of the Faculty of Letters at the Sorbonne. This amounts to the adoption by the Sorbonne of the methods, valuable in mediæval research, so famous in the practice of the *École des Chartes*. Since that time, a policy has also been pursued of diminishing the importance of classical training, which means in this context not only the study of Greek and Latin, but of the great French writers themselves, both in the *baccalauréat* or school-leaving examination, and in the *agrégation* itself. Even the Dissertation for the Doctorate, as I understand, is affected by the same tendency.

6. Now we come to the rebellion.

Like many English readers, I only became aware this spring, through a notice in the *Morning Post*, of the volume to which I now have to refer. It is called *L'Esprit de la nouvelle Sorbonne*, and consists primarily of a number of very able articles which appeared in *L'Opinion* from July to December 1910, over the signature "Agathon," a *nom de plume* whose bearer claims to represent the feelings and opinions of the *élite* among the students of the University of Paris. The campaign had a great success ; it elicited support from many distinguished personalities, notably, for instance, from M. Boutroux, a very well-known philosopher, himself formerly one of the most eminent Professors of the Faculty of Letters. It also had the success of drawing more or less direct and full-dress rejoinders from M. Croiset, the *doyen* of the Faculty

of Letters, and from other leading members of the Sorbonne. All these *pièces* are included in the volume, and many questions of the first importance are treated either directly or by the way.

I wish, as I said, not to take sides, yet not to conceal my sympathies; but mainly to indicate the ground and nature of the questions at issue.

For the purpose of this controversy the Sorbonne means, I take it, the Faculty of Letters of the University of Paris, housed in the Sorbonne building, and reinforced in its present tendencies by the École des Chartes, which, I believe, all scholars admire for its special work, and other institutions now housed in the same buildings.

It is contended in the main, to put the gist of the matter brutally, that the influence of M. Durkheim, his sociology, and the pedagogic on which he now lectures, reinforcing and reinforced by the mechanical and pseudo-scientific view of historical procedure, has, in the Faculty of Letters, banished philosophy, is strangling literary culture, and is embarrassing historical study itself. The matter is put in this way; but so far as it is a question of personal influence, it is not one on which I can offer any opinion. I have a high esteem for M. Durkheim, and believe myself to have learned a great deal from him. And if it is true that he carries all before him, that is what a strong and enthusiastic man is likely to do, unless and until a stronger than he shall come upon him. I should be disposed, however, to think it possible that a somewhat dogmatic tone may, as is alleged, accompany the particular type of opinion of which we now have to speak.

The contentions of "Agathon" are expounded under three main heads—the Sorbonne against

classical culture ; the Sorbonne against philosophy ; the Sorbonne against secondary education.

The allegation is substantially the same in all three cases : that alike in the teaching, and in the approval of dissertations, pseudo-science pursuing a mechanical routine and ideal is allying itself with a pseudo-democratic spirit, which aims at a culture accessible to all minds, by levelling down and not by levelling up.

A very noticeable proportion of "Agathon's" satire is directed against the abuse of the method of slips, which Anatole France has already pilloried. It is connected with the immense scope and importance assigned by the victorious method to researches which are properly preliminary, such as bibliography in literature and in history, and in philosophy to the victory of historical erudition over philosophical exposition and interpretation.

\* P. 38.—"Every research begins with a collection of slips, and they esteem you at the Sorbonne according to the number of your slips. He is a great savant, worthy of your respect, who has before him thousands of these coloured bits of pasteboard, the infinitesimal dust of knowledge" (note the reference to M. Seignobos' idea of pulverisation). "For the 'Diplôme d'Études Supérieures,' the preparation for which occupies a whole year, the candidate employs over six months in putting down the bibliography of the subjects on slips. In forcing a task so essentially passive on youthful minds, is there not the risk of choking for ever their individuality and their intelligence?" Form, it is complained, is becoming a thing of the past. The candidate simply "tumbles his box of slips into his book."

The false analogy with natural science is perhaps

active here. Here, it is said, you have real work, production, not exercises of translation or exposition. "Agathon" joins issue. It is not really analogous to the work of discovery and experiment in natural science. They *call* it practical work, they call the room where it is done a laboratory, they speak of "cleaning your instruments" when they mean using reliable texts. But this accumulation and copying of minute facts and references is really an indolent and depressing occupation; and being made a substitute for the reading and interpretation, the translation or criticism of great authors in literature, for the exercise of judgment and insight in history, for thought and appreciation in philosophy, is really a substitution of deadening mechanical labour for the true toil and expression of the intelligence. The results are said to be causing great uneasiness; style, quality of thought, precision of expression, are said to be falling off among the candidates, and it is being widely alleged that French, real French, is ceasing to be written.

I think the whole question of the thesis and original work at an early stage of education needs careful consideration.

The *raison d'être* is not the same in our sciences as in natural knowledge. There you are dealing with the material world itself, and you have every chance of doing something fresh by simple methods. Our world, that of human life, is more difficult of access. You are not dealing with it by these methods, and I believe that, as Ruskin said of art, a long discipline under exponents of the great masters is necessary to secure your effective entrance into the world of mind. I think the dissertation should come pretty late in social and philosophical training. One must

remember, to have published a thesis is to have acquired a past, and to have acquired a past is apt to be an encumbrance for the future. That is one of the questions of principle which this controversy illustrates by the way.

7. I return to the main point. Here is "Agathon's" summary of the state of things which the revolution of method has produced in the Faculty of Letters. "There is no longer a single course that is strictly philosophical. There is nothing but specialities. . . . In the least important Lyceum of Paris or even of the provinces, philosophy is more efficiently taught, is assigned a higher rank, than in the Faculty of Letters. How is the teaching staff occupied? M. Durkheim, a narrow sociologist, contemptuous adversary of all philosophy, is preaching a sort of social catechism; M. Lévy Bruhl is studying savages; M. Georges Dumas the insane, and so on. . . . Psycho-physiology, methodology, history of doctrine, such are the branches into which the old philosophy, no longer living, is broken up. . . . If a common spirit unites them, it is just the abhorrence of all philosophy. Since the death of Brochard, Rauh, and Hamelin, and the retirement of Boutroux, there is no longer a philosopher in the Faculty of Letters." "M. Bergson," a footnote adds, "has twice been rejected as a candidate at the Sorbonne."

It appears (p. 96) that this state of things is in substance admitted by the spokesmen of the Sorbonne, and hopes are held out of some amendment.

The views of M. Durkheim's book, *De la Division du Travail Social*, are impeached in this context, with reference to his morality of specialisation, and his attacks upon the ideal of a general humane culture and goodness. His view goes so far as to suggest

that a new morality has to be founded on the ideal of the division of labour, but this view seems to his critics antagonistic to the conception of human culture, especially to the French tradition of great and lucid ideas, and to any complete ideal of human excellence. Here we must be careful. Those of us whose philosophy has been formed in sympathy with Green's *Prolegomena* or with Bradley's *Ethical Studies* will not be ready hastily to condemn a morality of my *Station and its Duties*, any more than, on the other hand, to admit the point of view from which it claims to be a new and revolutionary conception. But we should so far perhaps sympathise with M. Durkheim's critics as to say that what is required to give a vision of the social soul and spirit as realised in my *Station and its Duties*—the universal in the individual—is either a sound philosophy or a solid common sense. The student of great masters has the one; the plain man has the other; the man who is obsessed in sociology by the ideal and method of natural science in the wrong place—is it possible that he has neither? I certainly think that there is a great truth in the idea of collective production and creation even in the world of mind and of art, as you find it represented, for example, in Professor Murray's *Rise of the Greek Epic*. And the idea that a recognition of the general mind involves social despotism, an idea which bulks largely in the criticism to which I refer, seems in principle unjustified. But if it is not the collective mind, but the collective hard fact—*e.g.* the density of population—which is alleged as a cause, then perhaps the critic has a good deal of right on his side. "The teaching of ethics," M. Durkheim is reported to have said (November 1898), "is a lacuna in our instruction. I propose to fill it up.

Let us set to work, and in three years we shall have an ethics (*une morale*)" (*L'Esprit*, p. 101). It is in essence, I suppose, the old idea of a natural history of Ethics.

One more set of problems must be referred to. It is what "Agathon" summarises under the head of "The Sorbonne against Secondary Education." It is in essence, as I said by anticipation, the question of levelling down against levelling up, and the particular points at issue are the position of Greek, Latin, and literary French in the various examinations and diplomas which lead up to the profession of secondary teaching. It is in part the problem of classical studies, too familiar to ourselves; but it is to be noted that throughout, under the head of classics, there is included, as I understand, the study of the masters of French literature and the practice of French composition. The term *crise du français*—the peril of the French language—is freely used in the discussion, and it seems to be admitted on both sides that the great tradition of beauty and lucidity in French writing is gravely endangered to-day; though how far this danger is due to educational "reform" is a matter in dispute.

8. The connection of this great question with our previous subject lies in the alleged prejudice which brings a mechanical pseudo-science to the support of a levelling pseudo-democracy, and, so the critics allege, under the disguise of opening the higher education to the people, is destroying the essentials of this higher education itself. The standard of primary education is invading the secondary—that is the gist of the complaint. Of course we have the problem here both in the old question of Greek and Latin studies and in such special controversies as that

raised by the Holmes circular. But as I said at the beginning, they are far too vast for treatment in a passing reference. I will, however, make mention, for its independent interest, of one very remarkable piece of evidence, a parallel to which we have known in England in some remarks of the Master of Trinity, Cambridge, on the English work of scientific candidates, I think, for matriculation.

The evidence I refer to is nothing less than a deprecation of a change introduced by Governmental order in the standard of secondary education, which removed an advantage previously given in the admission to the Polytechnic School to students who held a certificate for Latin in the *baccalaureate* (leaving-certificate). This deprecation emanates from no less and no other a personage than the President of the Comité des Forges—the Representative Committee of the Ironworks of France. As to the change having been initiated by Ministerial order, it is alleged all through the controversy that along with pseudo-science and pseudo-democracy you have pseudo-politics introduced into educational questions. I really think I will read the whole letter, addressed by M. Guillaïn to the Minister of Education.

MONSIEUR LE MINISTRE,—A certain number of those whom we represent having drawn our attention to the disadvantages attending the suppression of the superiority in marks, hitherto conceded to candidates for the *École Polytechnique* who possessed the certificate for the first portion of the *baccalauréat* with distinction for knowledge of Latin; the Administrative Commission of the Committee of Ironworks of France placed upon its agenda an inquiry into the training received at the present moment by our young engineers, both in the leading schools and during their time spent at the University.

It is, in fulfilment of the mandate which has been imposed upon us that we proceed, M. le Ministre, to express to you the serious anxieties for the future of industry which are aroused in us by the continuously progressive enfeeblement of general culture among our young assistants.

Although those who have the honour to be to-day the leaders of French industry, and who therefore have to play an important part in the charge of the present and the future of our country, are not called upon to participate in the elaboration of university programmes, and are obliged to accept their assistants and successors such as the University has trained them, they consider, nevertheless, M. le Ministre, that they are fulfilling their duty in designating to you the disadvantages and the defects which the working of these programmes has displayed in practice.

We cannot too strongly invite your benevolent attention to the extreme importance of secondary education from the point of view of the culture of our great scientific colleagues. The instruction which is imparted in our great scientific or technical schools, in the Polytechnic School, in the Schools of Mines and of Roads and Bridges, in the Central School of Arts and Manufactures, can only operate on the foundation which it finds; if it is purely technical, it cannot impart general culture, and is obstructed even in its special object by the insufficient preparation of its students; if it consists in general scientific culture, it is unable to initiate into this culture minds which have not been trained or which have been hurriedly specialised.

Now the chiefs of all our great industries pronounce, at the present moment, that from whatever school they emerge—Polytechnic School, Higher School of Mines, School of Roads and Bridges, Central School of Arts and Manufactures—our young engineers are for the most part incapable of utilising to good advantage the technical

knowledge they have received, because of their inability to present their ideas in reports which are clear, well composed, and expressed in such a manner that a reader can grasp precisely the results of their researches or the conclusions to which their observations have led them.

This incapacity has not merely the effect of diminishing the value and the serviceableness of our assistants; it has, moreover, the great disadvantage of remarkably diminishing the number of men whom the breadth and precision of their intelligence, the depth and justice of their judgment, mark out for the management of great businesses, for the creation of new ones, and for the task of maintaining France in that leading position in the progress of the industrial arts and sciences, which, in spite of her weakness in natural resources, her lucid genius has hitherto secured her.

It appears to us, M. le Ministre, that this enfeeblement of the general culture of our youth must have its cause, not merely in the various reforms of secondary instruction which we have seen taking place within a certain number of years, and which have found their complete expression in the programme of 1902, but still more in the spirit which is carrying with it the whole of university education, and which, with the view of increasing the number of branches of knowledge accessible to our youth, is more and more releasing them from the irksome but fruitful discipline of personal effort. At the present moment, while modern education is failing to furnish us with what it promised, young people well armed for life, with full command of the ordinary sciences and of foreign languages, what survives of classical instruction is no more successful in securing to the great schools, which have the task of training the future captains of national industry, students with the ample and vigorous culture essential to receiving with advantage the higher instruction which they afford.

Consequently, M. le Ministre, we venture to invite your most serious attention to the necessity of recasting

the programmes of secondary education, and to the danger of all measures, such as that which has occasioned this letter, which may tend, by unjustified equivalences of standard, to withdraw from secondary classical education the preponderating part which it ought to play in the training of the youths who are destined to recruit our great technical schools.

(Signed) THE PRESIDENT OF THE COMMITTEE OF  
THE IRONWORKS OF FRANCE.

9. Of course, throughout the controversy we can see, and there is explicitly admitted, a certain reaction against the methods of German scholarship and research, accompanied, however, by a recognition that an analogous reaction in favour of style, lucidity, power of expression, is taking place in the German universities themselves. Naturally, the French ideal, which noticeably admits that its genius is rather readily embarrassed by any extreme weight of learning, may not obtain from us quite the absolute homage which it commands at home. Still, the whole controversy, concerning as it does the intellectual and practical life of a leading civilised nation from top to bottom is, I think, of the highest suggestiveness. For our part, in the immediate matter which brings us together to-day, there are one or two points at which it touches us.

In History I do not much doubt that co-operative narrative, directed so far as may be to the main connection of events which seem to have determined evolution, will play a greater and greater part, accompanied by the manual and the Corpus. But we will not, I think, admit a mere pulverisation of great writings into a diamond dust of facts—or rather, we will observe the great works and the actual spirit of *de facto* peoples as leading achievements of humanity,

whatever the anthropologist—and we will listen to him attentively—may tell us about the realities of race. And we shall not forget, I hope, that history, after all, like other intellectual constructions, must depend on the quality of the historian's mind.

And in Sociology we shall not, I presume, adopt the methods which embody the prejudice that natural science is the model of research. We shall realise that mind is nearer to mind—an acute remark made in the present controversy—mind is nearer to mind than to matter, and in copying the methods of science we are abandoning the advantage of our object of study being not matter but humanity. We shall not, I hope, be doctrinaire philosophers, but we shall remain familiar with the world's leading ideas and retain our freedom to employ those which we find illuminating.

And last and best of all ; it was, in a word, the want of context, of a pervading life, that we saw reason to dread and to deplore. From this, I think, our studies are finally and absolutely preserved so long as we remain faithful to our tradition of what is in the full sense a practical training—work and invention vitalised by its direct bearing on humanity and not copied from a mechanical routine. I take it that the spirit of our practical method is essentially a spirit of context ; you cannot deal with human life by slips which may fall under the table. Ours, I think, is vital work, and in vital work and free ideas we shall find the safeguard of our teaching.

### III

#### IS COMPENSATION NECESSARY TO OPTIMISM ? <sup>1</sup>

1. OPTIMISM and pessimism are current names for opposite attitudes to life, and we are apt to think of these attitudes as matters of temperament and circumstance, as just tendencies and occasions to look upon the bright and upon the dark side of things respectively. And no doubt this is in a measure true. There are such moods and temperaments, and health has a good deal to do with them, and success and worldly prosperity also play a part. But if I believed that optimism and pessimism meant this and nothing more—a rose-coloured or sombre view of life depending upon mood and circumstance—I should not venture to stand up before you for an hour in order to express what would then be just my fancies—whether sick fancies or healthy. Such arguments are always more or less like those of Tartarin of Tarascon, clinging to the side of a crevasse, and roped to a disciple of Schopenhauer, who has just expressed the view that it would be a fine opportunity to be done with life, by letting go and pulling the whole party down. Tartarin appeals to him “L’existence

<sup>1</sup> Inaugural address to King’s College for Women, October 11, 1912.

a du bon, que diantre ! à votre âge, un beau garçon comme vous." That is optimism in fear of its life. It is a clever old joke that whether life is worth living depends upon the liver ; but only one of its meanings is true, and that very imperfectly so. It depends on the man who lives, whether he lives worthily, but not whether life is worth living.

I said that success and worldly prosperity have something to do with these attitudes. But certainly they have not everything to do with them. And this truth, universally recognised, begins to take us a little deeper into our subject. The facts do not bear out our first commonplace idea, that optimism and pessimism are just moods induced by health and ill-health, by success and failure respectively. Think of Wordsworth and the lesson he learned from the leech-gatherer on the lonely moor. There is a deeper secret underlying facts like these. There is a real difficulty in what we might call the interpretation of life. Its values seem not to reveal themselves quite simply. The "pros" and "cons" and their sources do not range themselves as we might have expected. Both for instinct and for reflection there is a good deal of perplexity. We not only get opposite judgments about the worth of life, but we get judgments on the same side which show very different degrees of appreciation. We often have to sympathise with our opponent more than with our partisan.

If we could even begin to trace the source of this paradox, it would well repay an hour's consideration. For superficial answers are not without danger, especially in social work and problems, which I suppose interest all of us ; it is all-important to have our heads in the right direction on these matters. It makes a difference, I am convinced, to every detail

of our everyday effort, to the spirit of our endeavour, to our sense of value, and therefore to our dominant aims.

In truth, the facts themselves, the facts of the value of life, are paradoxical—that is, they are two-sided; and to hold the two sides together, to accept the paradox and work it out, is essential for sanity of judgment.

I will outline at once in two or three words the conclusion I mean to suggest. I believe, then, in optimism. But I add that no optimism is worth its salt that does not go all the way with pessimism and arrive at a point beyond it. This, I am convinced, is the true spirit of life; and if any one thinks it dangerous, and an excuse for unjustifiable acquiescence in evil, I reply that all truth which has any touch of thoroughness has its danger for practice. It must be many-sided; and what is many-sided is always liable to be wrongly grasped, and is quite easy to caricature. But that is just why it seems worth while to take a little trouble to find the right way of approaching it. Great truths are great forces, and great forces are apt to be dangerous; but that is an argument not for neglecting them, but for handling them attentively and with precision. But I am leading you to expect too much, and I daresay—I almost hope—that when I have come to an end you will say, “Is *that* all?” I almost hope it, for if you can say that, why then some important things are matter of more general agreement than I had supposed.

2. The use of the superlative in the words “optimism” and “pessimism” is extraordinarily bold, and seems obviously to imply things that go beyond our knowledge. I will say a little about their history, to *explain* this use, though I do not assert that it

can be justified. It is connected, of course, with the phrase "the best of all possible worlds." I take it that the word pessimism embodies a retort provoked by this. The former phrase has become commonplace, and I suppose is generally thought a little ridiculous. In using it we think of the word "possible" as an enlarging term, an equivalent to imaginable, or "something that one could dream of." The best of all possible worlds means, then, in popular use, a world so obviously delightful and superexcellent to our simplest apprehension that our dreams and wishes could in no way go beyond it. And then we think this a ridiculous thing to say of the world as we fancy that we know it. We often meet with this impatient denial that our world can be the best possible world—the world we should like best. Now I by no means admit that this denial is right—that is, I do not think people always know what a tremendous pretension they are making when they think that their dreams and fancies can figure something better than the world as it really is. But at all events it is worth noticing what Leibniz probably meant by the words we are apt so impatiently to deny. When he said this world was "the best of all possible worlds," he did not mean chiefly that we could dream of nothing better. His word possible was a restricting, not an enlarging, epithet. I think we may put what he meant in this way. It is no use talking about a world being the best unless it is at least *possible*. And *possible* is not an idle word; it does not mean anything you can dream or fancy; it fixes a distinct condition without which no world can so much as be a claimant for reality. The condition is this: For a world to be possible, all the things in it must be such as can fit together—what Leibniz called

“compossible.” You cannot just imagine one thing or another that you would like, and say that *that* is part of a possible world. No world is *so much* as possible unless all its parts—that is, supposing it to be real, everything—are such as to belong together, no one feature excluding any other. When you have seen this condition fulfilled, so we seem to hear Leibniz saying, then you may begin to talk about what is best—what presents most perfection or satisfaction to spiritual beings. “The best of all *possible* worlds,” then, was for him not an idle phrase. This tremendous condition of possibility—the coherence, compossibility of all that is—being presupposed, then, within the universes that might fulfil it, the creative will, he thought, would surely choose the *best*. I am not saying that the view commends itself to us to-day. All I say is that the words were not used lightly. They had for their author a grave meaning, to the effect that a real system is not like a capricious fancy; things must have their consequences, and a world of our dreams would be sure to contradict itself. The extraordinary point to us is the notion of a *number* of possible universes. What is possible, I suppose we think, is a part of or depends on what is real, and not *vice versa*. Let us, then, give effect to this idea. Strike out then the possible universes which never became real. Then only one universe was ever possible, and that is the universe which is real—the universe in which we live. With this alteration the meaning of our superlative is gone; or, if you like, both superlatives, both optimism and pessimism, become true. For I suppose that if the real world is the only possible world, we may call it, if we like, at once the best world and the worst world that is possible, the best and the worst of all possible

worlds being the only possible world. And this bit of pedantry gives us two suggestions which are not valueless: that the use of the superlatives is unnecessary, as involving comparisons for which we have no material; or else that we have to find what both of them meant to express, our best and our worst, within the single universe we know.

3. Thus, giving up the idea of comparing our world as it is with something different which might have existed, we come to ask the question which interests us in a more modest form. Our superlatives, if they still mean anything, mean now something different from what they did before. We are no longer speaking of the best or worst among a number of worlds supposed possible. We are asking for a guide to the study and understanding of the world in which we live—we are asking what our attitude to it is to be. And that, after all, is what we wanted from the beginning. The comparison with other possible worlds was only a roundabout way of expressing our inquiry what the governing intention, so to speak, in our own world really was; and that is only an indirect way of asking what the nature of our own world at bottom really is. Thus, as I said, our superlatives have changed their meaning. What they mean, when we look at our difficulty in this way, is much more practical and direct. It is this: We accept the position that our ideas both of what is best and of what is worst must be drawn from the world in which we live. And we want to know, in a word, which of these we are to *believe in*. The question of optimism and pessimism now means: Are we to *believe in* the best as our guide to judgment and as typical of what we can expect, or are we to frame our views and anticipations on the type of the worst that we meet

with ? Optimism and pessimism, then, mean belief *in* the best we know and belief *in* the worst we know. Belief *in*, not belief *of*. I will return to this. Why not, it may be said, believe in just what we seem to find—that is, in a mixture of the best and worst ? Why not suppose that they just exist side by side as they seem to, like the urns beside Homer's Zeus, into which he dipped at random, scattering blessings out of the one and plagues out of the other ? Well, I mean to set aside this third alternative. I think absolutely good reasons can be given for disregarding it, but for to-day it is enough to say that it means giving up our inquiry. We are interested to know and believe something more than we can gather at first sight. But if we are told just to take things as they come—and there is no more to it than that—we are being told to give up the use of our minds, and to behave as we never do in face of any difficulty whatever of all those which confront us in life. We never believe in any ordinary case that contradictory appearances just lie side by side in the world without any possibility of in the smallest degree getting behind or understanding their inconsistency, and it is not likely we are going to believe it in this case either. We all have an attitude to the world, and we must have one. The world is not a world if we cannot. But here just a word of caution is necessary. In these great questions, in a sense, every belief is true that has ever influenced mankind, and all depends on understanding how and in what precise sense any belief is true. And so even this alternative has a good meaning if you know what you mean by it, as we shall see directly. I will state it at once in a word or two, for clearness' sake. It *is* perfectly true that we do not know what to expect of the world, if

we mean by that that we cannot foretell the particular circumstances and destinies of particular persons or of nations or of our globe. The chapter of accidents is a necessary chapter in human life. Poetic justice is not the rule of events; and a great deal of what we call justice is merely poetic justice—a gratifying but artificial scheme of retributions. It is true that you cannot explain the world by any scheme so simple as that. The sun shines on the evil and on the good. Nevertheless, it is impossible to believe that things are really disconnected, and that the “happenings” which seem to us so opposite have at bottom no coherence in their nature. There is not the least presumption in favour of first appearances. There is no branch of experience in which we accept them.

Well, then, we reject the idea of a mixed or incoherent world and return to the two first alternatives. And if we think only of them, then, as I said, the question comes to this: Are we to believe *in* the best or the worst? Belief *in*, we said just now, means more than belief *of*, or belief in the existence of. I believe a great many things and persons to be facts which and whom I do not believe *in*. To believe *in* a person or a fact or a way of thinking is in some degree to take it for your guide, to accept it as typical, to accept it as important and as likely to prevail.

Thus we seem to have brought down the problem of optimism and pessimism to a simple statement. Within our own world, the world of our own experience, what is it that we believe in? Do we believe in the best or in the worst?

But we are not yet at the end of our preliminaries. We have to recall something that we noticed quite at the beginning. We found that cheerful and

sombre views were not distributed as first appearances would have suggested. We found cheerful views with a hard life, and sombre views with an easy one. And now we know that what we are discussing is within our own experience, and not the difference between our world and others, this fact comes back upon us. We were asking, as if it was a simple question, "Which are we to believe in, the best or the worst" of what we meet with in the world? But now we see that there is a prior question. Do we know, at starting, what *is* the best and what *is* the worst among the things we meet with? All of us, I take it, modify our judgments of value as we go through life. So that, since our best and our worst are both of them within our own world, and since we all admit that first judgments and first appearances are usually wrong, our problem seems likely to be a good deal more fertile than it seemed at first. It seems not to be merely a question whether things might have been better than they are, nor yet whether what we like or what we dislike is commonest in our experience, but a question of where we are to look for our best and worst—for our values—within the varied experiences which make up our lives.

4. And this brings me to the first of the two principal points which I should like if I could to leave with you for your consideration. It is the danger of hasty answers, or, what is the same thing, of taking sides under first impressions. The root of this attitude, I am convinced, lies terribly deep. It lies in a misunderstanding of a claim which in a sense is quite real and just. Man has a right to take a part, and a free and critical part, in the activities of the universe. But he is apt to construe this as meaning that as he first finds himself in the world he

is a fully created being, and has only to go forward to assert himself and to judge. But experience suggests something else: it suggests that he is a soul only in process of creation, and essentially a learner, though a learner by acting as well as by suffering. So when he takes sides under his first impression, and picks and chooses within reality what suits him and has no use for the rest, he is very probably carrying out a necessary phase of the creation of his soul, but yet his judgments, which express it, may have but a trifling place in the true valuation of things. Perhaps we might even say that the great work of the universe is soul-making, and that the central significance of soul-making is just that we have slowly forced upon us the truth about values, and that in learning it we learn to maintain them. Then our best and our worst become problems rather than data, and our optimism and pessimism have a chance to become different sides within our single appreciation of the world in which we live. But our first picking and choosing, whichever side we believe in, is the root of the hasty answers that I deprecate. I will sketch three main types of these, as pairs corresponding with one another.

First, some have started from the most obvious and apparently simplest of standards, and asked whether the world has in it more of pleasure or of pain. It is a question that could not possibly be settled by direct experience, by counting or measuring; but there are arguments on both sides which are interesting and important. For instance, it may be urged on the one side that pleasure is a condition of life, and must be as universal as life itself; and on the other side, that desire, too, is essential to life, and is painful and insatiable—so-called satisfaction

being only momentary, and the pain of desire in its nature recurrent.

This first pair of alternatives is on both sides a flagrant case of what I call the hasty answer. And so I only mention it to deny that, taken either way, it gives an answer to our question. It is, to begin with, very hard to say whether pleasure and pain can be compared in magnitude at all. But our difficulty is deeper. We shall say the question of value is not whether you have had, or think you have had, more of pleasure or of pain. It is rather of this kind : whether the continued making of your soul, whatever instruments the universe may have used, has on the whole advanced its perfection. That is, we shall say that both answers—(i.) there is more of good because pleasure predominates, and (ii.) there is more of evil because pain predominates—are hasty and premature, and neither reveals a sense of the real question at issue.

Secondly, we find, throughout all the region of reflective common sense, an enormous influence exercised by the idea that the existence of failure and suffering is somehow counterbalanced by *compensation* ; or on the other side, if not so, is a demonstrative proof in favour of pessimism. It is to me, I must confess, most painful and terrible to observe throughout our serious fiction and popular philosophy an apparent inability to conceive that endurance or self-sacrifice can have a value if they are genuine realities and not recompensed or paid for. I refer to the perpetual wail and clamour after some form of compensation for every suffering and endurance and self-sacrifice, by a simple overbalance in the way of happiness ; so that, for instance, the fact of bearing one another's burdens may be made an illusion and

wholly removed from the universe. Compensation theories, of course, take many forms. There is the reward of goodness in common life and the future millennium or the Utopia on earth; and there are conceptions extending into another world. Of all this I will only say that the *theoretical reliance* on such conceptions, or the introduction of them as *essential props* of the belief that good is stronger than evil, is strictly self-contradictory. I will explain this directly. And also it leaves a terribly heavy bill to pay should they at any time become doubtful in fact. That very discontent of to-day and the clamour for poetic justice arises, I suspect in the main, from our minds having for centuries been trained and fashioned upon theories which deal with suffering on the basis of compensation. And I emphasise the point that the idea of progress as such, the idea of a millennium or a Utopia, if alleged not as an anticipation grounded on facts but as in principle an indispensable prop for your belief in the best, is not much more certain or more relevant than doctrines of a hereafter.

The real point to be noted here, I suggest, is that you cannot compensate for evil except in so far as you can transform it. Or rather, compensation means accepting the evil as what it is and trying to make up for it in another coin. It throws no light on it, and does not pretend to show how it can be undone. It is an expedient for such evil as is admittedly irreparable. That is why I say that as a theory of optimism it is self-contradictory. You compensate a man for the loss of his leg or arm by giving him money. That, of course, is a makeshift. The loss is irreparable, but you do your best by giving him something quite different to make up for what he has lost. You compensate just because it is impossible

to undo. Thus, in appealing to compensation, you are saying there is incurable and irreparable evil. It is an over-hasty answer; and the pessimist hardly needs to point out that your compensation is uncertain in fact, in order to show that your answer has in principle admitted his case. And if *his* answer at this point is no less over-hasty than the optimist's, it is only because he accepts the ground the optimist has taken.

Thirdly, then, you are driven up to the pitch of the old optimistic contention: evil, suffering, failure is an illusion; it does not exist; it is nothing. "The evil is null, is nought, is silence implying sound." It is somehow good in disguise. We remember Dr. Pangloss in Voltaire's *Candide*: "Les malheurs particuliers font le bien général, de sort que plus il y a de malheurs particuliers et plus tout est bien."

This is really the climax of the hasty answers, and it sets their principle in the clearest light. Beyond a doubt you have two overwhelming impressions—of good and of evil. And each of you, Optimist and Pessimist, has been trying to make believe all through these alternative answers that one or the other is somehow not to count. The impression he does not approve of is somehow to be outvoted, so to speak, or overbalanced, or covered up and hidden away by the other. And in this third alternative you get the real position plump and plain. Each disputant says the other's impression is simply an illusion; his facts do not exist; they are to be conjured away. The plain English of this is that you run off with a first impression, and try to explain away everything else. Those which we have considered, I say, are three pairs of hasty answers, in which the one side simply says, "It is all A, and B (which is there) is not to count,"

and the other, "It is all B, and A (which is there) is not to count."

Unquestionably this irrepressible instinct for explaining away one or other experience does point to a truth. It points to the truth that we cannot and will not tolerate a flat contradiction in the nature of things. We will stand anything, any makeshift, however transparent, rather than that. And so far we are right. Our world is *one* world. Only this irrepressible instinct lays a task upon us which so far we have shirked. We have not tried to see whether our ideas of the best and worst are sound and right. We have taken them from first impressions and found that they conflicted. But the real task, as both life and logic tell us, is to revise our valuation, and see whether this double-edged experience of ours has not some significance which we have missed.

5. We have seen so far, I hope, two simple things : first, that the question is one of learning to construe, learning to read, as Plato so simply and splendidly put it, the world of our experience—learning, that is, to see where its values lie ; and, secondly, that in this learning we are really and honestly to be ready to *learn*—to learn by action and enjoyment, but no less, if occasion offers, by suffering and endurance. No optimism, we said, is worth its salt that has not gone all the way with pessimism, and beyond. The paradox, the double-edgedness of life, we said, has not to be rejected at starting, but to be accepted as a problem to work through.

And now, what leader, what Virgil, shall we rely on to take us by the hand through the Inferno of suffering and failure ? Shall we turn to some Browning or Tennyson, possessed with a robust or partly sentimental faith in the happy ending of the

story ; or shall we entrust ourselves to some rationalist with a workmanlike prospectus of compensation like John Locke or Bishop Butler ? No ; we will try, I think, to be faithful to our logic, and we will go all the way with pessimism, and see where it brings us out.

Let us put before ourselves, then, shortly and in general, the thoughts which we can gather from the arch-pessimist of Germany, from a brilliant mathematician and philosopher who is a leader among the younger men to-day, and from the Russian apostle of humanity who, whether pessimist or optimist, has more seriously perhaps than any other of his day made his own the labour and sorrow of humanity—Schopenhauer, Mr. Bertrand Russell, and Tolstoi. Let us follow their lead, and see where they will take us.

All pessimistic writing is pale before the fourth book of Schopenhauer's famous treatise on "The World as Will and Idea," the book which is entitled *Assertion and Denial of the Will*.

The reality of human nature—here is the sum and substance of the book—is the will to live ; and the reality of the will to live is inherently pain and failure. For will is insatiable ; so-called satisfaction is but recurrent disappointment. "Optimism," Schopenhauer writes, "when it is not merely the thoughtless talk of such as harbour nothing but words under their low foreheads, appears not merely as an absurd, but also as a really *wicked* way of thinking, as a bitter mockery of the unspeakable suffering of humanity." The will to live, we said, is for him the root of all evil, of that unending *déception*, to use the extraordinarily pregnant French word for disappointment, which is the character of all satisfactions.

But there is, he tells us, a remedy. And what is the remedy? Necessarily, the denial of the will to live. Not suicide, for that is an extreme manifestation of the yearning and discontent which are the essence of that will. The denial of the will to live has many forms and degrees. It begins with justice and sympathy, when you penetrate the illusion of separation, when you see that the suffering of all is one, and that to inflict misery is to endure it.

If the red slayer thinks he slays,  
And if the slain thinks he is slain,  
They know not well the subtle ways  
I keep and pass and turn again.

It continues when you grasp the central nature of the vital illusion, and annihilate it in its essence through renunciation and spiritual discipline. I quote: "He who has attained to the denial of the will-to-live, however poor, joyless, and full of privation his condition may appear when looked at externally, is yet filled with inward joy, and the true peace of heaven." But there is more than this. The denial of the furious and passionate will to live is found once more in the contemplation of the beautiful. In other words, the insatiate craving which is the source of our suffering is "*quieted*," to use Schopenhauer's favourite word, in so far as in any mood or any degree we have a grasp of the deep reality with which our true nature is at one.

Or let us turn to the radical pessimism of the modern philosophical mathematician. It is striking how, in the essence of the matter, Mr. Russell's remarkable essay, "The Free Man's Worship," follows, I should think involuntarily, the track of Schopenhauer; and both, I may add, follow a part

of the track of greater philosophers before them. "Only," we read, "only on the firm foundation of unyielding despair can the soul's habitation henceforth be safely built." "In this way," he continues, "mind assures its subtle mastery over the thoughtless forces of Nature. The more evil is the material with which it deals, the more thwarting to *untrained desire* [notice the expression], the greater is its achievement in inducing the reluctant rock to yield up its hidden treasures, the prouder its victory in compelling the opposing forces to swell the pageant of the triumph. Of all the arts, Tragedy is the proudest, the most triumphant, for it builds its strong citadel in the very centre of the enemy's country, on the very summit of his highest mountain."

Of what nature the soul's habitation is to be we may partly see from that account of its supreme achievement. But here is more: "To abandon the struggle for private happiness, to expel all eagerness of temporary desire, to burn with passion for eternal things—this is emancipation, and this is the free man's worship. And this liberation is effected by the contemplation of Fate; for Fate itself is subdued by the mind which leaves nothing to be purged by the purifying fires of Time."

True knowledge we find—the recognition of eternal things—is "the quieter of desire." It was originally Dante's phrase. It is Schopenhauer's watchword. It is Mr. Russell's firm foundation of despair. It is not easy to remember that with the two latter we are supposed to be in the world of pessimism. Let us look round us in the country to which we have been guided, and see if it has no familiar features. We were told that we should reach a land where the will to live was annihilated; where the universe would

seem accidental in origin and regardless of our values ; where the only resource remaining was the firm foundation of despair. But what do we actually find in the new landscape ? The air has been cleansed as by a storm, and the outlines are abrupt and austere ; but the great features of man's inheritance stand out all the more distinct. Here we have sympathy and self-sacrifice, love, duty, and beauty, courage, endurance, and eternal truth. Assuredly we would leap to the side of such a pessimism, in contrast with many an over-hasty optimism.

What is it that has really happened to us in our pilgrimage, to some extent without our understanding it ? The answer is not difficult. We have surrendered our first impressions ; we have become disciples of the universe ; we have transformed our standard, and tried to adjust it to the whole instead of a part. In a word, we have seen what it is to pass through the furnace in which souls are made, and to feel some little touch of real values. We made our pilgrimage, as we promised, hand in hand with pessimism, and we have reached a point at last where optimism is founded on the rock. The path through despair to security is an old beaten track in philosophy, as in religion, and the pessimist has led us by it, because there is no other road, and because he could not help himself. Is it argued that our gains are but accidents in an indifferent universe ? It is difficult not to smile at the suggestion. What we have seen is the very necessity of things, and that it inevitably reveals itself in irrefragable and eternal values. Or are we, you and I, with our proper names and separate biographies, perhaps—we do not know—to come to an end ? Who cares ? You remember the song of Chevy Chase :—

I trust I have within my realm  
Five hundred good as he.

The universe is well able to carry forward what it has expressed in little through us by better men and better worlds and races.

For one further point we may turn to Tolstoi. What, in the main, he gives us is this. The saving knowledge which we have spoken of does not come solely in intellectual form, nor is confined to a clan or caste. That it may come in this form, and indeed has done so without any exception whenever a great thinker has appeared among mankind, is a plain and obvious fact which I fear that Tolstoi denies. But we forgive him this for his championship of the mass of humanity. I borrow a passage of Tolstoi from William James<sup>1</sup> :—

The more I examine the life of these labouring folks, the more persuaded I become that they veritably have faith and get from it alone the sense and the possibility of life. . . . Contrariwise to those of our own class, who protest against destiny and grow indignant at its rigour, these people receive maladies and misfortunes without revolt, without opposition, and with a firm and tranquil confidence that all had to be like that, could not be otherwise, and that it is all right so. . . . The more we live by our intellect, the less we understand the meaning of life. *We* see only a cruel jest in suffering and death, whereas these people live, suffer, and draw near to death with tranquillity, and oftener than not with joy. . . . There are enormous multitudes of them happy with the most perfect happiness, although deprived of what for us is the sole good of life. Those who understand life's meaning, and are content to live and die thus, are to be counted not by

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<sup>1</sup> *Talks to Teachers*, p. 280.

twos, threes, tens, but by hundreds, thousands, millions. They labour quietly, endure privations and pains, live and die, and throughout everything see the good without seeing the vanity. I had to love these people.

Here again is optimism founded on a rock.

Now, I said, in handling these high explosives in the way of truth, we were to be careful and precise. And here is a point that needs great care. Our hard-won optimism seems so powerful as to make us independent of any particular facts and destinies, of success and failure, of pleasure and pain. But can it be right to be indifferent to the material progress of humanity, and to the increase of justice and mercy and common sense in social arrangements? Can an optimism be justified which does not rest on a definite faith in positive ameliorations of life, to be realised in the future? If we say there is more nobility and a higher optimism the more there is to endure, are we not dangerously near the charming creed of Dr. Pangloss?

Now, first, I want to insist on a distinction. Our nature binds us to work for progress, that is for removing all definite evils that we can see and feel; and we must believe that they can be removed, and that so far the world and mankind will be the better. But if we rest our optimism on progress, instead of resting our progress on optimism—that is, if we believe that the deep-laid grounds of pessimism will disappear because of changes still in the future, and that these changes in the future are what justify us in believing in the best, then I think we are plainly wrong. We are getting back towards the notion that the future can compensate for the past; and also we are assuming that *on the whole, and all round, the*

future will be better than the past, and that the *rooted evils of man's condition can totally and in principle be got rid of*, and that *it is desirable and necessary to our optimism that they should be got rid of*, and further, that the sufferings of some are to be the joy of others who are not to suffer—a most medieval doctrine.

I take it, the real betterment will be other. It will lie in the experience by which the relative failure of mechanical civilisation will lead man to that true sense of values which we have indicated. But we must add, to be precise, that this sense of failure in mechanical civilisation to offer the highest values will itself be the condition of the adaptation of our increased resources in the service of such values. Yet, I believe, we shall always be fighting new and probably subtler evils. Our faith ought to promote progress and betterment, but it ought not to be one which the persistence of evil can stultify.

Next, I will put the case against progress, such progress as we most easily anticipate, by a quotation from William James, out of his work already referred to. It is a suggestive passage. I dare say you all know it.

“A few summers ago,” James writes, “I spent a happy week at the famous Assembly Grounds on the borders of Chautauqua Lake. The moment one treads that sacred enclosure one feels one's self in an atmosphere of success. Sobriety and industry, intelligence and goodness, orderliness and ideality, prosperity and cheerfulness pervade the air. It is a serious and studious picnic on a gigantic scale. Here you have a town of many thousands of inhabitants, beautifully laid out in the forest and drained, and equipped with means for satisfying all the necessary lower, and most of the superfluous higher,

wants of man. You have a first-class college in full blast. You have magnificent music—a chorus of seven hundred voices, with possibly the most perfect open-air auditorium in the world. You have every sort of athletic exercise, from sailing, rowing, swimming, bicycling to the ball-field and the more artificial doings which the gymnasium affords. You have kindergartens and model secondary schools. You have special religious services, and special club-houses for the several sects. You have perpetually running soda-water fountains, and daily popular lectures by distinguished men. You have the best of company, and yet no effort. You have no zymotic diseases, no poverty, no drunkenness, no crime, no police. You have culture, you have kindness, you have cheapness, you have equality, you have the best fruits of what mankind has fought and bled and striven for, under the name of civilisation, for centuries. You have, in short, a foretaste of what society might be if it were all in the light, with no suffering and no dark corners.

“I went in curiosity for a day. I stayed for a week, held spellbound by the charm and ease of everything, by the middle-class paradise, without a sin, without a victim, a blot, without a tear.

“And yet what was my own astonishment, on emerging into the dark and wicked world again, to catch myself quite unexpectedly and involuntarily saying, ‘Ouf! What a relief! Now for something primordial and savage. . . . Let me take my chances again in the big outside worldly wilderness with all its sins and sufferings.’”

And then he recurs to the unidealised heroic life of the working classes, the heroic element of which such a civilisation as he has just described is tending to abolish, and, as we seem bound to say, is rightly tending to abolish. I suppose the answer is that evil can take care of itself. We may quite safely, and

should, abolish all the evil we can ; but if we think this means that there will one day be a life on earth with no ground for pessimism, and still more if we rest our optimism on this anticipation of history, it looks very much as if we must be wrong. It looks as if true bedrock optimism not merely is undefeated by pessimism, but actually depends in part upon the grounds of pessimism, and would vanish if they were withdrawn. And I have no doubt that this is somewhere near the truth. Some failure is essential to our best success. Nothing else will teach us where the true gold lies.

If these things, or anything like them, are true, they have a serious bearing on social work. They would govern our attitude and direct our aims and our sympathy. There is no fear of any one inspired by them neglecting to set right offences against good management and good sense and humanity. But yet—the difference is difficult to describe—but some of us know it well at work—they would take up ground more akin to that of the working class themselves than to that of the ordinary helper or philanthropist. They would accept with simplicity their courage and self-denial and kindness, adopting its high level as natural, and not spoiling it by treating it as heroic. The spirit that went out from them would be one not so much of commiseration for hardship as of sympathy in fortitude and cheerfulness. If you meet a person with endurance and nobility greater than your own, the least you can do for him is to play up to it, and not to pull it down. By the help of such workers the people may be made happier, without diminution of the great qualities that *seem* only to be guaranteed by hardship. “Seem,” I say, for irrational hardship clamours to be abolished; there

will always be enough to bear. If the best things in life are what we really value, if we have arrived at our optimism through a due schooling in pessimism, our faith will shine through us, and communicate itself to all we touch.

## IV

### THE QUEST OF THE REAL THING<sup>1</sup>

It is an honour to be invited to give the inaugural lecture at a School of Social Science. The growth and influence of schools like this, and their close connection with the universities, point to the fulfilment of an ancient aspiration. It is with a smile or a sigh that we are apt to receive the famous oracle of Plato, that a better day can never dawn for humanity till kings shall be philosophers or philosophers shall be kings. But Plato was a man of extraordinary practical insight, and the facts are bearing witness every day to the substantial truth which his picturesque expression intended. Two things, as he plainly tells us, he meant by it ; and their conjunction was prophetic : first, social management demands the best of science ; and, further, the best of science cannot be produced apart from an actual training in the responsibilities of social management. The second of these is to us a hard saying ; but I have no doubt of its truth. For the highest efforts of thought the abstract mind is fatal ; and you get the abstract mind where you have no sort of training in social responsibility. Only, mankind has found that the throne of

<sup>1</sup> Inaugural Lecture given at the Liverpool Social Science School, October 27, 1913.

the philosopher-king is too great to be filled by any individual ; his office, we may say, is in commission, and lies in the co-operation of thousands of social workers, officials, experts, students. But it was an integral part of Plato's great aspiration, we must bear in mind, that in all these things an equal share, at least, must be assigned to women.

We are met together to-day, then, to take part in the inaugural function of a *school*. And therefore I shall not apologise if I ask you, old and young, to join me for a few minutes in the consideration of that flame-like force, that central spring and motive, which we may call the student spirit. If experts and officials are present to-day, the masters of their craft, who are conscious of having behind them years upon years of successful administrative experience, will they bear with us for part of a short hour while we endeavour to search out the interest and the method from which their own activity has won its sense of progress and its fertility of adaptation ?

We all of us, I think, make use at times of some such expression as "the real thing." We say it of anything we see or hear or *do* that seems to take us deeper into the heart of life than we had been before. Sincerity, courage, love, the effective mastery of situations or of persons, have power when we meet with them to draw us out of ourselves, and set us facing our difficulties with new efficiency and ardour. The inspiration may be momentary and fade away, but it is an experience worth all the rest. "When I worked under that man," we say, or "when I realised that poor woman's bravery and unselfishness," or "when I learned what had been achieved," perhaps at Duxhurst, or perhaps at Sandlebridge, then I felt for a moment that I was in contact with the real

thing. Something was there of the secret of life and strength, something of what goes to make life worth living and possible to be lived.

So I bring together these two phrases from which we start. The student spirit should accompany us through the whole of life, but more especially here, where we confess that all of us together are come to school, older and younger, tutors and pupils alike—for the teacher, especially in a university, is but the senior fellow-student—more especially here we may remember that the student spirit is one and the same with the quest of the real thing.

Now what I want to suggest this afternoon is just a hint—not perhaps amounting to much, but the best I have to give—about a point of method in the quest of the real thing, suitable, and indeed necessary, to the genesis of the student spirit. And, of course, what I have to say will be a generality, and a generality can always be received as a platitude. And so it may be worth while to remark beforehand that what we take for platitudes may be in truth very vital and important things, of which we miss the vitality because our experience or imagination is a little slack and passive. I will give an instance of what I mean. The late Lord Avebury was rather given to aphorisms, and I once heard an address of his at St. Andrews which did seem at the time to consist rather of platitudes. And there was a witty and wicked parody of it in *Punch* under the heading “Lord Hivebury *Speaks Out*,” which certainly made us all laugh.

Well, now, when Lord Avebury gave that address he was an old man of great experience, and one thing, for example, that he said was, quoting from some famous person, “I have suffered from many mis-

fortunes, but most of them did not happen." That is, you incur needless suffering if you are always expecting calamities. And it seems rather a platitude. But I, for one, have come round to think that the platitude was partly in the hearers. It is a truth, as true as can be, and of the very gravest importance. It is the meaning, I suppose, of a great passage in the New Testament, which in a school like this it is specially important to interpret rightly, "Take no thought for the morrow, for the morrow, etc.," and Shakespeare thought it worth putting into the mouth of Julius Cæsar :—

Cowards die many times before their deaths,  
The valiant never taste of death but once.

The thing is literally and most acutely true. I believe the old man, Lord Avebury, was giving us a profound and valuable lesson, won by severe experience, and we had not the imagination to enter into it.

The fact is, that a truth is quite a different thing, according as you just glance at it and pass by on the other side, or as you apply it in the interpretation of experience and draw out all that it will give you in practice.

And with this preface I pass to the simple truism which I seem to have found out anew by experience of its weight and value, and which I should like to pass on to you as a hint about the nature of the student spirit and the method of the quest for the real thing.

It just comes to this : Every predominant want and tendency of an age presents itself to us in many shapes at once. The connection of all these shapes is hard to recognise ; yet each of them is valuable

as a criticism on all the rest. The real thing, though it lives in some shapes more than in others, lives more or less in all, and the quest of the real thing lies in the unwearying effort to track out and analyse the underlying need which they all embody, and to build up line upon line and stone upon stone the many-sided activity which the whole situation demands. Then, of course, comes the danger I spoke of. "Oh yes," some one may say, "we know; it is the great modern discovery; there is some truth in everything, and nothing is quite true; so comforting; you do not need to believe anything definite, or do anything in particular."

Well, if any one likes to take it in that way I have no heart to argue with him. But perhaps those who have felt the student spirit and are enamoured of the quest for the real thing—I had almost said the quest of the Holy Grail—will try another path with me for a moment.

Let us take an example that will lead us towards the problem of our school. What we want to notice is how our quest sends us from one experience to another, tracking and building as we go.

Suppose our interest is in the *health* of the community, and we read in the papers about the tenets of Christian Science and are rather shocked. I could not possibly discuss them as a whole, but I take it that in practice they stand for two main things—doing without the professional doctor, and trusting to the power of mind over body. Now when we find a great number of people red-hot about ideas affecting their lives and willing to run all sorts of risks for them, it is wise and right, I suggest, to consider whether they have not a perception, it may be a caricatured perception, of something really valuable to the age in

which we live, something from which we may learn in our quest for the real thing.

For instance, set the Christian Scientists' ideas over against the simple faith in drugs and "seeing the doctor," and one may be led to suppose that a violent protest of this kind is natural and necessary, and that each of the extremes throws light on the absurdity of the other, not that we may smile at both, but that there is something underneath which we shall not be happy till we understand.

Now, take in another odd set of notions of to-day—the notions of those who advocate in many forms a return to Nature—life in the open air, simple food or vegetarianism, no alcohol, bare feet or sandals, no hats. Then take a third propaganda—eugenics in all its forms, reminding us more or less remotely of the methods of the stud-farm.

Let us first try, with reference to some of these notions, alongside of the accepted traditions of society, a little of the tracking out and building up we suggested.

We may start from, the return to Nature. It sounds like a thing flat in the face of our civilisation; but yet nothing is more remarkable than the sort of simplicity which may spring out of the very marvels of our applied science and the triumphs of our biological research. I suppose the bicycle, for example, is a miracle of metallurgy and handicraft; but what a simplifier it is! The man or woman with a bicycle is all but as independent as the pedestrian, and with what a power of returning to Nature or of searching out the unfrequented paths of humanity. So with electric light and power if drawn from a head of water, as we shall see it some day on the large scale in Norway and Sweden. It is so versatile and so facile

in use that it seems at home with the most dispersed and unartificial ways of living and working, like air or water, a force furnished by Nature at our own simple will and choice. Or, take the ideal house, the conclusion of all our complex biological and sanitary studies, as I once heard a great doctor describe it—a sort of bungalow in a garden, with a good water supply, but no underground drains, letting you live as far as possible in open air and sunlight, and carefully avoiding the costly forms of ventilation which are meant to supply air chemically pure without anything approaching a draught. It sounds rather like a Red Indian's establishment, or that, perhaps, of an ancient Greek. Just the good water and perfect cleanliness make the difference.

It is quite plain that the "Return to Nature" theorists are possessed with a truth which is not directly opposed to our civilisation, as it might seem, but is in the subtlest way necessary to us, and harmonious with the very best and latest of our science. It is well worth understanding, and the student spirit would be ill-advised to neglect it.)

We may pass on to the Christian Science people, whose views are somewhat akin to the last-mentioned. I take it that the enlargement of the ideas of modern medicine has been in a great measure due to heresies of this type, from homœopathy onwards. Only the other day a doctor said to me, "Undoubtedly we think now that the real thing is to teach people how to live." The power of mind over body, not in a magical sense, but in the sense of wise living, is more and more recognised. And all the open-air and sunlight treatment and what goes along with it—the establishment of home tuberculosis treatment, for example—are akin both to the return to Nature

theories and to the doctrine of the power of mind over body.

And I think there is more in it than this. A good doctor to-day knows that wise living is the great secret; but he knows something more besides. He knows that it is not in his own medical wisdom that wise management of life resides. He knows that in the patient's interest he must repress his own interference. Nothing is more remarkable to-day than how a good doctor withdraws himself as soon as he possibly can, and makes the patient resume self-government. This is what the Christian Scientist has such a red-hot conviction of. It *is* better for your health not to be under a doctor if you can possibly help it. This is quite a recognised point in the recovery from tuberculosis. The method of reconstituting the patient's self-dependence is found to be a very serious problem. I quote from Dr. Cabot's excellent book, no doubt well known to you.

I hope to see social workers devote more research and energy to the study of how to prevent the doctors from hurting the souls of their tuberculous patients while busy in the attempt to make them live by bread (with milk and eggs) alone. The importance of properly chosen work for the tuberculous patient in different stages of the disease has, I think, been greatly underestimated. The doctor's attention is directed elsewhere. It should be the special business of the social worker to point out that not for economic, but for spiritual, reasons it is a dangerous experiment to take a man away from his work and put him on his back in a steamer chair for months at a time.

And all of us have heard of cases where the younger doctor, more ardent and acute, has simply commanded out of bed and into self-governing health

patients from whom an older colleague had been drawing a steady income.

Dr. Cabot's book, to which I referred, on *Social Service and the Art of Healing*, deals to a great extent with this self-repression of the doctor, considered primarily as a limitation of his province in favour of the social worker, insisting, of course, at the same time on the absolute necessity of a positive co-operation between the two—"team work" he calls it. But he considers it also from two other points of view: as a division of labour and co-operation with public preventive medicine, keeping the latter, as I understand him, sharply distinguished from private medical practice—he actually brings figures to prove that the number of doctors is decreasing in the U.S.A., as public hygiene has made them less necessary—and also, what we have already noted, as a co-operation and division of labour with the patient himself. This latter point presented itself primarily to him through the question, how far truth should be told to the patient and the deceptions customary in medical treatment should be discontinued? We see at once that the question here is one of freedom and self-government on the patient's part—whether or no he is to be trusted with the control of his own condition.

And when eugenic theory shall come to its own (Professor Pearson seems to think that this will not be for some time yet) the same problem will arise in a very acute form. How far and under what restrictions will the highest interests of the community demand or admit of direct or indirect interference with the most intimate and important of all the concerns of life? We have seen the passing of the Mental Deficiency Act, the only definite policy which the eugenists in general have adopted, and one, of

course, not really due to them but to a much older agitation based on specific experience. I think we can say little more to-day than that the extreme eugenic theories have to be adjusted to the same world of experience which contains the facts appealed to by the Christian Scientists and by the few persistent opponents of the Mental Deficiency Bill. The reconciliation of them is a problem which will tax the knowledge and judgment of the social worker of the future.

So far we have taken as an example the health of the community. And what suggests itself is that we find the real thing—the method and treatment which would satisfy our hearts and our heads alike—seeming to expand as we touch it, and to carry us away beyond the first imperative need we felt, or the first routine we learned, which may have seemed so splendid. We are carried on to take up and reconcile combinations at first sight inconsistent with one another, and to construe the full need of our time at once as it appears to the Christian Scientist and the return to Nature theorist, to the Eugenist, and the doctor in private practice, and to the expert dealing with preventive medicine and sanitation; yes, and even to the sort of person who obstructed the Mental Deficiency Bill. We have to follow out and build up for ourselves an intricate scheme of division of labour, co-operation, and freedom. And if we have been fascinated at first by some other shape of the real thing, perhaps there is some little difficulty in maintaining our enthusiasm when we find how, after all, it seems to elude us, always demanding something more than we saw at first, and something rather different. So that it really might be helpful to understand from the beginning that this is a way the

real thing has ; it is always on ahead of us, as well as in our hands ; and what of it we have got in our hands is not worth very much unless, while devoting thorough work to it, we are prepared to see its limits and perpetually recognise new divisions of labour, new co-operations, new forms of freedom. And the faith and power to do this thoroughly are no ordinary gifts, and they make up just what I have called the student spirit, which, therefore, is a spirit not only of ardent positive achievement, but also of continuous self-denial and self-criticism. It makes our work rather arduous, but it is the only spirit in which really good work can be done. The real thing is a severe taskmaster ; but it is the only master worth following.

I pass on to quite a different example which illustrates the same point in a smaller compass. It is drawn from the question of working-class holidays.

When I began social work in London I was told by my chief that the Children's Country Holiday Fund was the best charity in London. It existed, as its full title and No. 1 of the Fund's rules informs us, to provide fresh air for *ailing* London children.

The word *ailing*, which appeals strongly to the public, was, in times which I can remember, the centre of a conflict between narrower and broader views of the Fund's object. The earliest practice, at least in some districts, was to have a doctor's opinion, and confine the operation of the Fund to children of whom he could say that they were definitely in need of a fortnight in the country. But, naturally enough, the theory and practice enlarged themselves. The Report for 1890 quoted a speech of Lord Hartington, which insisted on the need of a change into the country, for reasons of education as well as of health, for *all* town children of the poorer class. The rule says, " ailing

or requiring change of air," which lends itself to expansion. And the Report went on to regret that though the Country Holiday Fund movement had been spreading, yet there still were thousands of children ignorant of country life. This, of course, means that the managers were really making it their object that *all* London children attending the elementary schools should have a fortnight's holiday provided for them, whether ailing in the medical sense or not; or, if we like to put it so, that all town children are sufficiently ailing for want of the country to justify a special fund being raised to send them there. Of course, most of my hearers know that efforts are made to get the parents to bear part of the expense; in 1910 they contributed about half as much as was raised from the public—*i.e.*, about one-third of the total expenses. This proceeding, though in many ways desirable, has its own dangers—a good deal of fraud and jealousy. I do not know if you have similar funds up here; but no doubt the whole matter is quite familiar to you.

However, the main point is this: A vast charity exists, extending its operations year by year, for sending to the country for a fortnight's holiday as many London children attending the elementary schools as it can possibly get funds to deal with. The idea of a special urgency in the cases dealt with has altogether dropped away. "Won't you give ten shillings? Ten shillings will send a child to the country for a fortnight." That is the nature of the appeal.

This is a routine in which its patrons and promoters seem absolutely to find the real thing. And, of course, it does an immense quantity of good. We see the little creatures in our Surrey village; one

sees them following the gardener at his heels and learning to enjoy a garden, which is a delightful thing to watch.

Still the absolute naiveté with which the advocates of this scheme throw themselves into it and its indefinite extension "gives one furiously to think." Parents like to have holidays, too; and it is not a bad thing for parents and children to have them together. So that, without denying the immense beneficence of the Country Holiday Fund, one is just led to put side by side with it, as a mere suggestion, a well-known Lancashire institution. I mean what is most widely known as Oldham Wakes; but it exists, I believe, throughout all the cotton-working towns in the North Country. Some of us may know that I am alluding to a discussion which I raised many years ago. I do not want, however, to be at all controversial to-day, and it is not my point to deny the benefit conferred by Children's Country Holiday Funds in general. My point is rather the opposite—to suggest that while there certainly is a positive benefit, that ought not to arrest our thoughts from travelling further afield and picking up ideas from other social phenomena. Social facts criticise each other, if we only have the courage and patience to attend to them. That is the gist of what I am saying.

I suppose every one here knows more than I do about the "wakes" in northern factory towns. The facts were brought up to date by the *Manchester Guardian* in a special article on August 30 of the year 1913. In thirty-six centres of Lancashire and adjacent factory towns about a million pounds were saved, as, I understand, within the year, and were available at the time of the yearly holiday, though not by any means the whole of this sum was expended

on the actual holiday time ; the stock of clothes, for instance, is renewed, and some of the savings go to more permanent investments—shares in a cotton-mill or the like. I think there are four points to observe.

1. The system is said to have grown up with the demand. In earlier times of the cotton industry the holidays were on scattered days ; it was the persistence of the workers in pooling the off days that led up to the present arrangement with the employers, by which the mills close down for more than a week, making the regular annual holiday possible.

2. The holiday is taken by whole families together, usually at the seaside, for a week or ten days.

3. The young people and children take part in the saving, through school banks and otherwise. How far this practice is mixed up with the half-timer system I do not know. But everywhere children and young people have more command of money than one would think—it is an old story about the confectioner being the children's public-house. The co-operative system of dividends has much to do with the effectiveness of the saving.

4. According to the *Manchester Guardian*, drunkenness among the holiday people is becoming rare, and the character of their enjoyment is rising.

Now this system is rooted in very different conditions from the Country Holiday Fund or Fresh Air Funds of all kinds ; and it is possible to hold that the one offers no sort of criticism of the other. I could not myself altogether take such a view, and I feel myself fortified by the kind of rejoinder I have met with when I have brought these facts to the notice of persons deeply interested in charities of this type.

Of course, the absence in London of a regimented industry like that of the cotton factories, and the

corresponding absence of a really strong co-operative movement, makes a great difference of detail; and the question of wages has some bearing on the subject, though the amount of money coming into a London household, especially in the poorer quarters, where there are small industries, would surprise many of us.

But I have been struck by the fact that people familiar with the subject did not seem to base their arguments on differences of wages; and, indeed, the position of the families concerned is so very various that no general distinction could be drawn on this head between north and south.

The sort of answer which I got turned rather on such points as the difference of character between northerners and southerners, the greater development of the co-operative movement in the north, and the greater holiday facilities offered by northern as compared with southern railway companies. But all these points seemed to me just restatements of the fact that the holiday movement in London was not a creation of the working class itself, and showed none of the energy and organising capacity which their creations display. If it had sprung from them the detailed conditions would soon have altered, that of character included. As we saw, the Oldham Wakes are not an original fact. They and the habits and character belonging to them arose out of the free development of the workers' necessities.

I am very much inclined to believe that the great underlying reason why no systematic family holidays—unless you call the hop-pickers' exodus a holiday—exist in London for those whose children attend elementary schools, is just the presence in enormous numbers of a residential class, whose Philistine ideas are enforced by their immense pecuniary power. If

that class had been present in the same proportion in the Lancashire towns, I do not myself believe the Wakes would ever have come into existence.

But thus we are led to an important point which is new in our argument. If one social routine criticises another, you can often adapt the working of the second to the ideas suggested by the other. So much so, indeed, that part of the principle which I am emphasising is that the same institution can be worked with completely opposite social tendencies, and so made harmonious or discordant with general social needs. Whether it is harmonious or discordant just depends on whether those responsible for it have seen beyond their traditional routine along the road-way of the quest for the real thing. Thus one hardly sees why the Fresh Air Funds should not work a little towards inducing whole families to manage a week's outing on their own, so that perhaps, through realising what their children have enjoyed one year by means of the Fresh Air Fund, the parents might be induced to make their own arrangements for sharing the enjoyment another year. But, of course, that sort of thing would require the modification of routine by a more human type of management.

One more example, which illustrates particularly this same point, of the different ways of working the same institution. I may say, in passing, that the history of the school feeding problem also illustrates it very completely. The work of a Children's Care Committee, *if* it is competent and does its duty thoroughly, is altogether a different thing from the old careless system which distributed meals at random and did nothing more. Of course, Miss Frere's work at the Tower Street School in Seven Dials, out of which the real inspiration of the Care Committees

sprang, was primarily directed against the school feeding system of the day. In all these cases what you want is to do not less, but more ; though as we saw with the doctor, the " more " may take the form of wisdom in self-repression.

But what I was going to speak of, as an excellent example of this modified working of an institution open to criticism, is the ancient question of outdoor relief under the Poor Law. We know that, to the surprise of some of us, the Majority Report did not recommend the abolition of out-relief, and the old abolition theory looks perhaps from our present position a little doctrinaire. This because of what we have just insisted on, that the value of an institution is relative to the resources and the spirit with which it is worked. The gist of the old argument against out-relief really came to this, that the nature of the institution was such that, apart from a degree of efficiency then quite out of sight, it could not possibly be well administered, for reasons familiar to all who are interested in the Poor Law. So what the Majority Report said was in fact : You may keep your out-relief if you can work it efficiently, pointing out at the same time what a gigantic " if " this was. For, as we all know, both Reports insisted on the evil condition of the out-relief children, as well as on other terrible signs of inefficiency. I almost seem to remember that the name of Liverpool was to be met with in the report of Dr. Williams, the special investigator.

This is just a case in point ; to people who were red-hot about proper social management the old out-relief routine seemed quite intolerable and anti-social. But if you can cure it by doing more and not less (I do not mean by giving larger allowances without

superintendence), if you can make it an adequate mode of reforming the whole life of families which are breaking down, why then the issue is transformed. I have seen with pleasure in the *Poor Law Officers' Journal* that the officials themselves are taking up the matter. And, of course, a highly trained and sufficient staff, such as we are getting, and hope more completely to get, is altogether a different affair from a single untrained relieving officer with more cases than he can go round in a quarter.

Our point, then, at the moment is that the result of social criticism of an inadequate routine may not be its abandonment, for indeed all routines are in some degree inadequate, but rather to re-create it with a new spirit.

In conclusion, I will apply to the necessity for schools like this what I quoted from Plato at the beginning. You cannot get the best of science, I said, without a training in the responsibilities of social management. Otherwise your mind is not a concrete; you do not get the true student spirit, the feeling of how each routine has to criticise itself in view of the purpose which runs through all social arrangements. To gain and train this spirit the peculiar constitution of these schools is essential. The practical work is the special and fundamental element. It is much like walking the hospitals to a medical student; but I imagine it goes even deeper than this. It is not enough to look on at work being done, to visit or to be shown round institutions. You must have experience of being a responsible unit in the machinery. You can only see what the workers really do when you are a recognised worker among them; when you play a real part yourself, answering to the real part which you find that the others have to play,

you then feel by actual contact the attitude of the doctor and the nurse and the health authority and the school manager and the Poor-Law people, and also of all the persons who are themselves in trouble or difficulty. You have to take part in decisions and feel the results of what you do. In this way you learn what you can learn in no other way, and this learning is necessary for real knowledge, even if it is not your plan to become a social worker by profession. Indeed, with all the enthusiasm and *esprit de corps* of a great profession there is also a tendency to some narrowing of routine; and as social work itself becomes a profession I fancy that its wisest friends experience some anxiety lest the student spirit should lose its elasticity.

But this is a digression. At all events, through the connections it possesses, the school, as we saw, can place its students where they will be accepted as fellow-workers. This no university as such, no purely lecturing body, can do. And yet for the promotion of the student spirit nothing can be more helpful than the connection with a great university. What we have to learn throughout life, and especially in social work, is the double lesson which we have tried to insist upon to-day, the lesson of a thorough loyalty to the work nearest our hand, together with a readiness to adapt it and ourselves to the teaching conveyed by other shapes of social demand. It is just a hint of method. It insists on what we might call the responsiveness of the student spirit and the patience of the quest for the real thing.

## V

### TRUE AND FALSE IDEALISM<sup>1</sup>

I HAVE not come here to lecture social workers on the details of their work. I do not doubt that the science of social help has advanced since I was practically concerned with it. All that I wished or hoped to do was to give assistance, perhaps, against some general difficulties, by returning, in a general form, to social workers, some ideas that I had gathered from them in particular experiences. In these matters this is really the student's function: to interpret back to others what he has first learned from them. If he has good luck, his doing so may be suggestive; it may put matters in some new light or new connection.

1. The word "idealism" is something of a spell. It possesses the magic of a spell, and its danger. All these great watchwords of humanity, that represent predominant leanings and accumulating histories of man's mind, have in them something of an enchantment. When we use them we are drawing upon powers that are greater than our own, and we are liable to the fate of the wizard's apprentice who roused immense forces which he could not direct or control. Idealism is a word to conjure with; but a

<sup>1</sup> An address to some social workers.

wizard who does not know what he is about is dangerous to himself and others.

The magic of idealism lies, I suppose, in its promise of victory for the human mind. Somehow mind is to triumph; to subdue the "real" or the "actual." It is to achieve the best we can think, to make a new world.

But danger lies in all these expressions which indicate a contrast: good and evil, beautiful and ugly, true and false. They seem to indicate a battle, but they may indicate a flight, and often there is really a flight where the victory seems to be surest. Take, for instance, a "truth" that leaves outside it, standing and unexplained, all the falsehood in the world. Such a truth may seem militant and triumphant, but really it can have very little range and very little strength.

2. May I illustrate this point in a way that might seem far-fetched? We all know Wordsworth's splendid lines:—

The gleam,  
The light that never was on sea or land,  
The consecration and the poet's dream.

I wonder if others, like myself, have felt uneasy in them, supposing, that is, that they were meant to describe the poet's inspiration at its best. It was only the other day, in reading Professor Raleigh's book on Wordsworth, that I really came to understand what is their true content and bearing. (What a penalty one pays for neglect and inaccuracy in reading a poet! This observation bears on the main moral of what I am saying.) One only needed to read the poem through and the thing was plain at once.

The poem is called "Elegiac Stanzas: Suggested by a Picture of Peele Castle in a Storm." It refers

to the death of the poet's brother, who was drowned at sea. It opens by alluding to a time when Wordsworth had lived near Peele Castle in calm summer weather, and here occur the famous lines, which must be given with their context :—

Ah, THEN, if mine had been the Painter's hand  
To express what then I saw ; and add the gleam,  
The light that never was on sea or land,  
The consecration and the poet's dream ;

I would have planted thee, thou hoary Pile,  
Amid a world how different from this ;  
Beside a sea that could not cease to smile,  
On tranquil land, beneath a sky of bliss.

This is the idealism that escapes—a “ fugitive and cloistered virtue.” But after the deeper experience, the poet goes on to say he has won a stronger standpoint, and that a more human one, from which he cannot go back :—

Such, in the fond illusion of my heart,  
Such Picture would I at that time have made,  
And seen the soul of truth in every part,  
A steadfast peace that could not be betrayed.

So once it would have been—'tis so no more ;  
I have submitted to a new control :  
A power is gone which nothing can restore ;  
A deep distress hath humanised my soul.

Farewell, farewell the heart that lives alone,  
Housed in a dream, at distance from the Kind.  
Such happiness, wherever it be known,  
Is to be pitied ; for 'tis surely blind.

But welcome fortitude and patient cheer,  
And frequent sights of what is to be borne ;  
Such sights, or worse, as are before me here ;  
Not without hope we suffer and we mourn.

Here we have the idealism not of escape but of comprehension, and so of conquest.

3. I will give another instance of the spirit of true idealism, this time coming nearer home.

Have we ever noted the stages of our "comprehension" of a great city? When I was a boy I was taken to hear Lord Shaftesbury speak, and, like a boy, I remembered only one thing he said, an anecdote.

He said that when he first came to London a thing which soon struck him was that there were parts of the pavement that dried after rain much sooner than the rest. These were mainly, he soon noticed, at street corners, and then he saw that they were before the bakers' shops. This put him on inquiring into the conditions of the underground bakeries and of the people who worked in them. That was one route which took him into the heart of things. And all of us have in our own way passed through a similar training. Every one must, more or less, I suppose; though the interests that guide it must be different in kind and intensity. When they are wide and intense they lead to a true idealism. I mean that when we first begin to take notice, the great city is perhaps just the frame of our business and pleasure. The streets that take us from one to the other are meaningless, insignificant to us, but then gradually—from one suggestion or another, from one starting-point or another—our insight is awakened and our interest expands. We become able, more or less, to interpret the look of the streets and of the people. The walls become transparent to us; we see through them into the homes, or no homes, and become alive with the great life around us. We see the weakness of the poor and their strength; their goodness and courage and fun. I don't think I ever

knew a really good social worker who had not the gift of sympathetic humour.

The life which we have learned to respond to, and to feel ourselves a part of, imposes its purposes and standards upon us; we are united with it in its dangers and in its hopefulness.

Now it is a feeling of this kind which suggests itself to me as the path towards a true idealism of social work. Note how Mr. Stephen Reynolds has recently spoken of the cruelty of intellectual people. The best which we hope for must spring out of the life we are learning to know; it must not be brought to it or stuck upon it from without. We must learn from the people before we can teach, and as a condition of teaching. More especially we should know the life of the working people at their best and strongest, or else we can have no conception of what it is that we want them to be.

This is what I call idealism; when, instead of turning away from the life around us, we have so learned it that it speaks to us at every point, and the streets, and the houses, and shops, and people have all "come alive" to us, and indicate human wants, and hopes, and powers.

Our main point is, then, that idealism is not an escape from reality; but, first, a faith in the reality beneath appearances, which, secondly, works by "comprehension," and not by opposition, and confers, thirdly, a power of transforming the appearance in the direction of the real reality.

You often begin, I suppose, by remarking a pale child at a school. Then you try to pierce beneath this surface fact and work the matter out, till you have a whole network of conditions before you, by dealing with which you may be able to rescue a whole family

from some misfortune which is affecting them all, or from some foolish habit ; and to help them to do what you find they really want. A man must be saved, some wise writer has said, on his own decalogue, and not on somebody else's.

We should observe that true idealism is optimistic, because it grasps things, and does not leave them outside to become a terror. False idealism, sometimes called "pure," "lofty," "exalted," is pessimistic, because it is conscious of something which it has not the courage to face and overcome. Plato has a joke against this kind of idealism, which, oddly enough, people are for ever ascribing to him. He depicts an over-zealous disciple chiming in to Socrates' praise of astronomy, with the addition that it is a study which leads the mind upwards—to a higher world. Socrates answers that the question is whether you use your intelligence or not ; and if you do not do this, your mind will not be looking upward, even if you float on your back in the sea.

So, with this incomplete idealism, we have a wave of pessimism in England to-day—almost always in people who are not active social workers. All through life the weaker mind recoils from what it will not grasp. It is so much easier to condemn than to comprehend. We have an output of pessimistic fiction, and then a description of the state of England founded upon it ; what Plato would call, I think, two removes from the facts.

One point in this prevailing temper is well worth reflecting upon—the use made of the idea of justice. Almost all pessimism rests on the thoroughly individualistic question : Why this particular suffering ? in the sense of asking, Is this man's suffering due to this man's fault ? The novels are quite full of it ;

after the manner of "Did this man sin, or his parents, that he was born blind?" We should note the answer, which they do not give. It was that the works of God should be revealed in him.

Justice, of course, may mean that the best should be done for every body and soul that they can receive; and, as a rule for our action, is in this sense obviously right. But to the popular pessimist it means: "The world is all askew if any one suffers, except by his own fault"; and this principle, the root of bad individualism, would make man's life as cheap as beast's—nay, very much cheaper, for the beasts will on occasion suffer for each other. We should rather think of the great idea which, as Professor Bradley tells us, occupied the mind of Keats, that the world is a place for the making of souls; and consider what part the suffering not by one's own fault may play in that.

Our conclusion then, so far, is this: Idealism is not the power or habit of escaping from, or, in a customary sense of the words, raising oneself above reality. It is the power and habit of diving into the core of appearance, until the real reality discloses itself. Its appropriate epithets are not so much "pure," "lofty," as "thorough," "comprehensive"—the latter word in its double sense of inclusion and understanding.

This idealism is not a matter of the dreaming imagination; but of what Ruskin once called the penetrative imagination—what Wordsworth was unmatched in. "Love had he seen in huts where poor men lie."

4. A word about the kind of emotion, the passion or enthusiasm, that goes with true idealism.

Notice that we are quite right to be modest about

our personal work, our own performance ; but we are not right if we entertain a discouraging idea of the rank and quality of our work. In fact, the higher the idea of it that we cherish, the more personally modest we shall tend to be. But it is not right to admit, or to pass without protest, any notion that our work goes along with a cold heart and a lack of human love. There is really a point here in which explanation may be of use.

There is a vulgar prejudice, which appeals to all of us in our weaker moments, that it is one thing to be reasonable, and quite another thing to be full of love or devotion. This is wholly false. It arises from taking the terms compared at their most commonplace level ; reason, perhaps, as addition and subtraction, which really have only a little emotion, because they have only a little reason ; love or devotion as blind desire or foolish sentiment, which again have only a little reason, because as emotion they awaken none of the depths of our nature. Foolish sentiment goes very well with false idealism. Neither of them need any strength or effort ; they have nothing to comprehend, nothing which feeds their ardour by being overcome. But what is so cheap cannot be really dear.

If you go to any of the world's great men, you do not find them talking like that. What you find is that they bring together reason and love in a way that puzzles us, though we find it true in proportion as we are anywhere near doing our best. The two moods come together in the yearning for completeness, for the escape from contradiction ; the longing to find something which achieves or expresses the consummation which we want. We do not know, indeed, what it is we want. But the working of

Reason is just the way we build it up or track it out ; and feeling is the response of the whole mind and body—the joy or depression, the sense of life or of failure to live, which goes along with this seeking, and with the expansion of finding or the privation of failing to find. And this feeling, this aspiration, is good and valuable in proportion as it means a vitality of our entire soul, an utterance of all that we want. The yearning for completeness, in a word, is at once the spur of logic and the wings of love. Plato called it, in both senses, “ Passion ” (Eros). But there is something more, and it bears on our practical difficulties. To do or to feel things thus completely is exacting work. We are not always up to it. And then it may seem rather flat ; that is to say, we may feel rather flat in presence of it. Mountain-climbing is a fine thing, but we are not always in the mood for it. And this is why we may find ourselves dull and cold, not merely in presence of addition and subtraction, but in presence of very great works of reason and of passion. We cannot get at them. We are like the people who mock at classical music—so dull, they say. That is literally because it has more emotion in it than they are able to receive. Give them a music-hall tune and they would be happy. But, of course, in a great work of a great master there is actually present immensely more of what they want ; but it is like a food that a man cannot digest, it is too much for them and they cannot receive it.

So people are always telling you that primitive language, or primitive songs or primitive sketches, are so much more “ expressive,” or have so much more feeling in them, than the language, or music, or art of civilisation. Or a savage blind desire seems as much more passionate than the devotion of an

educated mind. It is the old story of preferring the noble savage to the civilised man. Such things are easier to get hold of because there is so much less in them.

The whole problem may best be explained by a comparison with fine art. Many years ago a friend told me that I could not think of Charity Organisation Society work in an artistic light. The remark cut so wholly at the root of all my convictions that I could never forget it.

What it meant, I take it, was that first-rate social work seems to some people (and perhaps to ourselves when we are feeling flat) cold and dull, hard and austere, dirty and ugly. It is so full of planning, contriving, carefully observing, sticking to the point, severity, exploring unlikely corners for a ray of light or hope.

But all this is just like the austere demand of great art. It springs from the same cause ; which is, that a great eagerness or a great vitality demands to construct something which is careful and complete, and precise and well-ordered throughout. A blind desire smothers and chokes utterance ; a loose sentimentalism issues in nerveless and sloppy productions. But a really strong and healthy emotion demands for its embodiment an orderly variety, a precise and careful fitting of part to part, the accurate and living logic that constitutes the austerity, which is an aspect of all great beauty. Let me read a passage from a writer who stated all this far better than any one else could state it.<sup>1</sup>

What seems to me to be true . . . is that feeling is worthless or precious in proportion as it is not or is trans-

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<sup>1</sup> Nettleship, *Philosophical Lectures and Remains*, i. 60.

lated into something which by an extension might be called action. The ordinary form of trouble about it . . . is that *either* I feel, and nothing comes of it, *or* I do, and there is no self, no life, in what is done. . . . But it is true—isn't it?—that action is good just according to the amount of feeling which, speaking chemically, is set free in it. The most perfect illustration seems to me to be art. In any art, the more artistic the work is, the more form is there—*i.e.* the more measurable, definable, calculable is it—the more rational or intellectual. Yet, on the other hand, everybody since the world began has associated with art, strength of feeling and unconsciousness of effort. A great piece of music can be taken to pieces like a clock; a great poem, compared with any other piece of language, is intensely artificial; and yet the amount of feeling which they represent is stupendous when compared with the song of a bird or a simple story. And this relation of feeling seems to hold good both of the artist and of his public. Nobody doubts that artists are more emotional than other men; nobody ought to doubt that they apply more intellect than other men. And as to the audience, I think what you say is frightfully true, that if you go to art to get your own feeling reproduced, you find it useless and flat, just because mere feeling can't find expression, and your feeling must be, at any rate potentially, endowed with form before you can be emotionally receptive of real form.

Doesn't the same apply to action in the ordinary sense? A strong man is always a man who feels strongly, *and* who can get his feeling out; and it may seem fanciful, but as far as I can see, if you are asked to *describe* action, you have to do it in some such way as you would do in the case of art. I mean any act, like any work of art, is measurable in time and space, and the more of an act it is, the more measurable is it, the more form there is in it.

Does all this sound mere pedantry? I do not

know ; but it seemed to me that it might help to cut up by the root a dangerous and recurrent fallacy, that which arouses the fear of measurableness and co-ordination and precision in social work.

This fallacy is a great danger. For our social work only lives in the doing, and changes if and as our faith and courage change. If a reader thinks George Meredith dull, or prefers Ouida's tales to *Antony and Cleopatra*, he can do little harm, except to himself. Fortunately, so far, Meredith and Shakespeare are dead, and he cannot get at their works to put his own faint-heartedness into them. But with our social work, if we let ourselves be over-persuaded that it is hard, and cold, and dull, because it is precise and systematic ; why, then we shall make it so. Wordsworth, we are told, spoilt several passages in his poems by changing them to meet his friends' objections ; because his friends could not understand the poetry of them. That is what we are being constantly urged to do ; to change something essential in our work, not in the way of growth, to remedy any defect exhibited to us, but to bring it down to the minds of people who will not take the trouble to get abreast of it.

" Precision," you know ; " you can't have feeling and the passion for humanity if you will be so precise." Why, what is the precision of our case papers, say, to the precision of the rhythm of a great poem, or to the adjustments of the parts of a flower ? No great feeling can be uttered, nothing can really live and be strong, without extreme precision of adjustment. This is the simple secret of Aristotle's doctrine that virtue lies in an adjustment governed by a right ratio. We all know it—we know how a secret stinginess or jealousy spoils the act of generosity, or ostentation or

evil temper the act of courage. In some one of its numerous adjustments to external circumstance the imperfect motive betrays itself and the act breaks down, rings false ; we give, for instance, too much or too little, or in the wrong way, or at the wrong time, or to the wrong person. You only get the perfect act when it is " the flower and native growth of noble mind."

A distinguished speaker has said that St. Paul, if he were now alive, would add another verse to 1 Corinthians xiii., to say that " Charity cannot be organised." Did the speaker not perceive that he was putting in the mouth of St. Paul the assertion that Charity could never be a living thing ? Anything that is not organised must be dead ; anything that cannot be organised must be more brute than the brutest matter.

What we have to do is just to go on, perfecting the adjustments of our work as occasion arises or as defects appear, in the confidence that that is the way to find utterance for all the poetry and all the religion that are possible to social feeling.

## VI

### THE MEANING OF "IDEAL" AND "CHARITY" <sup>1</sup>

THE word "Ideal" or "Ideals" is one for which I have always felt a certain distaste. It seems to suggest a *prima facie* contrast with reality; and reality, real reality, is to me what especially fires the heart and the imagination. But the lovers of the ideal would make out a case. They would say that an ideal is a clear presentment of fundamental aims; they would say that in the multitudinous facts of the day's work it is always some single thought or hope which inspires and moves us; they would say that real reality itself lies in some fiery core of spreading life, and not in the bare expanse of what at any moment merely exists. They would repudiate the impeachment which some of us are inclined to level against ideals, by reason of what has usurped their rank and title. They would deny that ideals need be superficial, divorced from the grasp of fact, Utopian, News from Nowhere. And they would even become aggressive. They would say that in the last resort all persons who profess to be rational ought to be

<sup>1</sup> An address to the Council of the London Chanty Organisation Society, January 25, 1915.

prepared to express in brief words and plain the sum and substance of the faith that is in them, the essence of the cause they have at heart.

Here the votaries of the ideal have, I think, about half the right on their side. It *is* well, I hold, now and again, to raise fundamental issues in a few plain words. But, probably, a few plain words may not at all suffice to solve them. A brief indication of a problem and its paradox need not be superficial. A brief resolution of it can hardly be otherwise. Yet here again, perhaps, a sort of general clue may be suggested in few words.

I remember, as a simple-minded and over-confident young man, in conversation with a wily and humorous senior upon the conception of a perfect life, to have stepped into a trap by observing that the question did not seem to me so difficult, that the best and ideal life was surely one of active beneficence. "Well, now," was the reply, "that ideal has always seemed to me to be one of such profound selfishness." Now, of course, there is an answer to this; the answer lies in the idea of reciprocal service. But all the same I must admit to have been a good deal impressed and somewhat taken aback.

Here we confront the paradox of all ideals. *Prima facie* they present you with a dilemma. Either the ideal includes the imperfection which it hopes to transcend, or it omits it. If it includes it, sustains and maintains it, as active beneficence implies preserving such miserable objects as it needs, then the ideal seems no longer to be an ideal. For it includes its opposite with all its imperfections on its head. But if the ideal omits the evil which is its opposite, then again it seems to have dropped out one half of its world, to be bankrupt and futile in dealing with

its antagonist, to be irrelevant and superficial, and so once more to be no longer the ideal.

My friend's remark applied this general paradox to the ideal of charity. Does the ideal of charity include the horrors which now in great measure seem its necessary counterpart, and which to a great extent even bear its name, or does it altogether exclude them, both from its occasions and from its manifestations? With them, it seems nothing at all ideal; without them, it seems a Utopia, highly incredible, and in no way akin to what we think of as the full revelation of charity. So neither with its evils, nor without them, can we easily find an ideal which we recognise as the ideal of charity. What are we to say?

Are we reduced to what in intimate thought we must often have been brought up against?

Are we to find comfort in the conviction that there will always be evil enough to go round; that the supply of misery will survive our time, and that therefore the possibilities of practical beneficence will outlast our coal, and even receive a fresh stimulus from its exhaustion? I believe there is a truth of some kind hidden in this ghastly consolation. The source of evil is strangely akin to that of good, and simply to annihilate the one would be apt to make the other unrecognisable. But we cannot take it for our answer as it stands. We cannot boldly pray for the continuance of sin and misery in order that charity may have scope. We are bound to believe that the charity of our ideals is not dependent for its existence on its own or on others' diseases.

We all of us, indeed, know too well that there is a charity which is so dependent, and that on such charity again depend the diseases to which it

has become adapted. Such charity and its mischiefs are

As two spent swimmers that do cling together  
And choke their art,

or like the blood-supply to some horrible tumour.

This is what you acquiesce in when you let the evil, in its character as evil, either persist alongside of your ideal, or, as it is sure to do if tolerated, even infect its character. We have such an admission in its coarsest form from any one who says, "There may be better plans than mine; but meantime the people are hungry." Here you have the paradox very clear and simple. You confess to an ideal which bars what you are doing; but you also confess and maintain that your ideal is bankrupt in face of the need for what you are doing. You separate the evil and the ideal, and assert both side by side. Then, as my friend said, your life of active beneficence becomes an outrageous selfishness which creates evil to ensure its own perpetuation.

Yet, as we see in this case, one element in this outrageous selfishness actually lies in the false purity of the ideal, an ideal so pure that, as I said, in presence of evil it is bankrupt. It is a perfection which fails of perfection by not including imperfection.

We see, then, where the dilemma of the ideal has brought us, and always must bring us, in charity as in all goodness, in beauty as in truth.

The ideal must not sustain the evil; but it must not ignore the evil. It must include it, but include it by transmutation.

This is in brief, as a few words can give it, the clue to what an ideal must be if it is not to be destroyed by the paradox of its own nature.

Let us restate the root of the paradox in other words.

The difficulty is this. Is it possible to frame a single ideal, say, of charity, which, being one and the same ideal, will serve to handle our present misery and degradation, and will also hold good, and be the same thing, as a principle of healthy living if and in as far as that misery and degradation were removed?

Illustrate it by the case of truth. We all of us hold a rather limited set of beliefs as true, over against which other people, taken all together, hold an immense array of opinions which we take to be in the main erroneous. Now suppose a clean sweep to be made of all the errors which other people hold, and nothing to be left standing, nothing to be thought of or to help in apprehending the world, except what we believed to be indisputable truth. Would not our array of indisputable truths look rather scanty and meagre? Most of the things in the universe would not be mentioned in them at all. We should find that without the familiar errors held by other people we simply should not be able to get on; the work of the world would not be done. On most matters we should have nothing at all to say. Our ideal of truth, in short, must not be to sustain our own beliefs and simply make a clean sweep of what seems to us other people's error. It must be something quite different from that. It must be, somehow—the actual solution would be infinitely detailed and certainly cannot be given in a few plain words—but it must be, somehow, that our little grain of truth should expand, and leaven the lump, and unite itself with the whole enormous mass of what we believe to be error. It must include the error, but include it by transmutation.

And so with charity. We have stated in brief the clue to the nature of the ideal. The ideal itself is not

a thing to be expressed in a few plain words, though its paradox, and some clue to its nature, can be so expressed. But the paradox is what we have seen, and, to repeat, the brief clue to its nature is this. The ideal of charity must be such that one and the same structure and function of the common soul which is the purest and highest we can imagine, may be perceived as proving its height and purity in its very contact and intermixture with the degradation of to-day and in its adaptation to it. Otherwise your ideal is split in two. The part which operates in adaptation to present conditions is making things worse; while the part which you think pure and lofty is doing no work at all. To use a good old comparison, your ideal, if it is to be a single ideal at all, must represent at once the principle of the healthy body as it adapts itself to the combat with disease, and at the same time the structure and function which is to be right and normal when the disease is vanquished, or in as far as it ever will be so.

Then the ideal must be two-sided, and yet one and the same in its two sides. It must be an adaptation to human weakness founded on the principle of human strength.

Now from this clue, which the demands of the ideal afford, we can pass to the different lights in which people view the nature of charity, and finally to that light in which we may see, I hope, something of its living and working ideal, or what I should prefer to call its real reality.

First we have the ideal split in two and the one-sided views which correspond to it. "Charity is demoralising." Well, we have no great doubt about this. There is a demoralising charity which some believe in and others condemn, and others again both

condemn and practise, which is a common thing. It is a charity "like the dyer's hand Subdued to what it works in." It has adapted itself so completely that it sustains and no longer combats this present evil world. It is half of the ideal torn asunder.

And there is the other half, upheld, strangely, by some who practise the first, and also by their adversaries whose clamour is to the effect "Charity is demoralising; give us justice"; "The rich will do anything for the poor except get off their backs"; or, in circles, I fear, nearer home, "Nothing is needed but good business; there cannot be a bad employer." Here all the doctrinaires, collectivist and individualist alike, agree to condemn what they see as demoralising charity, and set up against it the other half-ideal, some automatic perfection of society or of the economic world.

But now, secondly, corresponding to that complete ideal which, though two-sided, is in both its sides one and the same, we find the charity which has learned in another school, neither that of the empiric nor that of the doctrinaire. The clue to it, as we have seen, is the ideal of a function and structure based on the principle of strength, but true to itself in the utmost adaptation to weakness. Here, and here alone, is the self-consistent ideal and the comprehensive spirit of charity, which divines strength in weakness and cares for weakness as discerning in it the elements of strength.

We recognise this same paradox in what we sometimes say ourselves, that it is the duty of charity to make itself unnecessary. So far as concerns certain outward adaptations of charity this is surely true, as it is true that health makes unnecessary certain methods by which the organism combats disease.

But charity itself is more than such adaptations, and yet we have seen that it must be the same out of them as in them, and in them as out of them.

Now we saw that the paradox of the ideal could be stated in a sentence, and so too we thought could some brief clue to its solution. But the solution itself, the actual ideal which would solve the paradox—this we saw could not be stated in a sentence. The reason is plain, and we have seen it. It is that a true ideal must unite opposites in itself; and such unions can only be realised in living growths; that is, in a very highly disciplined moral temper, correlative to long and complicated historical achievements.

And such a true ideal, or what I call the real reality, is a hard thing to recognise. There is a passage I am very fond of in Goethe's *Götz von Berlichingen*. His son, who has been educated apart from him for some time, is brought to him and wants to show off how much he has learned. So he begins to recite "Jaxt-hausen is a village and castle on the Jaxt, which has been for two hundred years a hereditary appurtenance of the Lords of Berlichingen." Götz asks him, "Do you know the Lords of Berlichingen?" and the boy stares, bewildered. Götz mutters to himself, "For sheer learning the boy does not know his own father. I knew every path and road and ford before I knew the name of the village or the river."

And that is why I confessed a certain repugnance against the ideal—against the plain, clear statement in a single sentence. It savours so much of rattling off the names of things which you do not know by sight. I granted that the idealists might have half the right on their side, for it is well, of course, to have the use of phrases that are short and simple and clear. But so often the clear and simple watchword

turns out to be blatant nonsense ; and to learn of the real reality we have to call in the men who had made painful trial of all the paths and fords and ditches before they troubled about their names.

Let us try in our own way then to set about approaching some real reality, some genuine solution of the paradox of charity, or at least let us try to see in what sort of dusty and laborious and commonplace activity, not in a simple sentence or simple watchword, a genuine ideal, with its two or many sides and the same through all of them, is to be looked for.

“ Let us now praise famous men and our fathers that begat us.”

It is true that the ideal is not anywhere exactly the same as historical fact. If it were so, it would not be an ideal ; and even from our point of view, which favours the facts, it would be an error not to distinguish them from the “ real reality.” Nevertheless, even to begin solving the problem of the ideal, which we stated in five words as “ a perfection that includes imperfection,” involves, as we saw, the creation externally of a whole system and method of living, and inwardly the growth of a spirit which is ardent, expert, and disciplined.

The ideal, then, or the real reality, is not itself the mere letter, the mere history, of all that has been done for the achievement of social health, nor yet the total record of the lives of the workers, yet it is something which lives in all that, and can hardly be conveyed in less. And, of course, a difficulty which presses particularly on a view like ours, and really demonstrates its justice, is the difficulty of drawing the line. For the being of charity is for us not separate from the inward and spiritual grace which animates the entire fabric of a healthy social

institution. So that to convey our ideal of charity it might seem that we should have to handle the total history of civilisation. And, indeed, in Sir Charles Loch's great article in the *Encyclopædia Britannica* something of the kind has been achieved.

So that when we begin to speak, for example, of our own Society's work during the past half century as typical of what we mean by the real reality or the true ideal of charity, we must walk carefully, and must understand that we are nearing a slippery inclined plane—the inclined plane down which we slide towards the prejudice that charity lies in a sort of special adaptation mixed up with social evils and infected by them. And with this would come the very narrow-minded superstition that only ourselves and those who work in our peculiar way have in them the true spirit, and we should be back in all the errors of the ideal torn asunder, and the notion that charity is a life of service of special beneficence directed upon a miserable class of beings who are necessary to it.

But with this warning, that ultimately you cannot draw the line, we may use the special movement of the last half century to show what sort of thing is needed for the full solution of the problem and paradox which we stated in five words.

It is not unnatural to-day, after near half a century of work, to look back leniently on the generation of our founders, and to say to ourselves, "Really it is wonderful how much they foresaw and how near they came to the truth which we, of course, possess." But—I am speaking of a difficulty which I myself experience—could we not for a moment look at it all from the other end, from the point where the track starts over the moor, remembering that at first there was no track there; could we not consider the mean-

ing of the fact that so many able and experienced men had to spend such time and labour just merely to find the starting-point ? Dr. Hawkesley, we think, saw some very essential points ; Mr. Solly contributed excellent ideas ; Mr. Alsager Hay Hill was extraordinarily advanced on labour questions ; Lord Lichfield was wonderfully steady in keeping a definite aim before him ; Sir Charles Trevelyan was always full of original suggestions ; Charles Bosanquet was a loyal and devoted servant of the cause. But we can hardly help feeling as if the point where the work now stands was something which it was a sort of failure on their part, though a pardonable and even meritorious one, not to have attained and stood upon as we do.

Yet the truth seems to me to be somehow—it is not quite easy to express—the other way on. It was they that were just finding the first track over the moor. It was they who made the first part of the road which we have traversed ; they erected and established a large portion of that position which we now occupy. The fact that it took so many lives of first-rate men and women to find and make it—that any one of these lives alone contributes only a part, perhaps a small part, of the whole movement and position—just shows what is the costliness, the profusion, the magnificent extravagance of the ideal or the real reality ; it shows how little of it you can express in five words or in six. Why, as we see, a dozen or two—really, indeed, more like hundreds—of splendid life-histories go to every little bit of the task of finding the track or building up the fabric. It is the same, in essence, with what is so close to all our hearts to-day ; it is the same as in a war, at any rate, in a war for an idea. The ideal, the real reality,

uses up individual lives as a fire burns up fuel. But then these lives are not past and gone ; we, in as far as we are in any degree worthy of them, are re-living all of them as we maintain and amplify the faith and tradition and experience, and the outward organisation and mode of social living which they have bequeathed us. So, when we talk of ideals, we must not think simply of crisp sentences and simple watch-words. We must learn from the Scottish fishwives who think, quite truly, that they enhance the value of their wares when they reiterate the ancient appeal, " It's no fish ye're buying ; it's men's lives."

This is, then, the first thing. The ideal is not made up of words ; it is made up of lives. It is the single spirit in them which outlives the perishing individuals. Not all that has gone to make it up survives in our actual remembrance : it is well that it should not ; we should be oppressed, as men have been before now, by the weight of tradition and of the past. But it is well to reflect sometimes what sort of thing the real reality is, where it all came from, and what it all cost.

And, further, to see that this is the make and stuff of the ideal is a very great help to seeing more or less the sort of way in which its problem and paradox are not merely to be stated, but to be solved. The solution cannot be given in mere words, except more or less in science or in poetry, if you call those mere words. It can only be given in the growth of habits of mind and body, of unselfishness, considerateness, healthiness, cleanliness, and in the development of external arrangements which correspond to these habits. It is only in realities of this kind that you can find the double adaptation which we saw to be essential to the ideal ; a spirit both good in itself and

strong in the conflict with misery and degradation. The matter is not so hopeless as it has been painted. The people need not remain hungry because the better plans are followed. There is a place in Anthony Trollope where he expatiates on the theme that you can both eat your cake and have it if you will only be a little sensible. I am not speaking of mere frugality ; I am speaking of sense and considerateness in the whole conduct of life. What are elements of strength and goodness for the better life of the future, are strength and goodness no less in the troubles of the present.

Something I have just said may seem not clear ; but I think it explains itself when we pursue our line of thought. We were to speak about charity, you may say, and charity is a quality belonging to charitable people. But in talking about sense and considerateness in the conduct of life, and habits of cleanliness, and so on, we seem to have passed from describing what we want of charitable people to describing what we want of the people who are the objects of charity. Are we not confusing things ?

I think not ; I think this is rather our point. The qualities of the charitable people [how I hate the phrase] must be the same as the qualities to be brought to light in the people they are trying to help. Their task is to build up a good world, such as can stay, and the distinction of helpers and helped is subordinate and ought to go. In other words, charity must be judged by the response it elicits. Trouble cannot be removed by a class of donors over against a class of recipients. I think I am right in saying that this principle is dear to the heart of Sir Charles Loch.

After this word of explanation I will take a couple

of instances, one from an important page of social history, another from a change in verbal usage among ourselves, to indicate the mere beginning of a solution demanded by one of the paradoxes and problems which the ideal of charity involves.

First, then, a brief word on the problem of the children since 1870. What I wish here to lay stress on is the fact that on the whole, admitting all the mistakes that have been made, a new world has been brought into existence of attentiveness to children's peculiar needs, among parents and other persons alike, along with external arrangements which will make such attentiveness a part of normal life both in the family and in society. I suppose that four great necessities in child life have presented themselves as emergencies clamouring to be met : Education, nutrition, hygiene, eugenic precaution. And round about these rough necessities there has in the last half century been waged a conflict, a sort of triangular duel between the factors which we found by analysis in the ideal. There has been the eleemosynary view, tending simply to recognise and sustain the evil ; the automatic Utopian view, which would consider it abolished by a system that ignored it (we have already noted a meeting of extremes between this and the eleemosynary view) ; and there is the complete organic point of view, which labours to promote new growths and responses of mind, backed by adequate institutions such that the rough emergencies will be dealt with and transformed by a new attentiveness and sense of responsibility on the part of all concerned. This will at once deal healthily with the evil, and constitute an integral and valuable part of social and family life in the future. We have actually felt, one might say, these factors

of the ideal conflicting and co-operating as rough-and-ready methods were proposed for application to this or that emergency, and people such as ourselves, helped by the plain reason of the case, subtilised and developed these rough methods until out of them there sprang something which may some day become a decent organisation of parental and social responsibility. It is the growth of such organisation with the habits of mind which belong to it, as opposed to a marked distinction between classes of donors and of recipients, which I point to as involving the devotion of innumerable lives and the lapse of long chapters of history, but also as promising some approximation to a true solution of the paradox of the ideal; the attainment, we said, of a perfection which includes and assimilates imperfection.

The second point is a matter of verbal usage among ourselves, the use of the word “deserving” to describe a qualification for the receipt of relief. I have observed this usage as late as 1878 in a motion made at Council, and the phrase “worthiness or unworthiness” in a published letter of the Council in that year, while a year later the term “deserving” occurs in a report of a District Committee on exceptional distress measures. I am not suggesting that it was used in a pharisaical or censorious way. I presume that all it was intended to mean was that character was a necessary condition for help to be of any use, and that a deserving case was one in which there was evidence of character. Still, it did to some extent echo the old distinction between a class of donors who were to sit in judgment and a class of recipients who were to be judged. I should suppose that soon after 1879 the usage began to change; but I have made no exhaustive search. In 1893, however,

a paper was read at the Charity Organisation Conference in London which pointed out that the word "deserving" was open to misconception, and that it was strange that we had developed no more fitting term for what we really intended to say than the barbarism "helpable." And I should think that the term "deserving" was largely passing out of use before 1893, and is probably not to be found in the later utterances of the Society.

Here I think we see just a formal note of the full transition from the half ideal of something to be conferred by a richer class on a poorer, to the complete ideal of a life to be worked out in common by all persons of good will—an ideal which represents, as we have urged throughout, a force and spirit of a kind which we can hope and pray shall be permanent in any human group to which we belong.

I have tried to bring out both the fullest meaning of the word charity as the loving and persistent goodwill implied in every part and member of every human group, and the kind of real reality in which alone the paradox of its ideal can be solved. We must not, I think, limit the spiritual meaning of the word charity by its technical usage for a particular class of institutions or for something incompatible with the service of the State. We must not deny the full spirit of charity to any who have the full spirit of service. Our old terms—voluntary and volunteer—were perhaps a little misleading. We must not deny the heart of a volunteer to a man or woman either because he is an official of the State or because he accepts from some other source a salary barely perhaps sufficient to keep body and soul together. Our war is teaching us this.

On the other hand, the contrast with State institu-

tions does imply some part of what we have found in the ideal. We have found that charity cannot be in “ ironclad ” form, as the Americans say ; it cannot be purely statutory, though it may co-operate with a statutory committee. This is because, from its nature as a spring of life, it loves above all things flexibility and growth, and is necessarily imaginative, inventive, experimental. It is thus that it protects itself from the distinction of classes and the sustentation of morbid growths, and is enabled to link its remedial adaptations to normal and progressive life ; and instead of sustaining and retaining an evil past, anticipates in its operation and arrangements what I will call after our explanation an ideal future.

All that I have been trying to say is much better expressed in the famous *Indenture of Apprenticeship of Wilhelm Meister*, part of which I will conclude by reading to the Council. “ Art ” here means, of course, your life work, whatever definite thing you have to do.

Art is long, life short, judgment difficult, opportunity fleeting. To act is easy, to think, hard ; to act according to our thought, troublesome. All beginning is cheerful ; the threshold is the place of expectation. The boy stands astonished, his impressions guide him ; he learns in play, earnest overtakes him. Imitation is born with us ; what should be imitated is not easy to discover. The excellent is rarely found, more rarely valued. The height charms us, the steps to it do not : with the summit in our eye, we love to walk along the plain.

Only a portion of art can be taught ; the artist needs it all. Who knows it half, speaks much, and is always wrong ; who knows it wholly, inclines to act, and speaks seldom or late. The former have no secrets and no strength ; their teaching is like baked bread, savoury and satisfying for a day ; but flour cannot be sown, and the

seed corn must not be ground. Words are good, but they are not the best. The best is not to be explained by words. The spirit in which we act is the highest thing. Action can be understood and again represented by the spirit alone. . . . Whoever works with symbols only is a pedant, a hypocrite, or a bungler. There are many such, and they like to be together. Their babbling impedes the scholar; their obstinate mediocrity vexes even the best. The instruction which the true artist gives us opens the mind, for when words fail him, deeds speak.

## VII

### THE MEANING AND RELATION OF “POLITICS” AND “CHARITY”<sup>1</sup>

I HAVE come to see you to-day in answer to an invitation, and because it is pleasant, and perhaps a duty, to meet one another from time to time and exchange ideas. The subject which I have chosen was in part suggested to me by a very able and striking article in the September *Review* “On the place of Organised Charity during the War,” and also by my own recollection of opinions within and without the Society. But after studying the Provost of Oriel’s delightful paper in the October *Review*, I feel two things. First, that my main argument will seem to you, who are accustomed to his highly expert guidance, as breaking in an open door ; and, secondly, that it *is* for a comparison of ideas, and not as having anything new to teach, that I visit a Society with such old experience and having him for one of its instructors.

I can only hope that my brief discussion will, so far as it goes, confirm the point of view he has taken, and perhaps a little insist upon the demands which

<sup>1</sup> An address delivered before the Oxford Charity Organisation Society.

are made by such a point of view both upon those who stand outside us, and upon ourselves.

"The fact that the call for service on the part of charitable workers has been put on a civil and municipal basis has already worked wonders." "We may hope that the tendency to consider the city as a whole for charitable purposes will grow in strength as time goes on" (*October Review*, pp. 324-5). These texts from the Provost's paper bring before us as successful just that large co-operation about which I want to consider in what precise form and through precisely what ideas it is likely to be permanent and valuable.

The relation of the Charity Organisation movement—originally one of private initiative in the work of social helpfulness and amelioration—to public administrative agencies has been a problem from the beginning of that movement, and it looks as if after the war that problem might become very acute in the question of the position of the Local Representative Committees and all along the frontier of co-operation. What I wished to do was to discuss in principle the obstacles to such co-operation presented by current ideas of politics and of charity, and to indicate how far an apparent antagonism between them could be removed, and how far it might be best that a certain division of labour should continue.

In the half-century, more or less, since the beginning of the great movement for the improvement of the condition of the poor, which rested on private initiative, a relation to public agencies has become more and more inevitable. The very success and consequent magnitude of the movement has made it so. And so the temper of the two sets of workers, speaking quite broadly, of the social workers on the one hand, and of the political workers on the other,

has become very important. The Charity Organisation movement did from the first essentially pronounce private charity—the most private of private initiatives—to be a public interest, and therefore open to public criticism and interference. So the London Society in the first report of Council: "The proper administration of all sums contributed by the benevolent is a matter of public policy rather than of private privilege, and as such ought to be secured by co-operative action of all charitable agencies." The direction indicated by the last six words is a matter to which we may return.

But this attitude plainly contained a spring both of conflict and of co-operation between the new movement and any authority which should really represent the public, and during the last half-century the public authorities have been extending the scope of social interference in the name of civic right and duty, and disaccustoming the ordinary citizen to welcome or even tolerate what might appear to be the intrusion of private initiative.

Thus the temper of the Charity Organisation movement, as starting on the whole from private initiative, and also that of the public authorities and the citizens who thought of civic right and duty from the political side, has been inclined to suspicion. The relation has been characteristic in the case of the Poor Law authorities, whose work had all along a common frontier with the Charity Organisation movement, and therefore was to a great extent in conflict with it, while occasionally, as here in Oxford, showing examples of highly successful co-operation.

I want to consider what the suspicion depends upon on both sides; how, if at all, it can be removed and co-operation made effective; and whether, grant-

ing all feeling of antagonism to be removed, some forms of social service still demand a greater remoteness than others from directly political control.

1. What I have called the inclination to suspiciousness depends on both sides in part on a narrow notion of "politics," and especially of democratic politics. We are apt to identify politics with the electoral machinery and party organisation of representative bodies chosen on a very inclusive franchise. Such bodies are jealous of encroachment on their powers, and their elector, the typical elector, is jealous of encroachment on his powers as exercised by them. Why should anything of public importance be done but by their orders? Why should they, the general public, depend for anything important upon any one whom they have not empowered to deal with it? This idea of democratic politics restricts it to exceedingly direct governmental action. It is indeed action by representatives of the electors and by their officials, and so far of selected persons and not of the citizens *en masse*. But it is not altogether removed from the temper which believed that the whole multitude of citizens together was the true legislative body, and even, in the ancient world, the true executive.

Now the point seems to me to be that, as is natural in the same civilisation and the same country, you find these current ideas on both sides. As I have just said, they make public bodies, and the electors who look to them as their representatives, very jealous of their powers; direct political action seems to them to be the natural mode of action in the public interest. On the other hand, people who are enthusiastic for particular forms of highly skilled work are apt to be jealous of elective public bodies. They say that these are elected on a cry, with all sorts of other aims

and qualifications than to do careful detailed service or cause it to be done, especially such service as needs long acquaintance and training; they say that the best workers may be turned out any day on a cry either false or irrelevant to their work. And in fact our movement, in the main, has elaborated its methods and gathered its experience pretty much by itself and in comparative privacy. Of course, as I have said, a reference to public interests and problems was always implied and continually recognised in practice. Still, expertness was won, in the main, without the participation of elective bodies, and there was and is a feeling that it is better so.

2. So much for narrow notions of politics, held by both sides, and making each distrust the other.

The same thing, I suggest, holds true about "Charity."

I confess to being impressed by what I have often experienced and what was reported to me with emphasis the other day. "The wage-earning class won't look at you as long as you have the word charity in your title." Of course, this is only a general presumption. Men who have once seen what the thing is will not shy at the name. I have sat for years myself on a Charity Organisation Committee with Trade Union men—and admirable Committee-men they were—and we have plenty of such experience as that which Mr. Shairp, of Leeds, described at the Conference in a speech I shall refer to again.

Still, I believe the wage-earners entertain this objection, and it seems to me natural. Charity suggests to them "almsgiving." And this means to them a violation of their independence, an admission that wages are inadequate for proper life, and that supplementation of them is to be at the discretion of

a different class. They feel that almsgiving, besides indicating economic dependence, is morally dishonest, being in the main for the almsgiver's good and not for the recipient's ("Don't come saving your soul on me"). Few of them know perhaps that we feel, or profess to feel, exactly the same, and loathe no less than they do the connection of charity with almsgiving. And if they know we say so, they think we do not act up to our professions, and that if we did we should give up our movement.

Turning to our own ideas of charity, are they above suspicion? I believe that they are, and that our enthusiasm for the art and spirit of helpfulness, of which we shall speak below, has altogether outgrown any historical connection which charity has had with the selfish side of almsgiving.

Nevertheless, we on our side cannot be too careful to have our ideas clear and to make them clear to others. There are, it occurs to me, three main usages of the term "Charity" according to context and history, which it would be well to free from ambiguity.

a. Charity as almsgiving. This has, I fear, on the whole, a bad ecclesiastical tradition behind it, in spite of Francis of Assisi and Dr. Chalmers and, no doubt, many wise and capable ecclesiastics besides, in all the Churches, who may have made it in action a better thing than it was in theory. I cannot speak of the history on my own authority, but as I understand Sir Charles Loch's *Encyclopædia* article, the poor of Christ whom the Church took under its care were really, in Rome at any rate, the Roman plebs as demoralised by distributions of corn, which the Church took over and continued. The good of the recipient was not really in the forefront, and the popular traditional meaning of the word charity was fixed, I

should say, by the ecclesiastical conception of alms. This usage, with the practice corresponding to it, indicated, I suppose, the state of things and of thought out of which the Charity Organisation movement intended to raise the whole matter. I note that, facing such a usage as this, we might welcome the reproach that we have more organisation than charity. I hope we *have* more organisation than almsgiving. Our title is not exactly charity, but charity organisation, and the second word defines the meaning of the first.

β. Then there is quite a different usage of the word, which will recur in our argument below. This is the legal use by which certain non-private purposes, in older days anything from education to maintenance of a bridge, when made the object of endowments, came under the class "charities" as a legal category. The Charity Commissioners deal with charity in that sense. And to some extent I think that this usage has affected the ideas of the Charity Organisation movement, through the obvious right and duty of the public to see converted or adapted to the best use what are confessedly institutions or benefactions with a public aim.

γ. And then there is the ideal charity, St. Paul's charity, of which the other forms are the caricatures, or at best the occasional instruments. This is the spirit of the Christian community, the body in the description of which Plato and St. Paul are so nearly at one, I have heard of it being said that St. Paul, if he were here to-day, would say that charity could not be organised. This was an unhappy remark, because St. Paul's charity was certainly living, and whatever is not organised is dead; and, moreover, the whole idea of organism and organisation descends to us from Plato's description of the community as

a living body, which St. Paul repeated in his account of the Body of Christ.

But the two other meanings, more on the level of prosaic daily life, tend to disguise this fundamental meaning and frustrate all attempts to make it current coin.

3. In order that co-operation and division of labour, which are sides of the same thing, may be thorough and effective, we need, I suggest, wider ideas of politics and more precise ideas of charity. The liberation of mind which I have in view seems to me to be needed in both respects by both the sets of people who are enthusiastic for social improvement—by those who start from the political, civic, or municipal idea on the one hand, and by those whose care is primarily for the art of helpfulness, not of course apart from its wider social conditions, on the other. The wider idea of politics is more particularly necessary, I should say, for those whose main interest is civic and political, although it is also necessary for ourselves to prevent us from seeing an antagonism where none exists, or, at all events, needs to exist. The more precise idea of charity is advisable, perhaps, for ourselves, although I do not believe that the worst of the superstitions attached to the word have now any hold on the movement to which we belong. Yet, even if it is merely putting definitely to ourselves the meaning of our own practical ideals, such a thing is generally worth attempting; and it may help us to see and to avoid sources of misconstruction. And also to politicians and the public the more distinct conception of charity would be of service; it would help them to understand in general what, as I have said, they see immediately when they come into effective contact with any such movement as our own.

(i.) It has long been observed, not less I venture to assert by students of theory than by practical men concerned with very various interests, that the popular conception of democratic politics needs widening and deepening. Dissatisfaction has prevailed among enthusiasts for fine art and for education, for expert social service, for military efficiency, and, as we see in syndicalism, for the autonomy of labour. We are told that in the U.S.A. the mere procedure of voting for a long list of officials, whom no one knows or cares about, is enough to make pure and efficient civic government impossible. A good way of stating the necessary reform is to substitute the term "public" for "political," in order to indicate those functions and interests which are more than private, and demand in some way the best attention of the community, and then to distinguish within the class so indicated the functions which are strictly political from those which might rather be described as social or as public without being political. Then the term political would have mainly to do with the determination of the main direction of national and local endeavour, with all such matters and machinery as are most conveniently conducted on the party system. I do not myself believe that this method of bringing fundamental questions to an issue can be dispensed with in a great country by any electoral contrivance. The State then, and politics proper, would be one aspect of the community, that in which it exercises sovereignty by making and enforcing laws and policies which embody its main intention and line of progress. And this is what comes to our minds when we think of democratic politics; responsibility of representatives to electors, short terms of office, all expenditure under the vote of an elective body, all

administration conducted by its official servants. It is, as I said, not wholly dissimilar in spirit to the ancient primary democracy, or to the small popular governments which Rousseau had in mind. The idea is that the people alone can be trusted to look after its own affairs.

Now it is important to notice that the true theory of representative government, as it takes us away from government by mass meetings, also takes us away from the idea that democratic principle requires everything to be done by directly elective bodies and their officials. We have come to see that the "general will" is a thing which has to be constructed in executing it. It means the achievement of social welfare in an immense diversity of ways, and with a degree of skill and detailed knowledge which is not only not present in the electors—that is the very point of representative government—but is moreover, as concerns an enormous area of public interests, not present in the representatives themselves. All sorts of contrivances are employed in great modern countries to secure efficiency in public functions by making their subordination to representative bodies indirect instead of direct. You have committees co-opted and selected in various ways for special functions, sometimes with statutory regulations; you have more or less independent commissions for special duties; you have responsible directors of various services, with a staff selected for competence; you have the bench of judges. All this is not a derogation from democratic politics. It is developing the tendency which lies at the root of representative government itself—that is to say, that the enormous diversity of public interests and functions demands a great variety of methods and institutions in order to the due and

skilful discharge of the duties concerning them, that is, in order to the efficient execution of the people's real will.

Are we not, it may be asked, in talking thus, edging away from popular government? No, I reply; the more confidence popular government has in its own strength the more it recognises that efficiency demands a very free delegation of functions. *Bona fides* throughout and a sound public opinion, and, to secure it, a free Press, complete publicity, a firm control over expenditure, and methods which make intelligent participation feasible for the general public—these are the kind of arrangements which safeguard the essential democratic control. I refer again to the American "long ballot," which, on the pretence of perfect electoral control, makes the intelligent participation of the elector absolutely impossible. He has to vote for perhaps 500 officials of whose offices he knows nothing, with a list of candidates whose names he never heard before and never wishes to hear again.

These safeguards being presupposed, I draw attention again to the distinction between political functions in the narrower sense—*i.e.* wherever the party machinery has to be applied—and public functions or interests which one might also call social, or political in the wider sense—that is to say, things of the deepest concern to the community and not managed by individuals for private profit, but by corporations, associations, public bodies, as we call them, of all possible kinds, ancient and modern. These are recognised by the governmental machine and often subjected to regulation by it, but are not immediately operated by it; and they exhibit all degrees of dependence and of independence with regard to it.

Such are the great educational corporations of Oxford and Cambridge, which pursue their functions with a good deal of freedom to follow their own judgment and traditions, although in a certain contact with statutory control, which is on the whole a guarantee of *bona fides* and against corruption. So you have the Churches, the trade and professional organisations, the charities in the Charity Commissioners' sense of the word, "movements" such as the Anti-Tuberculosis and Dispensary Movement, and a whole system of learned and scientific bodies or bodies existing for the sake of art or literature, some of which, like the Royal Society, have very great influence and great public value. The relation of the newer and of the Scottish universities to Government regulation as compared with Oxford and Cambridge is an interesting study in constitutional methods, and I should suppose that the diversity is educationally valuable.

Now all these bodies and movements stand for functions and interests which in a wide sense might be called political, and which we certainly ought to think of as valuable and essential functions of the community. But in the language which I have suggested that we might adopt, they would be called public or social functions in contrast with those which are more narrowly political—that is to say, in which our system of party government is explicitly recognised. We are always to remember that the division between social and political is a distinction of degree only; that they are points of view from which one and the same community can be regarded, and that the political fabric would be meaningless apart from the social community, while the social community could not exist for a day unsupported by the political fabric.

We hear a great deal of talk, both on the left and on the right of political doctrine, about the failure and incompetence of democratic politics. This means, I believe, for the most part, that the democratic principle is not understood, and that current political notions both on the part of the enemies of democracy and on that of its friends fail to appreciate the width and depth which belong to the real or general will in a modern nation. Much of this talk is found in second-rate works of fiction, and I confess it to be my belief that, like many current catchwords, it has become a literary convention, which passes on from one inferior writer to another without ever being tested by a glance at actual life. "It is easiest to criticise, harder to understand, hardest to construct." There is nothing hostile to democratic politics in the view of public functions which I have just been expressing; nothing, for example, in the independence of our judicial bench or of the Royal Society. The real point of importance is the political constitution by which in a free and intelligent nation a very wide choice of methods and organs may and should be left open within the necessary safeguards against sinister and corrupt interests.

Therefore I say that in the matter of larger and freer political ideas,

a. First, politicians must recognise that there are everywhere political or social functions in various degrees external to the province of purely political machinery, and that these are not subordinate, but in great part represent those higher activities which presuppose and make use of the community in achieving the ultimate human purposes. To these, politics in the sense of the political machine, is, as a follower of Aristotle finely said, like the major-domo

to the master of the house, who may be a scholar or a soldier. It determines the arrangements necessary on the whole to the functions, but the functions themselves it cannot perform. As I have said, many modern political contrivances recognise this fact—such a contrivance, for instance, as the permanent Statutory Committee, which is withdrawn from direct election and has a special function of its own. This and many other types of delegation of special functions are essential to the complex life of a modern nation, and a large and liberal view of politics must necessarily make room for them. Syndicalism is an extreme suggestion of an analogous type.

β. Secondly, if those who start from the civic or political basis are to take, as I have claimed, a more liberal view of the methods appropriate to great public functions, so we, who began with private initiative, are bound to recognise that in dealing with high interests of the community our efforts necessarily take on a public character, though not necessarily one that is in the narrower sense political. And we must recognise that such public interests and functions are in their nature continuous with the political fabric, and grow into it by the same necessity by which they also grow out of it. Certainly we must have, and we always have recognised that we must have, a common frontier, if not a debateable land, with the work of elective bodies and their officials; and how far we actually work on or under them, or on different sides of the same problems, or on bodies specially constituted by some of the contrivances mentioned above, seems to me to be a matter of convenience and efficiency in each special branch of service, and not a matter of essential principle. Of course, there is such a thing as representation of a

whole set of kindred institutions, by which the advantages of publicity and responsibility may be gained without forfeiting those of special training and experience. For some kind and degree of organisation and co-operation with kindred institutions as well as with strictly political bodies we must be prepared; it is indeed the very thing we set out to achieve.

(ii.) Both sides need more precise ideas about charity. Here we shall naturally believe that it is rather our critics' ideas than ours which lack precision, and I hope it is so. But to make our position clear to others it is important that our own notions as well as our practice should be unimpeachable; and there is the further question whether our practice is always up to our principles. So here as before I think we must say that precision is or may be wanting in both the principal streams of social thought.

a. I spoke above of the wage-earner's point of view as partly justified by old misconceptions which hang about the name of charity. These misconceptions we must get rid of chiefly by living them down. But there are two positive points belonging to a precise notion of charity in the modern sense which it is necessary that working men, and those who with them take primarily the civic point of view, must learn to appreciate as outstanding facts which no social doctrine can ignore.

First, in every large modern community it is a public interest of the first rank that there should be a function of helpfulness for very various occasions of need and emergency, not primarily economic. The need is intensified by un-coordinated efforts on an enormous scale instinctively made to meet it, the mere dealing with which so as to hinder them from

becoming a serious social evil is an essential part of the public interest and function referred to. The comparative absence or inadequacy of such a function has been proved over and over again to involve serious social diseases.

Secondly, there exists a special form of experience and training relative to this function and verifiable in the same way as are the services of the medical and nursing professions, though less universally indispensable. It is the outward shape taken by charity in the Pauline sense, and involves neither almsgiving nor institutionalism, though on occasion it may make either of them its instrument.

The public interest in question, with its two aspects of a conspicuous social need and a special spirit and capacity of service, is on the same footing in political theory as the other great social or public interests of education, religion, literature, the organisation of labour, or the medical and nursing organisations. It is a fact of the same order, and combines in itself, like each of the others, the two sides of public interest and special enthusiasm and experience. No social student or reformer with his eyes open can neglect its importance. Its necessity and the special ability and inventiveness monopolised by it were fully recognised, for example, in the Minority Report of the Poor Law Commission of 1905.

β. But, then, on our own side we need to be quite clear about the same double aspect of our work. It necessarily claims a public status, not merely, as I said above, because of its magnitude, but because of the interconnection of the problems with which it deals. We all know how we are driven from a family in a mean street to housing and tuberculosis campaigns and demands for efficient local government.

We must be ready to bring the forces of our experience to bear on wider and wider problems, and to co-operate with any bodies or authorities who will take our questions up. In principle, the work is a public interest, in the same high sense as education or medicine; some of us would say as fine art or literature; but though this comparison has much truth in it, yet as the work has more directly to do with the life of the particular citizens it falls more naturally into the strictly social sphere.

It does not follow that its public rank should be that of a body directly representing the electorate, or subject to such a body. Public rank has many forms, and we trust to have shown how a free political thought might contrive or recognise what would be suitable to the very various functions which exist in a great community. Mr. Shairp (Conference number of *Review*, p. 155) speaks of "what I would call tentatively a Charities Board for the district," an idea familiar on a large scale from the Majority Report of the Poor Law Commission, of which the Provost was so important a member. The whole passage of Mr. Shairp's speech is well worth reading. I do not venture to dogmatise, but the suggestion illustrates at least in how many forms public value might receive recognition.

I conclude that our strong point, all opposition to which we must simply live down, is the highly trained work, with its double aspect, the art of helping and the organisation of public agencies which it involves. I take it that we will co-operate heartily with any agency which will recognise or embody these essentials, and that, while never abandoning our own name, we will grudge its own chosen name to no society or authority which will take these essentials seriously.

They mark the kind of service into which our movement has developed the old "almsgiving." The spirit of helpfulness is the same as in St. Paul, but it has developed a body more adequate to it by thought and experience. But even here it is necessary that we should be thoroughly clear in mind and method if we are to demand that our critics should be so too. I do not know whether we are absolutely above the imputation that we sometimes fall back into unprofitable relief work. I remember sitting on a Committee which, after introducing the special case system and acquiring an energetic Secretary, increased the money raised on cases from, say, £150 to near £1000 a year. But I remember our Treasurer, a man of great acuteness of mind, observing as he looked at the accounts, "Here we are pouring £800 a year into this district more than before. We may be doing good——." Of course, if it was all money that would otherwise have been badly spent in the district, that would be well. But these things are not easy to prove.

The relation of views very current among us to misconceptions entertained about us makes it our duty to be precise. There is a delicate problem here. We are, of course, non-political. Our members have a right both to their own general opinions, and to any opinions which they may have formed as to the connections between political ideas and the goodness or badness of methods for improving the condition of the people. But we have to remember, as an argument for extreme care and distinctness in tracing such connections, that any antagonism to the "civic" point of view blends *prima facie* in our critics' eyes with the errors of almsgiving, to which we are opposed, but from which they do not readily believe us to be free. Our cry of "independence," which is verbally,

and also I believe in spirit, the same as theirs, assumes to them a different complexion when it is directed against civic supervision or industrial combinations, and not, as in their mouths, against what they think private interferences founded upon class relations.

Against appearances of this kind, while we all have an indisputable right to our opinions, it is up to us to exhibit with perfect distinctness and precision the spirit of our trained service as a necessary function discharged in the public interest without fear or favour by the methods which experience has approved and further may approve, and in such co-operation with public authorities or subservience to them as may appear practically desirable at any moment. This, I believe, has always been our line, and I am sure that no sound charity organisationist has ever been influenced by prejudice in matters of practical co-operation. “No society can be constituted of similars.” “It takes all sorts to make a world.” The first saying is Aristotle’s. The second came to me through an old Lancashire nurse. There is no truth more necessary for all who do practical work.

Such a question of method as I have in mind was stated in Mr. Shairp’s Conference speech, to which I referred above, and was represented, as I said, by the Majority Report of the Poor Law Commission and by the long effort of the London Charity Organisation Society to obtain the establishment of a representative Hospitals Board, while in another form it is now being worked out upon the London School Care Committees, which all of us are watching, I suppose, with intense interest and some anxiety. Is the work here being pulled right by the skilled workers, or is their effort being swamped and frustrated by its conditions? How is the difficulty overcome about the handling of

public money by or through agents who are not fully official ? <sup>1</sup>

The best school inspector I ever knew or heard of used to tell me that he put great faith for the future in the method of Statutory Committees—*i.e.* committees of a public body, appointed under by-laws with Parliamentary sanction for a special service, probably with power of co-option. He thought that the ordinary representatives would be glad to be rid of onerous special work, and a habit would form itself of leaving certain branches of administration continuously in the hands of those who cared about them.

For all these problems the proof of the pudding is in the eating, and I am confident that the job will come to those who can tackle it. What we have to stand by, it seems to me, is a clear conception of charity organisation in that highest sense which it gives to the word charity, never forgetting its double implication of skilled individual treatment and a public interest and policy into which it ramifies. I see some new lights inform us from time to time that “casework” alone is to be left to the Charity Organisation Society. The idea would make our founders turn in their graves. Casework which is not handled as an engine of social improvement is not, I should have said, Charity Organisation Society work at all.

So I conclude—and it is little better than a platitude—that we should all of us always be endeavouring

<sup>1</sup> The London School Care Committees use public money for certain specific expenditures—*viz.* meals, medical and dental treatment, and visiting and inspecting staff. They have no funds for general casework, and do not raise any “on the case.” They can of course refer cases to other agencies—*e.g.* Charity Organisation Committees. It seems as if this system would hardly be adequate apart from a network of voluntary agencies doing less limited casework with voluntary funds. <sup>1</sup>

to keep our position clear and defensible, founding it definitely upon the facts and necessities of our work at its best and always bearing in mind its importance as a public function and the need of co-operation which this involves; and then, if there is still prejudice against a movement so convincingly a high public interest and so transparently a special social service of unique value, we have simply, having done our best to be distinct and sympathetic, to live the prejudice down.

## VIII

### SELECTION BY MAINTENANCE OF A SOCIAL STANDARD

1. WHAT right have we who are not expert students of the sciences of physical life to approach this difficult problem, involving, as it must, so much of the theory of evolution? We answer that we are compelled to act, and therefore it is inevitable that we should judge. *Who* are we that are compelled to act? In the first place, every one, in some degree, aspires to influence, or at least to criticise, the behaviour of the social authority in face of fundamental social problems. Secondly, every individual has to govern his personal conduct and to frame his share of public opinion, and ought to desire to do it upon rational grounds; and, last but not least, the typical example of civic responsibility, the heads of every household, and the parents of every family, have to take action on all-important matters of the kind in question. Consider for a moment this last-mentioned case. It is at once the type and the justification of the citizen's continuous effort to subordinate to the general uses of life a complex of sciences and services which he is inevitably incapable of mastering in his own person. Every householder, more particularly if he is a parent, has to deal with a great variety of specialists,

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with none of whom he can compete upon their own ground. Clergymen, educators, doctors, dentists, architects, builders, sanitary engineers, or inspectors, all providers of special commodities, you may say—with all of these the citizen has to help himself to construct his life and that of his dependents. The ultimate judgment rests, and must rest, with him. It is impossible that he should allow any specialist to run, as the phrase is, his household or his family. In this respect the citizen is the type of the statesman and the social reformer. They, like him, stand for the main conduct and purposes of life. In view of these, they have to act, and inevitably, therefore, they must be allowed to judge. And the same thing is true of the social student, who is, as Aristotle would have regarded him, in training to be a statesman.<sup>1</sup>

What he has to do, in problems where science most obviously impinges upon social practice, is to note and to survey the information which it appears to him to furnish, to point out the practical questions which it appears to him to raise, and further questions which in the light of social knowledge it seems to force him to ask, and ultimately to indicate the general line of social action which seems at the moment to meet the greatest part of the requirements which the discussion has brought to light.

Nothing could be more modest than the attitude required of him, but, also, nothing could be more

<sup>1</sup> This, and not the unscrupulous adventurer of our third-rate literature, is the true type of the politician. He represents the ordinary citizen in the task of framing a good life out of the innumerable special suggestions which are offered him. And he is maligned by all the experts, because he will not surrender control of the community to any one of them.

decisive. He need not say he is right ; but he must say that in the use of his discretion, from which he cannot escape, he is, in view of all considerations, acting for the best.

2. Following the method I have indicated, I will begin by trying to survey what we seem to learn from what is unambiguous in the utterances of recent science on the problem of selection in human society, and by trying to point out that the position of the thoughtful reformer is in some ways made more and not less perplexing by recent views of heredity. This point is only noticed to illustrate our need of self-consistent information from the scientific side, and the sort of perplexity to which thoughtful men are liable in turning to practical account such information as they can obtain.

Forty years ago it seemed plainer sailing than now. Everything, we believed, might be inherited, and there was a rising feeling for abstaining from marriage in the case of any defect which medical opinion pronounced "hereditary." I cite some sentences from Jowett's *Introduction to Plato's Republic*, published in 1871.

Owing to the very conditions of their existence (people) become emaciated, and hand on a similar life to their descendants. When, again, in private life we see a whole family one by one dropping into the grave under the Ate of some inherited malady, and the parents perhaps surviving them, do our minds ever go back silently to that day, twenty-five or thirty years before, on which, under the fairest auspices, amid the rejoicings of friends and acquaintances, a bride and bridegroom joined hands with one another?—The late Dr. Combe is said by his biographer to have resisted the temptation to marriage because he knew that he was subject to hereditary con-

sumption. One who deserved to be called a man of genius, a friend of my youth, was in the habit of wearing a black ribbon on his wrist, in order to remind him that, being liable to outbreaks of insanity, he must not give way to the natural impulse of affection; he died unmarried in a lunatic asylum. These two little facts suggest the reflection that a very few persons have done from a sense of duty what the rest of mankind ought to have done under like circumstances, if they had allowed themselves to think of all the misery which they were about to bring into the world.—The prohibition (of such marriages) in course of time would be protected by a *horror naturalis* similar to that which in all civilised ages and countries has prevented the marriage of near relations by blood.

We should certainly have counted alcoholism among these hereditary taints.

I cite these sentences only to show how relatively simple the problem then appeared, when we held that practically everything was inherited, and how ready thoughtful men were to act as scientific opinion appeared to indicate. To-day, with an equal readiness to be guided on the part of thoughtful men, the matter has become to the layman rather more difficult to grasp. I suppose that no disease depending on a micro-organism can be called strictly hereditary in the sense of being a character inhering in the continuous root-stock—the germ-plasm—on which all individuals are buds. (Of course, certain terrible *infections* are transmitted direct to offspring, but that is another story.) So that our old simple faith in hereditary disease has now to be replaced by a belief in inborn immunity on the one hand, or susceptibility on the other, to the assaults of the microbes. You do not inherit consumption; you may inherit a want

of immunity against it, and this has to be the support of our good old conviction that people with phthisical tendencies had better not marry. So with other defects than zymotic disease; it is not so easy to obtain a unanimous verdict that alcoholism and lunacy, and feeble-mindedness itself, are inborn peculiarities, root-stock attributes of particular strains, heritable in the normal course of things. Even if we are clear that a susceptibility "to the charm of alcohol" (Dr. Archdall Reid's poetic phrase) is existent in certain strains, and can only be extirpated by selection, we are discouraged on the whole from believing that the effects of alcoholism are handed down to children in the form of degeneracy, *e.g.* of mental defect.

We may take as a type of the advice now offered to us the conclusions of the Royal Commission on the Feeble-minded. As regards congenital mental defectives, you can condemn—whether or no you legally prohibit—fertile marriages absolutely. As regards lunatics, you can justify no general prohibition, and you cannot set out clearly in general terms the conditions under which marriage is permissible. The practical instruction is more complicated by conditions than it was forty years ago.

The three great cases in which multiplication is now accepted as undesirable are, as I gather, those of people very susceptible to tuberculosis, those of people very susceptible to "the charm of alcohol," and those of congenital mental defectives.<sup>1</sup> About, *e.g.*, the "emaciation," to use Jowett's word, of slum-dwellers, we have lost the simple faith that it naturally survives in the children of those who suffer from it,

<sup>1</sup> And, of course, that of the terrible infections I spoke of. But these are not, strictly, characters of the stock.

and this is replaced, as it seems to me, by no clear showing whether the fault is degeneracy and the remedy selection, or the fault is too little to eat and the remedy more food.

The light we have to-day seems certainly to spring from a deeper truth than we possessed forty years ago. But its range is very decidedly narrower, and, surveyed as a whole, the unanimous guidance to be obtained from science on the principles of social selection is not enough to constitute a theory of the subject adequate to direct social practice. We can all see, we have all long seen, the enormous importance of carrying it into action by the discouragement or prevention of multiplication in such cases as those already spoken of. But when we get beyond these rather simple points we find that the guidance is no longer unanimous.

3. Passing beyond the attempt to arrest the multiplication of strains that are definitely defective in marked characters, taken with good reason to be inborn, we come to a further demand for a positive policy of social selection. I am glad here to quote with the heartiest agreement a sentence from Major Leonard Darwin's inaugural address to the School of Sociology: "In all cases where different lines of advance are open to us there is a danger in attaching too much importance to any contrast between them; for the citadel of evil should be attacked on all sides at once if our forces are sufficient for such a movement."

Still, our instructors, even those of them who most clearly maintain the non-inheritance of acquired characters and the general principle of natural selection, do not speak at all with one voice when they come to deal with problems of human society. Within their ranks, and without in any way reviving the

problem whether or no the parents' acquirements are reproduced in the natural growth of the offspring, there is a division of opinion which for social practice seems to the layman to be absolutely fundamental.

(i.) Starting from the doctrine that nothing but inborn characters are transmitted from parents to children, we yet know next to nothing for practical purposes unless we also can estimate the differences of reaction to which the same set of inborn characters will give rise under different surroundings. Do inborn characters, for example, determine the physical and mental development of persons with the same sort of fatality with which they determine the colour of their eyes or their power of twitching their ears? I will state the problem in a pre-scientific form in order to suggest that as a consequence of the work of science up to to-day we have it upon us again. Robert Owen, at a public dinner given in Glasgow to Lancaster, the educationist, in the year 1812, expressed the following opinion: "If any number of children were exchanged at birth between the Society of Friends, of which our worthy guest, Joseph Lancaster, is a member, and the loose fraternity of St. Giles' in London, the children of the former would grow up like the children of the latter, prepared for every degree of crime, while those of the latter would become the same temperate, good, moral characters as the former."<sup>1</sup> The passage does not mention physical characters; but, in fact, such physical characters as depend upon use for their development are included in the corresponding modern view, and I shall treat the problem as concerning them no less than mental and moral properties.

The question then is this: Ruling out *definite*

<sup>1</sup> Lloyd Jones, *Robert Owen*, i. 100.

inborn defect, with which we have already dealt, can it be said that the general difference of mind and body between one social stratum and another is a difference depending on inborn qualities, due to social sifting, and only to be removed by selection ; or is it simply a difference produced by the environment, *e.g.* want of proper food and housing and parental care, in generation after generation as it arises, and capable therefore, *prima facie*, of being removed by alteration of the surroundings within the period of growth of any one generation ? Could the members of one social stratum be transformed into members of another, mentally and physically, by an alteration of their circumstances from birth upwards ? Or does the inborn nature, which it is now agreed that all creatures inherit, tie down the so-called inferior classes to a narrow groove of capacity and behaviour which distinguishes them permanently and inevitably from their so-called superiors ; almost, indeed, as a different variety of the human species ? In yet another form of words : Can we judge from the social position and the actual fortunes of a man or woman—a pauper or a casual labourer, or a starveling—whether they are desirable physical parents for the coming generation, or are social misery and misfortune compatible with an inborn nature capable of very different responses to wholly different stimuli ?

The question is, as I said, how far the same inborn characters may be capable of giving rise to widely different responses under widely different stimuli. When we believed that practically the whole parental life-history tended to be inherited by, to pass into, the child, the answer was a foregone conclusion. Now that we are taught that the child rather starts where the parent began, in consequence of a common

germinal basis, than carries over character out of the parents' actual development of brain and body, the question has to be re-stated. We now have it suggested that a leading inborn character of human beings, acquired by selection, actually consists in the ability to acquire by use enormously different dexterities and convictions and forms of intelligence. Thus, as I said, the layman appears to encounter within the ranks of the purest selectionist orthodoxy, and altogether apart from any revival of doctrines of use-inheritance, a difference of opinion which for his purposes is fundamental. Is all solid and permanent social improvement to be dependent on selection, and on such selection as shall favour the classes now considered "superior" in character and ability? Or has selection, except in case of the definite defects above dealt with, really little to say to the development of characters socially and humanly desirable?

Here is a significant quotation from Mr. De Morgan's novel, *Alice-for-Short* :

"How came you to go in for Mental Cases?" she asked. . . .

"I was a Mental Case myself.<sup>1</sup> Here. Acute suicidal mania. Then I married one of the attendants. . . . Mr. Gaisford is at Witley just now. That's the Convalescent Home. That's where I met him. We've no children. But I shouldn't have been the least afraid. I saw you thought of inheritance?" Alice nodded.

"There was nothing to inherit. I was as sane as you are now. But under the same circumstances you would try to kill yourself. It was the only thing a girl of sixteen,

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<sup>1</sup> The nurse who speaks is a nurse in Bethlehem Hospital—"Bedlam."

in her senses, could try to do, that I can see." Then, dropping her voice, though there was no one near, the nurse told Alice her story.

I think common-sense tells us that there must be cases like this. What proportion of the cases are like this is a further question.

I will cite a characteristic passage from Huxley : <sup>1</sup>

In a large proportion of cases crime and pauperism have nothing to do with heredity ; but are the consequences, partly of circumstances and partly of the possession of qualities which under different conditions of life might have excited esteem and even admiration. . . . The benevolence and open-handed generosity which adorn a rich man may make a pauper of a poor one ; the energy and courage to which the successful soldier owes his rise, the cool and daring subtlety to which the great financier owes his fortune, may very easily, under unfavourable conditions, lead their possessors to the gallows or to the hulks. Moreover, it is fairly probable that the children of a " failure " will receive from their other parent just that little modification of a character which makes all the difference.

Dr. Archdall Reid, I gather, practically agrees. Bar the consequences of feeble-mindedness and susceptibility to alcohol, and certain terrible *infections*, and we may say that the lowest population has descended " through sheer misfortune, including the great misfortune of a bad mental training."

And, of course, we cannot help noticing for ourselves such extraordinary sudden changes as the adoption of a new civilisation by the Japanese within a single generation. So that, while by no means asserting that all men are equal in inborn capacity,

<sup>1</sup> *Evolution and Ethics*, p. 39.

we cannot help wondering whether the limitations of character and ability are so strictly drawn by inheritance as a purely selectionist policy would imply.

(ii.) This line of thought suggests interesting considerations regarding the recent diminution of the birth-rate, and its selective operation which is alleged to be unfavourable to the superior stocks.

I will take the second point first. The inferior stocks, we are told, are less affected by the diminution of the birth-rate than the superior stocks, and therefore the inferior type of man and woman is tending to predominate and the superior is tending to extinction. Now, I suppose that we are not to doubt the existence of stocks of superior capacity, and if we knew which they were, and if we knew in what degree their capacities were socially desirable, and those of others which we should call inferior could without danger be dispensed with, all possible discouragement of the multiplication of the latter and encouragement of that of the former would be a desirable social policy. But at this point there is a suggestion that strikes me very forcibly. This argument about the selective birth-rate is surely an old one, and originated in a controversy within the limits of which it was an obvious truism. But in its present and wider application it is no longer a truism, but an allegation of fact which demands to be supported by strictly relevant evidence.

When the older Malthusian ideas were in the air, and prudence and self-control were held to be equivalent to the avoidance of a long family, it was a simple truism to retort: "Then the selective birth-rate must always be unfavourable to the classes endowed with prudence and self-control." And this was an un-

answerable objection to the pure prudential theory. But when we have come to consider that the question of population is not so much quantitative as qualitative (because there are some people who would always be superfluous, and others who never could become so), then, if we are going to identify the inferior stocks with the lower social strata, we have our work cut out for us. If we are convinced that the poorer classes, either by having long families or simply by being the poorer, have *ipso facto* established their lesser inborn capacity—their lesser degree of fitness—then we may lament the appearance of a selective birth-rate in their favour. But in the allegations current on this subject I seem to myself to see far too little discrimination, and I suspect this want of discrimination descended from the times when it seemed a truism that a long family proved inferiority. “The feeble-minded are highly prolific, though with a high death-rate.” Well, their case and that of one or two more types is clear, and we have dealt with it and ruled it out.

But when we go on to speak, for example, of casual labourers and criminals in the same breath with the feeble-minded as a class whose relative fertility is a danger to society, we wonder to what precise proposition we are to be committed. Criminals are a very large class; we saw what Huxley said of some of them. Casual labourers are a class including very many and varied elements. Bear in mind that we no longer hold the parent’s acquirements during his life-history to be transmitted to the child. From the point of view of heredity his fortunes only concern us as *evidence* of his transmissible qualities. From other points of view, of course, they concern us in other ways. But here we are speaking of heredity

alone. I do not think we can be sure that our rough classification of types of labour corresponds with any sets of inborn qualities, desirable or undesirable. We must remember the history of the English labouring class. Their position is not the result of a general social sifting from an equal start. Historically, they have been handicapped,<sup>1</sup> and I do not believe that the social position of individuals among the body is a trustworthy index to their transmissible qualities. Besides, unless a man's inborn qualities are very highly independent of the stimulus to which they have to respond, any favouritism, so to speak, exercised in encouragement of the fertility of the so-called superior classes or stocks would tend to disturb and might destroy that very utterance of their capacities, which has made us think them desirable types of citizens. We will return to this below.

And when the fear of the selective birth-rate is dispelled, the diminution of the rate of increase of population loses its principal terrors. Its true moral seems to me to be the extraordinary sensitiveness of the population rate, and its amenability to fashion and prevalent conviction. Huxley, writing in 1894, still thought the increase of population a leading perplexity of statesmen. We had been taught this doctrine for nearly one hundred years, and in the lifetime of the older among us a whole-hearted crusade and propaganda sprang up to enforce the doctrine. You will still find many people, who ought to be well informed, in the grip of the old population scare, and quite unaware of the diminishing birth-rate, or else welcoming it. The new state of things has hardly been for five years distinctly before the mind of

<sup>1</sup> T. H. Green, *Principles of Political Obligation*, sect. 229; and I now may add Mr. Maurice Hewlett's "Song of the Plow."

society.<sup>1</sup> My point is that though many factors, some of selfishness, have co-operated, the facts and the fashion have, on the whole, adapted themselves to the doctrines and convictions long prevalent throughout society. Now that these doctrines and convictions are being, by the logic of facts, seriously modified, I see every reason to expect that the sensitiveness which has shown itself in one direction will show itself under modified influences in another. And considering the ultimate difficulties of the problem in both directions, it appears to me that this extreme sensitiveness of the social reaction is a thing to be glad of. Its moral is, I believe, that the growth of population is very capable of adjusting itself to the needs and prospects of the human race, as presented to the social mind for any fairly continuous period.

(iii.) Thus no need is made out, I venture to submit, for applying, in any direction, the method of positive artificial selection or encouragement of multiplication. I cite a judgment of extreme importance from Professor Bateson's work on Mendel's *Principles of Heredity*:<sup>2</sup>

To the naturalist it is evident that, while the elimination of the hopelessly unfit is a reasonable and prudent policy for society to adopt, any attempt to distinguish certain strains as superior, and to give special encouragement to them, would probably fail to accomplish the object desired, and would certainly be unsafe.

The distinction is created partly by the fact that

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<sup>1</sup> It must be remembered that the actual total increase of population, as distinct from the percentage rate, is so far—*e.g.* for England and Wales—markedly greater in the last decade than it ever has been before. Written in 1910. This is true of the decennial increase 1901–1911.

<sup>2</sup> *Principles of Heredity*, 305 ff.

whereas our experience of what constitutes the extremes of unfitness is fairly reliable and definite, we have little to guide us in estimating the qualities for which society has or may have a use, or the numerical proportions in which they may be required. But specially important are the indications that in the extreme cases unfitness is comparatively definite in its genetic causation, and can, not infrequently, be recognised as due to the presence of a single genetic factor. There is as yet nothing in the descent of the higher mental qualities to suggest that they follow any single system of transmission. It is likely that both they and the more marked developments of physical powers result rather from the coincidence of numerous factors than from the possession of any one genetic element.

I will only repeat that if the qualities which it is desired to promote are, as we have seen to be suggested, capable of widely different developments according to difference of stimuli, the means employed to promote selection or to endow motherhood—with whatever object—might very well be found to destroy the responses in the way of more excellent parentage which they were intended to elicit. The physical heritage might be the same, but its consequences different, both in parents and children.<sup>1</sup>

4. Our instructors seem then to have brought us to this point. They advise, unanimously, a definite acceptance of a policy of elimination, so far as parentage is concerned, with regard to certain very strictly limited types of unfitness. And we see every reason to put their instruction in practice. When we further ask whether the conceptions of the unfit and the fit can safely be applied in the comparison of social

<sup>1</sup> I am glad to find myself here in agreement with Dr. Saleeby, *Sociological Review*, October 1910, p. 278.

strata, with a view to the discouragement of certain strains as inferior apart from defects specially diagnosed, and of the encouragement of others as superior, there seems to be a fundamental division of opinion. And according to our attitude towards these opinions there would also be raised certain further problems as to the scare of the falling birth-rate, at least in English-speaking populations,<sup>1</sup> and of the alleged selective birth-rate which is held to be operating unfavourably to the superior strains. It is presupposed that here, as throughout, we treat separately the question of defects that can be diagnosed and that of presumptions drawn from social position and good or ill "success." We concede the fertility of the feeble-minded, and are prepared to take them out of the problem. But when this is done, it seems to us that a question remains whether other selective birth-rates are as bad as they are painted.

Evidently we are in a difficulty when we try to go beyond the elimination of certain very definite unfitnesses. A man's or woman's life-history does not tell us for certain what their inborn qualities are. We do not know how much is to be attributed to variation of environment. Nor do we know what inborn qualities are in the long run socially desirable. It is to some of us a repulsive idea that we should try to breed up a society of the general type of "successful men." The roots of good life, we feel, probably lie somewhat deeper than that.

In this uncertainty, then, we are recommended by very good advisers to operate on the individuals of

. <sup>1</sup> Because for them we can date the rise and expansion of a certain propaganda. The American pamphlet which popularised the discussion in England was circulated by Mr. Bradlaugh and Mrs. Besant, mainly as a protest in favour of free speech, from 1876 onwards.

each generation through the environment. Huxley and Dr. Archdall Reid urge this policy; and Major Darwin, as we saw, was careful not to repudiate it utterly. True, by this policy you primarily touch the individual only and the one generation only. But suppose the individual to be suffering, not from want of inborn qualities, but from want of the environment necessary for their favourable development! And we do not seem to know that it is not so; or that it is not so in a certain proportion of instances. A man may be thin because he is one who can never get fat, or because he has not enough to eat. If there are both kinds of cases, it is a serious matter to neglect the second kind. Then it would seem that a policy of improving the environment is necessary, certainly in some cases, and we cannot really tell in how many. Well, then, why not? Improve the housing, the feeding, the sanitation, and the medical treatment of the people. Build up a perfect environment by force. This is what, in our doubt, we seem to be driven to; and the authorities, who have brought us so far, leave us, we are inclined to think, without much further guidance.

But here we remember that there are other considerations—partly urged by some of our authorities, partly within our own experience.

(i.) Outside the definite unfitnesses which we have admitted and supposed to be dealt with, every one, as I understand, would agree that there would probably be a large, though unknown, amount of defectiveness and inferiority, which is really due to inborn characters, and can be amended by no variation of surroundings. This factor, whatever its amount, can only be dealt with by selection.

It would be foolish to take up a method which

ould wholly abandon all regard for selection, *i.e.* o make no attempt at all to favour the predominance of good stocks in so far as they may be presumed to fulfil certain general conditions. Can we then lay down general conditions which will tend to differentiate our social methods in favour of good stocks, even when we cannot say precisely in what inborn characters the excellence of the stocks consists? I believe that we can, and I shall endeavour to explain this possibility.

(ii.) Our authorities <sup>1</sup> have named the *modus operandi* through the environment, but have not told us much about its nature. But it is plain, from what has just been said, that it cannot be without influence on the general problem of selection. If we proceed by guaranteeing the best surroundings equally and unconditionally to all comers, we shall lose every chance of differentiating in favour of the better element which we presume to exist, and we shall incur the dangers of promoting parasitism. Now we are not advocating a general *régime* of hardship. It is clear, I suppose, that where general hardship stamps out the weak, it often weakens those who would have been strong; so that as a selective agency it is wasteful and ineffective. But we are saying that in human society, when you set to work improving surroundings, there are many things to be thought of. You must secure certain safeguards. You must obtain certain responses and reactions. You must, in a word, maintain a standard demand on the objects of your treatment; and this standard demand, as we are now to see, will keep you straight from the point of view of selection, while guiding you, or by guiding you, in your operations on environment.

<sup>1</sup> *E.g.* Huxley and Dr. Archdall Reid.

5. I suggest, then, in conclusion, that there is a social policy and attitude which will guide us fairly right in the main over the whole area of the problem of social selection, which is very much wider than the question of the elimination of the definitely unfit. To this policy and attitude I should give the name of maintenance of the struggle for existence in the social sense, or the maintenance of natural selection in the social sense of that term.

The conception is definite, and requires definite explanation. With a view to this we must revert to the full meaning, as Darwin laid it down, of the phrase, "struggle for existence."<sup>1</sup> The important point is that the expression does not, as is often stated, primarily imply the alternative of life or death for the individual. The struggle for existence, he tells us, is really a struggle for success in leaving progeny. And in dealing with creatures to whose progeny parental care is essential, we may surely at our own risk add to Darwin's words, "success in leaving progeny," the further qualification, "themselves likely to be successful in leaving progeny."

Now in the animal world, and also in a great degree among the human race, there are two kinds at least of success in leaving progeny. There is a high fertility, without special command of the resources of life or special parental care, and there is a high degree of parental care and command of the resources of life, with often a more moderate, but not necessarily a low fertility. It is plain that the former is relatively

<sup>1</sup> When Darwin says in the passage here referred to, *Origin of Species*, sixth ed. p. 48, that he uses the phrase in a metaphorical sense, he obviously means that it has a wide and pregnant significance. I think it is to be regretted that Dr. Ward has laid hold of the term "metaphorical," and relied on it to disparage the significance of Darwin's usage (*Naturalism and Agnosticism*, i. 275).

likely to fail in the second qualification of success, that the progeny left shall be likely themselves to succeed in leaving progeny. In other words, such fertility will be liable to a high rate of unsucccess, though not necessarily one which will destroy the whole preponderance given by the fertility. For that result we are looking to other causes.

The former kind of fertility is what we admit to exist in the feeble-minded, and perhaps in some other and analogous types.<sup>1</sup> But these types we have urged throughout, so far as definable, should be taken out of the problem by segregation. We could then go forward to lay down the nature of the social struggle for existence, with a view to the promotion of the other type of fertility (with its greater chance of success in leaving progeny themselves successful) on the basis of Darwin's statement. Success in the struggle for existence, in the social sense, would then mean success in leaving progeny, such as themselves to be successful in leaving progeny. And, mere excessive animal fertility being ruled out, we could say that on the whole the means to this success would be, on the one hand, such discharge of social function as would confer a command over the resources of life; on the other hand, the capacity for sound family relations and adequate parental care.

On this basis we could advocate a policy and attitude of what I have already called natural selection in the social sense, consisting in the maintenance of the struggle for existence in the social sense. This policy and attitude, conformably with the meaning which we have ascribed to the struggle for existence, has nothing to do with the maintenance of a hardship

<sup>1</sup> We saw that it is a very doubtful proceeding to apply this idea of undesirable fertility to whole social strata indiscriminately.

of conditions such as to endanger individual life. It is not true, as is often asserted, that natural selection operates exclusively through the destruction of individual existence. The point is not existence, but parentage. Social natural selection and the social struggle for existence operate essentially through the prevention or discouragement of mating, and may be brought into action through the most various forms of policy in matters of public assistance, through public opinion, and the education of the public mind, passing also into the province of private opinion and conduct.

The attitude and policy here advocated would be, in a word, in every way to maintain and enforce the normal social demands as test-conditions of parentage. The normal social demands, I mean, on both sides ; both in the discharge of social function as instrumental to an adequate command of the resources of life, and in the apparent will and capacity to enter upon parentage as a matter involving the foundation and government of a household, and complete parental care.

It is objected, I know, that these are not normal social demands ; that as things are the individual has no difficulty in mating without conforming to any test-conditions whatever. To this I reply that the most frequent and alarming cases of such multiplication are ruled out by the policy which all through we have presupposed ; and that though sound family life with high parental care may be outstripped in its results by this and that excessive fertility, yet it always tends to give a reliable birth-rate with a low death-rate—a strong probability of the progeny being themselves successful in leaving progeny—and must tend to become the normal and adequate source of

sound population in as far as the lower types of fertility are socially discouraged and ruled out.<sup>1</sup> And it presupposes capacities and conditions which are perfectly well understood, and which have a sound claim to be recognised as the normal social conditions of mating. Such recognition, public and private, would constitute the healthy social policy and attitude which is here advocated.

The point in this conception which I am particularly anxious to insist upon, and to distinguish from other views, lies in the acceptance of actual social functions—of the power and will to render service in the given social commonwealth—as a condition precedent of fitness for mating. This point makes our conception fundamentally distinct from all, of whatever school, which set up theoretical judgments, ethical or biological, of qualities of persons, as grounds for accepting and endowing them with a view to mating; whether by endowment of motherhood (otherwise than through fatherhood),<sup>2</sup> or by bonuses to selected families, or simply by a lavish policy of public assistance to those who without it could not maintain a household. This is why we insist on the term “natural” in our definition of social selection. We do not imply an infra-social struggle by remorseless competition; we do mean a maintenance of normal-social responsibilities and demands. Society is not itself perfect, nor a perfect standard of human capacity. But it is the best we have, and infinitely more to be trusted than the theory of any individual. It springs out of our manifold needs and powers, and

<sup>1</sup> We saw above what a sensitive thing the birth-rate is, and how capable, according to all analogy, of recovering itself, if the desirability of a recovery should be urgent.

<sup>2</sup> Here I agree with Dr. Saleeby, *Sociological Review*, l.c.

is far more liberal, many-sided, and natural than the knowledge and judgment of any man, or of any science. It is here maintained, then, that we shall be right on the whole if we demand that the individual who aspires to parentage shall be *voll*, complete or adequate, as tested by *de facto* will and capacity to give a value in the way of social service for which a return adequate to self-support is received from society. This will and capacity, as tested in life, and the apparent will and capacity to found and govern a household, are the tests and pre-conditions of mating according to the policy and attitude of natural selection in the social sense.

This policy and attitude, as it appears to me, meets the requirements both of improvement through selection and of improvement through the environment. It maintains a standard, a social demand, as the pre-condition of mating. It rejects those who *cannot* come up to it, presumably owing to inborn defect, and so far, I suppose, satisfies the selectionist. It also adjusts the improvement of surroundings so as to reject those who, in spite of offered opportunities, *will not*, as we commonly say, come up to it. That is, those who, having nothing apparently to prevent them but a lack of their own exertions, fail *de facto* to meet the requirements which it imposes. In this way it prescribes the right course for those who try to effect improvement through surroundings.

Thus it is the only kind of selection which is really practicable in the case of moral beings of apparently full calibre. At the same time, it is the only guide to the true method of amelioration through the environment. You cannot select or reject moral beings by mere inspection at a given moment; you cannot possibly judge in that way of their capacities

for development, always supposing the unfitnesses, of which there are clear and direct physical or mental signs, to have been eliminated by other methods. Again, you cannot make moral beings into what you want by modifying their surroundings. They must co-operate ; and to make them do this you must hold up a demand before them.

Thus the simple and adequate policy is to set the standard which you hold socially necessary, and which we say is provided for you by normal society. Then you "select" by rejecting those who *cannot* come up to it ; and you "improve through environment" by requiring all who are to profit by your improvements to meet them by certain reactions and responses, and by rejecting those who *will not*. And for the application of the method it is not necessary to be able to distinguish those who cannot meet the standard because they have not the capacity, from those who will not, because they will not use the capacity. Whether they cannot or whether they will not, they are unfit for the social right and duty of parentage.<sup>1</sup> And selection, or the right kind of improvement through environment, takes place automatically if only the standard is maintained.

How is it possible to maintain a standard which requires you to reject people from mating ? Well, all sorts of means of discouragement, public and private, are in our power. And it is all-important to note this, and not to fancy that you can do nothing unless you can kill the unsatisfactory individual. I have had

<sup>1</sup> Therefore I am not so much alarmed as many good judges have been, if it is to be doubtful whether alcoholism is a cause of filial degeneracy. No one has said that an alcoholic person is a good head of a family, whether or no he may be a safe parent physically. And, not being likely to be a good head of a family, a social standard would reject him.

in mind to a great extent the policy of public assistance authorities, and various proposals for the artificial encouragement of population. Against all these I advocate our "natural" standard of selection. Then there is the action of parents and guardians dependent on the education of general opinion; and ultimately the action of the women themselves. Let them raise the standard which they demand of their mates,<sup>1</sup> and the battle is won.

<sup>1</sup> It will be said "fastidiousness is difficult; there are too few men to go round." Here there is a practical point insufficiently noticed. More male children are born than female; but more die during childhood. To arrest this cause of disparity would strike at one great reason of the falling birth-rate.

## IX

### THE AFFINITY OF PHILOSOPHY AND CASEWORK

To begin with, you may ask why drag in Philosophy ? Casework is difficult enough ; why study it in the light of something else which is, if possible, still more difficult ? I will try to explain my reason, and it will make an introduction to the subject.

It is not that I want to lay down doctrines. I only want to suggest an analogy, which I have found helpful to myself. There is a close affinity between philosophy and the higher kinds of practical work, such as our casework, though, of course, they are not the same thing. I should think we have all, one way or another, come across the old notion of the three stages of experience ; call them " Common sense," " Science " (like mathematics, economics, biology, where you have to do with " laws " and " principles "), and in the third stage back again to common sense, carrying your laws and principles with you, like an engineer with his mathematics or a doctor with his biology.

Philosophy belongs *par excellence* to this third stage. It needs an eye for facts and a sense of values. And our casework is the same in this respect. It needs a good eye—a sound common sense—to begin

with, then a study of causes and principles, and then back to your common sense, with a trained judgment of values—a trained judgment, that is, of what makes life worth living—and a common-sense insight, also trained by science, as to how to help people to get it.

I will carry this point further by an illustration which, I hope, takes us into the heart of our subject. Look at the stages of one's knowledge of a great city. There is no better example of what a philosopher means by knowledge, and it just fits in with what we want in casework.

When you first come to a great city it is all strange to you: streets and great buildings and bewildering crowds. Then the outside of things becomes familiar, and you begin, if you have an eye, to notice significant details.

You begin from the outside, things in the streets attract your attention; and gradually you begin to see how they hang together—the ways different people make their living, and the character thus impressed on different neighbourhoods. You begin to probe a little deeper, and to study the people themselves, and also all that devoted students have written and taught about the causes of what you see: about economics, social reform, housing, Poor Law, and the rest of it. That is your second stage of experience. Many and many Londoners never reach it.

Then, if you keep up your interest, the third stage of experience begins to open up before you. You come back to the life of the streets and shops, and the crowds who besiege the tramcars at night, and the influences that work upon the homes of the people, some of whom you have learned to know intimately. And the face of the great city has become expressive to you—like a friend's face, from which you know if

he is ill or in distress or if he is well and happy ; the look of the streets and houses speaks to you ; streets, houses, gardens, the surface of the civilised earth, are members of society, people will tell you now. In a word, what you see has become *symbolic* ; it reveals to you a great life behind it ; and you live with the currents of this life, and are at home in it, seeing and feeling the causes of its happiness and unhappiness or its worthiness or unworthiness. That is the sort of thing a philosopher means by knowledge, and that is the sort of thing, I take it, you want as a basis for casework.

We used to be told, the first thing is to *chart* your district. I suppose, now, you find this pretty much done to your hand, through the registration system, and through the widespreading knowledge and friendships of those who are your guides. All the same, it remains to be done by each one for him- or herself. You have to make the knowledge your own ; in the long run you cannot work on other people's knowledge, nor on other people's friendships. " Charting " your district does not mean merely having a list of agencies stuck up on the wall ; it means a spiritual chart ; a chart of influences, temptations, resources, true help and false help, and above all things, surely, a plan of friendships. Your mind must be a spiritual focus of your district.

Every case, that is, every person and family who needs your help, will, I suppose, have two main aspects. He or she will be, like yourself, a meeting-point of all or some of these influences of your district ; and others as well, for he has perhaps not lived there always ; and will also be a human being. You are in relation with him in both ways ; of course, I do not mean that they are separate. Humanity responds to

the influences immediately round it ; but this is not all there is in a man, there is much in him that has not been brought out—that is what I mean to say.

Now here, I think, we come to the main thing I can suggest about casework. It is nothing new—only a little bit of theory which is more use as an encouragement perhaps than as a guide ; for the guidance in detail must come mainly from your trained common sense.

But I will approach it in this way. I asked an experienced worker, "What is the chief thing I ought to say to them about casework?" and I got the answer, "Individualise the case ; don't classify." I am impelled here to digress, and put before you the three rules laid down for interpreting the ancient classics by the great teacher Moritz Haupt, of Berlin. They are so sound that I think they apply to the whole of every attempt to understand the life of others. He said : (1) "Man soll nicht übersetzen," "You are not to translate," *i.e.* you are to fix your mind on the expression before you in its own context, and not to accept ready-made equivalents for it. One notices how different case-papers are that are taken down by different people, some pointed, some inexpressive. (2) "Grammatische Kunstaussdrücke soll man nicht brauchen," "You are not to employ grammatical formulæ"—that is our "not to classify"—not to let names and phrases come between you and the life you have to interpret, "a subjunctive mood" or "a chronic unemployed" ; (3) "Man soll nicht logisch sondern psychologisch verstehen," "You are to interpret psychologically and not logically." Did you ever happen to read, for instance, an old *Review* article called "An Apology for False Statements," reprinted in the large edition of Mrs.

Bosanquet's *Standard of Life* ? False statements, as we call them, are so very natural, and by no means always show "intent to deceive."

Of course you *must* know the classification ; Moritz Haupt did not mean that an interpreter of the classics should be ignorant of grammar. He meant, I take it, what we mean when we say that all these things—rules, forms, headings, red-tape even—are good servants but bad masters. In a word, you must *subordinate* classification to individualisation.

The reason of this ? Well, it is, in principle, that an individual human being, a mind, is inexhaustible ; and this is true both of yourself and of the person you are trying to help, and because it is true of both of you, it is true of the resources of the world which surrounds you both.

You may say, this does not seem the fact in practice ; on the contrary, one appears very quickly to get to the end of most people, and more particularly of oneself. I know I used soon to get to the end of myself, sitting on a committee with numberless cases before it of people who seemed helpless and hopeless.

This is true also ; one does soon get to the end of oneself and others. But it is a good thing to see the reason ; and the reason is just our own weakness and the weakness of those whom we are trying to assist. Mr. Gage Gardiner, one of our very best secretaries, to whom I was sent as a beginner to get some sense put into me, impressed me greatly by saying, " Of course, you know, among the reasons for non-assistance there ought to be a heading, ' Incompetence of the Committee.' "

It remains true, then, that there is a whole world of resources open to you and to your case ; each of you has, or is, a mind which can be always finding

out and practising new things, and though you are very limited, yet your limit is not ironclad or unremovable; it is just the limit of your faith and courage and ingenuity and painstaking. I remember a worker dealing with a slippery customer who didn't want to repay a loan, and would not name a time when he would be found at home. The worker pressed him, "Well, when *can* I find you at home?" The man growled out, "At 12 o'clock midnight." "All right," the worker said, and went cheerfully, having a long journey to make, at the time appointed, and got his repayments. Now, I am not saying one should make a rule out of that. The worker just saw it was the thing to do in that case. Another man might have done something else, and succeeded equally well. All one knows is that he did not give in, and that he scored. The point is merely that there is always some resource, if you can only see it.

One needs to think of this, and it brings out the point very well, when you meet the incorrigible commonplace objector to our work—the man who tries to prove that you mostly don't and can't be of use to any one under present social conditions. He says this sort of thing: "Suppose you meet with a case of hopeless unemployment, and illness in the house, what are you going to do about it? You can't help except by brute force, *i.e.* simply supporting the family, and that is what ought to be done, but only a State agency can do it for the numbers who need it."

Now, if you allow that sort of statement to pass, I think the enemy has got you. You have then allowed three inexhaustible living forces to be reduced to a barren formula, and a very poor one at that. The three living forces are the man in need, yourself, and

the world in which you both are, of which your charted district is the nearest part, or, still nearer, his family. I think you must answer: "The assumption is impossible. A living person with his family, with the world about him, and myself a human being representing a whole network of human beings interested in him, must have much more in him and open to him than the sort of  $x$  and  $y$  you offer me. *What* more I cannot say till I have seen him and made inquiry. And I quite admit that I *may* not be able to say anything to the point even then. But certainly there is more there, whether I can see it or not."

I often think in this connection of the stories of detectives and of adventures. You know the sort of thing; there is some one locked up in a prison with walls twelve feet thick, and the impossibilities of escaping are all piled up against him. But you know it is going to be all right when the hero comes along; he will perhaps tap the wall and find a hollow place and a passage, and will walk off with the prisoner as comfortable as you please. The thing is coarsely pictured, but the moral is true enough in general; the hero succeeds because he has thought of some pretty obvious idea that has occurred to no one else, or has pluck and ingenuity to try some simple device no one else ventured to try. Your inquiries are just tapping the prison wall; and you do find a hollow place and a way out. You can't do it by rule; it is in the individual case and individual conditions that there lies some clue, if you are clever and painstaking enough to find it. I say you can't do it by rule; but it helps immensely, of course, to know all the rules, *i.e.* all the hints taken from ways and means that are often successful and that point out dangers. And above all, it helps, nay, it is almost the whole game,

to know the people and their world, and to care for them very much.

This is the full meaning of charting your district, and the full use of our registration work. The individualising, the adapting yourself, by help of the resources, is the thing. Here is a little case, quite simple, but just fresh in my mind. A girl, doing dressmaking at home, but the custom very small and irregular; a good chance, owing to the war, of regular clerk's work at good regular pay, but training needed, and to leave the old groove. The girl was funking it. I should probably have let it go at that if it had been my case, and thereby have qualified for an entry under Mr. Gage Gardiner's heading. But there was a better judgment at work—a rather sharp letter was written, pointing out what a disappointment and failure it would mean to lose this chance. Of course the writer had long-standing influence over the girl. The girl agreed to try the training, succeeded better than she expected, and now is on the way to regular, well-paid employment under fairly human conditions. Perfectly simple, as I said. Any secretary here would do it with his or her little finger; yet it means the rescue of a life from ill-paid drudgery, and, I suppose, two men set free to serve—the brother who was keeping the family, and the clerk whose place she takes. We may note that the acquaintance with the family which gave the knowledge and power to do it arose from the careful observance of our habit of visiting our pensioners. The case was in the family of an old city charities pensioner, handed over to some of us outside London some fourteen years ago. The pensioner died long since, but the family have become our friends.

Well, then, this idea of individualising our casework

I call a serviceable idea, and the bit of theory behind it, if it sustains our faith in it, I consider a useful little bit of theory. You may call the theory by any name you like. Call it the principle of the infinity of mind. But in these words alone it is not of the least use to you. And the workers who apply it best have probably never heard that name for it. What they would say, I suppose, would be something like this, "It's no earthly use talking about what can be done until you have gone carefully into the case." But there is no harm in having a reason for the faith that is in you; only the reason is futile without its application.

Well, then, this is the way in which casework requires you to look at things, and, as I said, it is rather like the way in which philosophy looks at them. Both represent the third stage of experience. First common sense, then science, then science plus common sense. To philosophise is to vitalise, to individualise; so is treating a case.

This rather forces on us the question how far we rely on rules or principles in the Charity Organisation Society. It comes up to be talked of every now and then. The old thing we used to say was, we have principles but no rules. That meant, I suppose, that the rules "don't pay back-rent"; "you can't help chronic unemployed," "you should always see the man," are hints about the best way to work, founded on reason and experience, but our servants, not our masters. Even our one rule which is almost infallible, "Do nothing without thorough inquiry," of course admits of exception in case of interim relief. I remember Sir Charles Loch saying, when we were accused of slowness, that it lay absolutely with the district committees; they might give guineas upon guineas in

interim relief if they thought right—of course taking the risk of doing very serious mischief. Even interim relief, however, would, I presume, hardly ever be given without the home visit. But this is not because of a rule, but because it is so reasonable. Why not visit the home? It may be a false address. Even so, I do not know about homeless cases referred to a refuge *pro tempore*. There will be no home visit there. They might be an exception even to this rule.

Even "principles," we were told in Council the other day, should not be recommended to us as Charity Organisation Society principles, but only as the right principles. They should not be a shibboleth, dividing us from the rest of humanity, and they should be supported because they are right, not because they are ours. That seems to me all very true, but only half the truth. We have our flag, which we believe to be the flag of humanity; we inscribe upon it the things which, it is our faith, are most important to man. It is "ours" in particular, it is "Charity Organisation Society," only because we are banded together to put in practice a certain attitude towards life, which is not as yet recognised by every one as right, though we believe that it ought to be, and is so much more than people know. And we might do well to speak of an attitude to life sometimes as well as of principles, or even in place of them. Because in a great concerted work like ours the feeling and spirit of it, though you can more or less put them in clear statements, are yet much more than you can put in clear-cut words. This is very important, I think. Our work is of the third stage of experience. We don't start with bare doctrines or principles and derive our actions from them. We start with common sense and a spirit of thorough service, and the reasons

of things come to us, to all of us, by each other's help, and that of those who have gone before, as we join hands in the work, and learn by experience; some being more of students, some more practical people. So, I mean, it is really a life or an attitude or a spirit that we share, and if you understand principles as the spirit of a life and the banner of a great human cause, then we have principles, and they *are* Charity Organisation Society principles, because they interpret a human good which is certainly the common possession of mankind, but which not every one recognises as clearly as we believe we recognise it. Only, of course, sometimes you must try to express yourself in word, as you are always doing in action. And then you say that you are trying to make clear your principles—the central point or the fulcrum of your practical attitude.

Therefore, accepting the need of sometimes crystallising our attitude into words, one might suggest that the principle underlying our work is that we value mind above body; that we value character and intelligence above comfort and external regulation. But this statement would be quite misleading without the reason why; because we refuse, I take it, to set the one thing against the other; that is, we say that the one includes the other—mind includes body—but not the other the one—body does not include mind. We place mind *above* body only in the sense that (1) it is mind that feels and judges the value of the whole arrangement together, mind and body and the world; and (2) it is mind that governs the whole arrangement with a view to the values that can be got out of it. Anything that can be done for our bodies, or for any one else's, can only be desired and achieved by the excellence of our minds and of theirs. So, as a

mere test of success, I should be quite willing to have our work judged by its consequences in permanent and general bodily well-being. Because I am absolutely sure that *such* well-being cannot be separated from control by character and intelligence.

Now, I am not saying that Council has ever passed a resolution in terms like these, *e.g.* "that mind is infinite and is the ultimate power of all powers." There would be some derision in Council if one proposed it. I am suggesting it at my own peril, as an interpretation of the attitude which it seems to me that all of us implicitly share in the work which is our living bond—an attitude from which such expressions as we use in the Manual naturally flow.

One word more about "rules." Long ago we banished the phrase "undeserving" from our case-papers, though I believe the novelists all imagine it to be our favourite category. (In speaking of the novelists let me digress for a moment to protest against the nonsensical phrase "charitable organisation," which is coming to be used as an equivalent for "society engaged in relief work." It is obviously a misconstruction of our title, using the words which indicate our general purpose, extending over the whole field of social work, as a mere descriptive phrase for a single association.)

But to return. We have got rid of the category of "undeserving," but I suppose we have an idea that bad character is apt to make a case "unhelpable." So it is *apt* to ; but we must not, I suppose, take it as a fixed rule, only as a hint, and we should always judge on the possibilities of the particular case. Here is a case ; it has been in print ; I daresay most of you know it, but some may not. A man's brother

was charged before a magistrate with stealing sausages. This so greatly annoyed the man—he was having his glass of a Saturday—that he went down to the police-court and assaulted the principal witness against his brother, and was promptly sent to prison for two months. His wife, who had children, applied to the Guardians, who offered the house. She came to the Charity Organisation Society—Shoreditch. I don't know whether they thought the man had shown laudable family feeling, but they had him interviewed in prison, and arranged to keep his wife and children while he was away, and he to repay them, which he did. I daresay this would be thought a very simple case now, but I think in those days some committees would have shied at it. It would read oddly, "Applicant, wife of a man in prison for assault committed in state of intoxication." I should think the committee were right, were they not?

But I don't suppose I have anything to teach you in casework. I should imagine that the machinery at your command is enormously improved and extended to-day from what it was in my time. And I should think that your minds are freer, expanded by the general movement of ideas and by the necessity of co-operation with other agencies. I notice a feeling—we had a striking expression of it one day in Council—that the level of our very best workers is not too good for *all* the work of a district office, and that *all* the details of receiving applicants and making inquiries in the district need to be carried out with a discretion and considerateness which we have been too apt to restrict to the very most important and difficult work—that there should be no roughness or treatment of applicants *de haut en bas, anywhere* in a Charity Organisation Society office. I think this is a

sign of the times, and a very good one so far as my judgment goes.

I should suppose that to-day you are more likely to be embarrassed by the number of agencies on the ground than by the lack of them, and that your difficulties really must be in avoiding competition and in securing a sufficiently high standard of work while maintaining friendly co-operation. I should think there must be statesmanship as well as skilled relief work in dealing with every case. Organising on the case, which was rather at its beginning in my time—rather an ideal—must now, I should think, be an ever-present necessity. It just means—does it not?—analysing and working out your case on the basis of your chart of the district, calling in the agencies according to your judgment of their different functions. And it involves, I suppose, a reaction back from the cases upon the various agencies, and upon the life of the districts and the great city, and the whole country, which implicates both your work in the district, and ultimately the Council office and the whole system of societies in sympathy with us. I mean, it is from your casework, your experience of, say, the needs of children, or of housing, of the Poor Law, or of tuberculous cases, that there radiate the influences which end in better co-operation of agencies, in great national movements, in the policy of the Council, in legislative and administrative changes. It is important to realise what comes up from our casework, as well as what goes down into it.

Returning to the problem of co-operation, I should think you must have questions of over-visiting and of over-relief which must tax all your judgment to deal with. I remember working with the district nurses, who had a most able and zealous representa-

tive on our local committee. They helped us quite immensely, both with information and with active assistance. But there was one limit. They would not co-operate negatively. Their point was to get their patient well. If we wanted to impose conditions on our sick-relief in their cases, they would not assent. They would be perfectly good-humoured and straightforward, but they would simply get the relief from other sources, which through their numerous friends they were well able to do. This is a general question which was becoming acute about the time when I ceased to work locally. We *used* to say, the question of money does not come in ; decide the treatment on the merits, and then raise the money. (And certainly it is wrong to spend money because you have it to spend. But it is often done.) But then we found that people organised us, instead of our organising them. They brought us the cases they knew we should raise money for, and spent their own money on cases which they knew we should not approve of. This was a serious matter, because it meant a sort of organisation for the benefit of bad relief work ; and in 1898 Council suggested to committees that they might decline to proceed with a case where the referring agency, being able to contribute, refuses to do so. This is a sort of reciprocity bargain, a sort of hostile tariffs, but obviously does not go to the root of the matter. Plainly, the ultimate cure is only in a higher standard of relief work on the part of all agencies, in friendship and conversion.

So, again, you are brought across such general questions as that of school feeding, and in all these things the method of charting the district develops into suggestions for better general organisation. The important point is that the very chaos of agencies,

whose overlapping and overstraining leads to bad work, contains, when you consider them all together with reference to cases, the suggestion for a scheme of better work, which is the organisation at which we aim. The order lies implicit in the disorder; you have to evolve it out of the given material.

We were talking at Council the other day about influence in a district, and very strong opinions were expressed in favour of a certain reticence, an abstinence from preaching, and talking like superior persons. I feel about this, as I said at the time, that considerateness, and, to put it plainly, good manners and cordiality, which are absolutely necessary, do not exclude taking a decided line and letting it be known. I do feel that great influence has often attached to a man or woman who never lowers the flag. I think of Mr. Albert Pell, and our old friend Mr. Mackay, and the weight which they and others like them have carried through their resolute and decided front. Mr. Pell was best known as a Poor Law man, but it seems to me the same kind of thing. If he were accused of hard treatment of cases, he challenged publicity, and fought the imputations, he said, as you would fight a parliamentary election, by meetings and speeches, and I think he always carried his point. Mr. Price, I believe it was, used to say, in the days of our great unpopularity, "the working people may hate you, but they trust you; they know you don't tell them lies." I think all this should be borne in mind. There is power in courage and decision. And with regard to applicants, it is a great thing to have your line thoroughly known in a district. Raising expectations and disappointing them is the fatal thing, even for popularity. But my main argument is that there is no conflict between the two lines; good

manners and absence of pretension may go along with perfect decision and a readiness to give reasons.

One of these questions of tact came up at Council the other day ; the question of taking a clergyman's cases together at a certain time, so as to spare him sitting through the whole committee. I am not sure—it was my fault perhaps—if we raised the question whether the clergy whose time was thus to be spared were to be members of committee or not. It strikes me as perhaps not altogether healthy that members of committee should come as a rule for their own cases only. Great evils are said to have arisen in that way on Boards of Guardians. It tends to pass into wishing just to get help for your own case and then go. I merely mention the point. Of course it is quite natural now and then to take a case out of its order to suit any very busy man or woman on a committee.

I hope that the main lines of our casework follow from what I have said. Chart the district, work towards a division of labour—every agency having a distinct province and keeping within it, knowing that if it trespasses it must do harm—*e.g.* if the hospitals do the General Practitioner's work ; organise on the case, remembering also that in every person, especially every family, there is infinitely more than you can see, and that all depends on how much you can see in him and his world—your inquiries are auxiliary to that. And carry the case up to the state of the district and the country, as you carry the agencies down to the case. And your practical common sense is to be of the third stage, *i.e.* it is to have science behind it and in it ; and the passion for the improvement of the condition of the people by the triumph of character and intelligence is the life-blood of all your action. And I should be inclined to add, absolute friendliness with other

workers and with all who are interested in cases, considerateness, and good temper, and never to preach, except when challenged or summoned as I am to-day. But yet, never to lower the flag; always to be ready to point out respectfully but distinctly your reasons for the faith that is in you. I think, you know, it is well not to talk too loftily. But all the same, we have a faith, and, I believe, a strong feeling of comradeship and trust in one another. I know nowhere where I feel so sure of unity in the good cause and of trustworthy friendship as in the Charity Organisation Society.

One word in conclusion about this, about the value of our faith. I know it is a danger to speak too gushingly. There was a time at which, in connection with some of the great public schools, one used to hear a great deal about spirituality and purity, and it rather tended to make one feel ill. All the same, I suspect that young workers, otherwise desirous to help us and throw in their lot with us, are apt to be put off by a certain slur which may be cast on our work, and I should like to say a word about it, because I am prepared to fight this point to the death. I suspect that our work and methods are often compared unfavourably with ideas which favour more complete social reconstruction. Our work may be held "second best," a palliative, not the real thing, not "drastic"—an attractive word. I would, in passing, recognise that we have had very good service from people who regarded it so; a convinced Socialist curate was one of the very best Charity Organisation workers I ever saw. He knew the life of the people and saw the need for our work, but believed in Collectivism beyond. He was absolutely straight, and never tried to get round us in any way, but

worked very hard and most thoroughly. I honoured him.

Still, the idea of doing what is second best is disagreeable, and we find that people are naturally attracted by what seems to promise more brilliant and universal results—social reconstruction of one kind or another. To work for this seems like working for a new heaven and a new earth, while we seem content with the old ones.

I believe this difference of feeling rests on a profoundly contrasted view of life and the world. And I believe that our attitude is nearer the right, and the other more akin to the wrong. I speak moderately, for the subject is very difficult.

I think, then, that the root of the view which demands complete change by way of external reconstruction lies in the idea that pain and badness are somehow a mistake in the world, and a mistake *prima facie* of our making, something not meant to be, so to speak. Undo our mistake and all will be well. Along with this goes the idea that all is wrong now. All is wrong now because of some great mistake. Find out the mistake and put it right, and all will be well. Or even if you are a total pessimist, and think the mistake is in the making of the world, still the idea is the same—to put it right by a few strong measures. A naïve view, childish in fact.

I believe that *our* attitude is founded on an instinct and experience which point to a much deeper view—I don't mean we philosophise—much deeper and very complicated, but very far more nearly true—the view which all take who see and feel profoundly. I must put it in successive statements to be clear.

First, we have no doubt that pain and badness are to be fought against and overcome so far as in any

way possible. There we agree with the other side. And we must never let this go.

*But*, second, along with this, we see that good and bad hardly seem to be meant (so to speak) to be separated. It is impossible to cut out the bad and leave the good, like cutting out a decayed beam from a building. And we do not feel that this depends on a great mistake somewhere. The others feel, I think, with Moses Wardle in De Morgan's *When Ghost Meets Ghost*, "If only they'd a-let *me* be God A'mighty for five minutes at the first go-off, I'd a seen to it no such a thing shouldn't happen." But for us the fact is that the power to do well and the power to do ill are at bottom the same thing; and if you have one you must have, and will always have, the other.

So we do not think the presence of great badness shows everything is all wrong. We don't believe you can have great goodness without it. Are we having to-day the worst time of our lives, or the most splendid? Both, surely.

These difficult things, however, *are* dangerous. This quite true insight, that bad goes with good and the conflict is a condition of human life, has perhaps made some of our people too content with things as they are. They see the existing good that the other side do not see, and the connection of bad and good, and do not realise that the conflict and struggle towards the better is as necessary as the existence of bad and good which is part of it.

So, thirdly, we are sworn, we said, in the first place to the fight for the better. But we add: it is foolish to think of cutting out the pain and badness by an operation. The conflict is permanent, and bad and good must always be there; the only way to help is something quite different from any external recon-

struction or regulation. It depends on the nature of the problem. You cannot remain outside the conflict of good and bad, like a superior person, or put an end to it by some great change, like an omnipotent despot. The only possible way of helping is to throw yourself into the conflict and attempt to direct the power which does both the good and the harm—that is the human mind—towards doing good rather than harm. It will not cease from doing harm, but it will learn to do higher good as it fights against more puzzling forms of harm, those which come with what we call civilisation. The good and harm have become more moral, less merely animal—less like a fight with nature, and more like a fight with the devil. I mean, largely, a fight with fallacies and delusions, which is always a more worthy conflict.

Then, when you are well into the fight, working to strengthen character and intelligence—then, any outward reconstruction which you see to be auxiliary to the relative success of good is quite a fair thing to try for ; and I do not think we should be biassed against it. Only you notice how it comes in. It can never be the central thing—no law or regulation can possibly be the central thing or the valuable point. It is our method, and our method only, that goes to the centre of the great fight, and aims at directing that power on which alone success depends. And this is, I suggest, because we feel, by our experience and contact with life, the great double truth. Pain and evil, we see, are certainly to be fought and overcome ; but for all that they are not a slip in the arrangement of things, which can be rectified by a few strong measures. They are for us and here part of the permanent way of working of a certain power—the mind of man ; and, whether we like it or not, whether we rebel against

the world or not, the only practical course is to modify the action of that power which is in us and in all human beings.

Rebel as much as you like, and say it would be much finer to do it by a few great strokes, and make a new heaven and a new earth. But there *is* no new heaven and new earth, except by a change in the mind of man, and therefore there is no way but this, and there cannot be anything more "drastic." Drastic means effective—what does something; and there can be nothing drastic in changes which go nowhere near the central point, and leave the great operative power unmodified.

But, as I have said, we should, in my private view, admit no general bias against legislative and administrative change. Whatever of this kind comes, in social experience, as auxiliary to a change of mind, or as consequential upon it, is an instrument of our work. Only it can never be the main thing; it is always subordinate, and apart from a change of mind it will be wrongly conceived and executed.

## X

### "REFLECTIONS ON VIOLENCE" <sup>1</sup>

I MAY say at once that M. Sorel appears to me to have worked out for himself a fine philosophy of life and social forces. Whether or no he has seen to the end of it, either as a gospel of humanity or as a motive in social process, at all events his attitude is one which commands respect.

In his preface of seven pages, the translator applies himself to explain the general misconception of Sorel's work. His point is, in a word, that Sorel, while at the very heart of the working-class movement, is absolutely hostile to "democratic" theory. But in saying this, he proceeds, we must know what we mean. "Democratic" ideology here stands for "Liberal" doctrine, the pacific, rationalist, and hedonist temper of social democracy; and is inseparably bound up with the conception of man's natural goodness,<sup>2</sup> his perfectibility, and the necessary progress of the species. Against all this, in Mr. Hulme's view, Sorel stands for "classical pessimism," which is to mean, not the mere disillusionment of the shallow optimist, but the belief that man's nature has in it

<sup>1</sup> *Reflections on Violence*. By Georges Sorel. Translated by T. E. Hulme. Pp. xvi. + 299. Price 7s. 6d. George Allen & Unwin, Ltd.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. a similar characterisation of certain movements for social reconstruction, p. 179 above.

a radical evil, and can only come to good by heroism and the sublime, in short, by war.

It is not necessary here to enter upon the doubtful speculations with which Mr. Hulme has interwoven his exposition. The reader must not accept his dicta either about Rousseau or about Hegel—his reference to Condorcet seems more justifiable. And I hope it will not be believed that because some progress-of-the-species humanism has been shallow, therefore we are to look for the higher faith in an anti-humanistic ethics.

For a first introduction to Sorel it is enough to note the thesis that "the transformation of society is not likely to be achieved as a result of peaceful and intelligent readjustment on the part of literary men and politicians." The whole region of liberal and democratic politics, it may be added, Sorel regards as a mere hotbed of corrupt compromise, where the true Socialist temper cannot live, and the virility of the middle class itself is bound to die.

At the close of the introductory letter to Halévy, an excellent résumé of his position in some fifty pages, he accepts a simile thrown out by the latter in which the legend of the Wandering Jew is taken as the symbol of man's highest aspirations, fated as he is to wander for ever without repose. And his social gospel frames itself consistently with this attitude. The true position of the working class, at once their hope and their destiny, is the "*marche vers la délivrance*"; the "*délivrance*," the great catastrophic liberation by the general strike, being to them what Christ's Second Coming was to the early Christians, what the final restoration is to the Jews,<sup>1</sup> or the unity of Italy

<sup>1</sup> One can almost hear M. Sorel quoting :

"Thy face took never so deep a shade,  
But we fought them in it, God our aid."

was to the Mazzinians. This is what M. Sorel describes as a true myth—a conception absolute, single, unanalysable, not proposed for discussion, but one thing with the class-gospel which expresses and inspires the class's soul.

The myth, it is to be carefully observed, is not to be confused with a Utopia. A Utopia is a thing of shreds and patches, an intellectual imagination botched together out of old material, and intended for piecemeal fulfilment. (M. Bergson's idea of intelligence has had an influence here.) The myth is essentially a faith in a total transformation, not intended for piecemeal fulfilment, nor for analysis nor discussion. It is like the hope of victory over the world entertained by the Catholic Church. It cannot be refuted, and conveys undying inspiration. A Utopist, on the contrary, is *ipso facto* a reactionary. When Professor Beesly, in 1869, wrote an article on the future of the working class, Karl Marx (the story comes through Brentano) wrote to him that he had hitherto regarded him as the only revolutionary Englishman, but henceforward he should hold him a reactionary, "for any one who composes a programme for the future is a reactionary."

Thus when the critic, whether parliamentary Socialist or wholly anti-Socialist, objects that Sorel tells one nothing of the future social organisation, Sorel, I imagine, admits and defends his silence. What we gather comes to this, I think. The faith in the general strike is a faith in the future of free men, capable of taking up the highest organisation of the workshop at the point at which they will force the capitalist employer to lay it down. Art at its best is but an anticipation of the spirit in which they will live, produce, and invent.

But it is not prediction, but the necessary present condition of a better future, on which his mind is bent. The essence of this necessary condition is the avoidance of the gospel of social peace, which means degeneration of the middle class, enfeeblement of the wage-earner's spirit, and a corrupt compromise between the two, constructed by the politician as broker, who does nothing for nothing. A masterful, virile, and competent middle class over against a strong, improving, and industrially very capable working class, fanatically inspired by its gospel of the great deliverance—this is the class war which is the condition of social health, and will, by the victory of the workers, one day regenerate the world.

And the "violence"—what about that? The poison of violence—the horror which attends the revolutionary memories—all came from the presence of the idea of the State first on one side and then on the other. The very red flag of the revolutionist was—so we are told—the symbol of martial law under the *ancien régime*; and its adoption by the revolutionist meant that the State was now to be on his side, and his opponents were to be traitors who merited extermination. With the rejection of the idea of the State all this poison vanishes. A degree of roughness will survive in the self-defence of the workmen by means of strikes; and it will be desirable to mishandle the emissaries of the corrupt politicians who will try to mislead the wage-earners into the primrose path of the *quid pro quo*. The ingenuity with which this parallel is drawn out—the parallel between the actual bribing—the *pot-de-vin* by which the contractor buys advantages from the politician, and the transaction by which the democratic politician, with his hand on the throttle-valve of labour agitation, sells peace and

protection to a cowardly middle class—this ingenuity backed by a bitter confidence in the fidelity of the loathsome picture, makes the argument very painful reading. “I assume,” he writes, “that no one is ignorant that no considerable transaction takes place without a *pot-de-vin*.”

But to return to violence. It is better than ruse, than corruption and the furthering of private interests by this skilful handling of “politico-criminal” associations which systematically terrorise the middle class at the politicians’ instigation. Parnellism is cited as a type. The working class, left to themselves and to their gospel, will use roughness to protect their strikes; but they will not enter upon these calculated terrorisms, nor cherish the envenomed malice which is associated with the idea of revolution, and which springs from rival claims to the control of the State.

The modern history of the Catholic Church in France is a demonstration that politics and compromise do not even pay. It is characteristic of Sorel’s whole position that the relation of the Church to the democratic State is analogous for him to that of the workers. Concessions invite further pressure; an aggressive policy is the only one that is safe.

It is natural that from such a standpoint English Collectivism and the whole English temper, both in internal and in external politics, are very severely judged; and the English attitude to international arbitration is attributed to want of sensitiveness on the point of honour rather than to the motives which we should claim for it. On all this, of course, as on the general question of English democracy, and the alleged essential corruptness of the democratic régime, I am at the opposite pole to M. Sorel. It would be interesting to know whether on this and analogous

questions—*e.g.* the anti-patriotic bias of Syndicalism—the war has affected the author's views. So lately as on the publication of the third French edition he expressly observed that he had seen no reason to modify them. But it may be noted that even should those who think with him have followed the whole of France in its rush to the country's defence, this would not necessarily be a serious inconsistency in their position. They might well maintain that while aiming at the abolition of national exclusiveness they were justified in championing their country against a worse exclusiveness than any she ever symbolised.

To the present writer the true thing in M. Sorel's speculations is his insistence on the necessity of suffering and conflict; although the solution by a future event, about which we have seen that M. Sorel himself speaks uncertainly, seems inadequate and indeed self-contradictory, and a deeper explanation is demanded.

And the practical thing in M. Sorel's attitude is his concentration on the actual conditions of present social health and virility, as opposed to dreaming of the future. Give us, we are inclined to cry, in every class or functioning organ of the community, such a faith and inspiration as he claims for the workers and their gospel, and we could have confidence in the future, not because we could predict the detail of what must come, but because whatever comes, under the influence of such inspiration, and to a people so prepared to suffer and be strong, could not be other than good.

## XI

### THREE LECTURES ON SOCIAL IDEALS <sup>1</sup>

#### PREFACE TO THE COURSE

I WILL begin by one or two observations which may be taken as a Preface to the course of lectures as a whole.

1. I hope my hearers will dissociate me, while I am lecturing to them, from the accident of the chairmanship of Council. My work is not at all to lay down Charity Organisation Society doctrine, nor indeed to teach anything authoritatively. Where one's treasure is, there, no doubt, one's heart will be; but what I should like to do, if I could succeed in it, would be to break paths for thought, and leave you curious and inquiring into some of these troublesome social ideals, though not without a sort of direction or most general criterion, holding to which one cannot go absolutely astray.

2. The subject of the first lecture, "Justice," though it seems easy and obvious, is really, I think,

<sup>1</sup> Special literature recommended: T. H. Green, *Principles of Political Obligation*, sect. 211 ff., *The Right of the State in Regard to Property*; Sir A. Clay, *Syndicalism and Labour*; Sorel, *Reflections on Violence*; Lagardelle (edited by), *Syndicalisme et Socialisme*, *The Herald*, *National Guild Pamphlets*.

very hard; and I know very little useful that has been written about it. Here especially my hope is chiefly to break a way into the subject that we might move about within it and investigate it freely for ourselves. It is, as it seems to me, the first thing in people's feelings to-day and the last thing in their thoughts. If we could clear it up ever so little it would be worth our while.

3. The literature that I have put on the syllabus<sup>1</sup> is, of course, not all that I hope you will have read. You have no doubt read much, and you know where to look for current economics and the experience of the Charity Organisation Society. What I have recommended, excepting T. H. Green and Sir A. Clay, looks mostly in one direction; and I have just explained why I am taking this line. I want to free our ideas, and to bring our interest in contact with very significant movements, which are influential among the dissatisfied class to-day, and yet are not quite what we might have anticipated some twenty years ago. I begin with T. H. Green and Sir Arthur Clay because in the former you will find, I think (I commit myself so far as this), the permanent basis in philosophical common sense of the social doctrine of ownership—a broader doctrine than is always recognised—and in the latter you will find a mine of information upon recent developments of ideas, and also upon the actual history of the corresponding movements.

4. It is my own experience that makes me insist on the value of studying labour journals and propagandist literature of that stamp. Nothing impresses me more when I take up any publication of this kind than the fact that as regards mere information its authors and our ordinary Press seem to live

<sup>1</sup> See note on p. 189.

in different worlds. You might say the same, up to a certain point, of different organs of the middle-class Press according to their party divisions ; but the news agencies and reporters and correspondents on which these rely are after all of the same general type, and present things on the whole from the same social angle. In the other literature of which I speak you are at once in touch with a different facet of the social mind. You hear of, I am sure, many facts which we do not hear of, or only most faintly or hurriedly, in our chosen organs. And the whole tone and spirit and reading of social life are new to us. One of these pamphlets begins, “ ‘The real aim of the miners,’ complained the *Morning Post* in April 1915, ‘is to make mining not a profitable industry but a source of living to the miners.’ ” It is well to see how this extract looks when thus set by itself for Labour readers ; and even supposing the difference to be wholly due to bias and misrepresentation, we ought, if we wish to understand what is going on, to be pretty thoroughly soaked in the medium in which the majority of our fellow-citizens pass their lives. There are also very capable organs which make an attempt, from a scientific point of view, to hold the balance. Omitting one which I must not mention, I may instance the *Economic Journal* (Journal of the Royal Economic Society), whose article, *e.g.*, on the “ Dilution of Skilled Labour,” in the March number for 1916, seems to me extraordinarily illuminating.

5. And as with facts, so with feelings. If we could once penetrate to the centre of feeling which animates this or that movement, and so far make it our own as to realise the natural human demand which lies beneath it, then we shall never again present to it the blank face of non-comprehension and amazement,

not to speak of the grimace of active misinterpretation which creates the fury and malice of social collisions. Every one, of course, must in the end get less than he set out to demand, though the half may, and we know it will, prove more than the whole. But there is no possibility of any one getting anything, except frustration, unless we all make it our first duty to understand and feel with one another. Here is a passage which any Charity Organisation worker, any ardent specialist, going ahead in the full tide of life and experience, might make his own :—

*Syndicalisme et Socialisme*, p. 8.—“ Plus de dogmes ni de formules ; plus de discussions vaines sur la société future ; plus de plans compendieux d'organisation sociale ; mais un sens de la lutte qui s'avive par la pratique, une philosophie de l'action qui donne la première place à l'intuition, et qui proclame que le plus simple ouvrier engagé dans le combat en sait davantage que le plus abscous doctrinaire de toutes les écoles.” This is a paragraph from the most definite manifesto of syndicalism.

Let us take as an illustration the conception of the class war. We shall return to it in its place in Lecture III. But here I will say merely a word or two on the possibility of realising how it presents itself to those who hold it. We have to connect it with such ideas as, on the one side, that of direct action, in opposition to indirect action through parliamentary representatives. This is an idea familiar in Rousseau, and to-day seeming to command the adhesion of both political extremes. And, on the other side, we have to connect it with the conceptions of class loyalty and class consciousness. I can here only say a word or two of the latter aspect.

To us of the middle class this feeling was first

widely interpreted, I believe, by George Eliot's *Felix Holt*. On myself, personally, at about the same date, the same message was enforced through an intimate friend, a Balliol undergraduate of working-class extraction, the only undergraduate, we used to say, for whose intelligence Jowett ever showed signs of respect. I can see the same message, defined and exasperated, in the spirit of the Syndicalists and of the National Guilds.

To begin with, we have to realise that the career ever so open to talents does not satisfy the class-loyal and class-conscious workman, any more than I should be satisfied that philosophy was winning its battle if a philosopher were sometimes made a peer. The class of the workshops is a permanent group, with its own *raison d'être*. It is not a career for himself, but recognition, security, status, and power for his class that the loyal and class-conscious working man desires. He knows he has much to learn. He wants, of course, an education and a philosophy, but he wants them of his own. He does not want to draw them from the substance of the middle class, any more than he wants to wear our cast-off clothes. I have noticed a spirit of this kind at a meeting of the Workers' Educational Association. It seemed self-contradictory; but perhaps it was less so than it looked. "What economics will they teach us?" was the feeling. Names of economists were mentioned, and were received with applause or with hesitation. It looked as if the student were going to begin by instructing the teacher what the latter was to say to him. But the demand has a meaning. All our worlds—artistic, literary, political, financial, philanthropic, scientific—have in the spirit of the passage I read just now a creed and culture of their

own. All of them overlap, but no one would consent to replace his own by that of another kind. His vital experience is different, and moulds his life and action inevitably. And the working class want at least to be like this. They are not to be as such at the bottom of society. They are not to be fed with the crumbs that fall from the rich man's table, material or spiritual. They believe instinctively that their peculiar experience, their creative activity (there is Bergson somewhere about, I think), their vigour and intuition alone can regenerate society. Do we not all think something of the kind about our class, whose life pulses in us, and whose excellence we feel from day to day in all the vitality we possess?

Why call such a demand a war? Because it is a struggle for a definite recognition with definite consequences, which on the whole is refused. For it is, the class as such, in the workshops, that makes the demand; it is definitely direct, and averse from the indirect methods of representation and political party. Fairly to open and accommodate our minds to it, to put off the attitude of condescension, is the first step—I do not say to ending, I might rather say to rationally beginning, the class war.

Of course, the old difficulty is, and will be, present, on which Socrates put his finger. The working class, he said, knew all sorts of fine things that other people did not, but, because of that, they fancied that they knew all sorts of things which they did not know. But that is surely the case with all of us, and more or less, I suppose, it always will be. To some extent, plainly, it must be. And it is no worse with them than with us.

At any rate, here is the point. They want recognition as a class, and they do not admit that any

political party represents, or possibly can represent, them. They claim their own function, their own culture, their own duty, their own ambitions for a worthy and influential life. When I say "they," I speak of those who stand for the class war. I imagine the idea has influence beyond its outspoken advocates. That, I take it, is the essence of what at least the class war means to them, though no doubt it may mean a great deal besides.

If we can think of things in some way like this, perhaps we may get nearer to our fellow human beings; at least it seems worth trying. But now it is more than time to enter upon our opening lecture.

## LECTURE I.—JUSTICE

1. The appeal for "Justice" is urgent in the social literature of the day. It is one that goes straight to every human heart. No one who has read it can forget how Dante tells of the poor widow who convinced the reluctant Emperor Trajan that he must do her justice before he stirs from the spot.

What is the nature of this appeal? What is its precise demand? How does it find its place among other human necessities?

It seems to be based on the fact that human nature lives in a multitude of individuals, who have a common quality which demands that they should be treated by a common rule. Thus the cry for justice is effective at once through a direct comparison. Whenever a difference of treatment appears, Justice will ask "Why?" It is always the opposite of dealing with human beings differently without a reason for the difference. So Justice has to do with "rights." Right is the rule, the straight or undeviating line

(*droit, diritto*). It is just to protect all men's life and liberty, because it is the rule, the right, for human beings. What makes it the right or rule? That, I hope, we shall see directly; but that it is recognised as the rule is what makes the doing of it just. Injustice, in the simplest sense, is to recognise a rule, but only to follow it in some cases and not in others.

Plainly, there are different rules or standards. The letter of the law is not the only rule; Shylock had law apparently on his side and then against him; both, I should think, we all feel were unjust by the better rule. *Summum jus, summa injuria*. The extreme of law is the extreme of wrong.

So Justice has two factors: one constant, the other variable. First, it is keeping the rule you profess to keep and allowing nothing to interfere with its application. Secondly, it depends on what rule you recognise. Some rules are shallower, some are deeper. But with all, if you profess them, it is *so far* unjust to depart from them.

If it is ordered that every tenth man is to be shot, it is unjust for the officer carrying out the order to shoot a ninth man and spare a tenth man for private reasons.

But, also, such an order may be *itself* called unjust as compared, *e.g.*, with a more adequate rule for treating human beings, such as to proceed only on proved individual guilt. The former is, then, seen to be a rule which is itself a single large violation of *the* rule, and so unjust. You are not even professing the rule which you are forced to admit to be *the* rule you ought to profess.

We must distinguish the two forms of injustice. If you make arbitrary exceptions to your rule, *you*

*break the rule*, and so far as it is concerned, you are unjust, though you may be just by a higher rule. You are treating in different ways cases which your rule calls the same—*e.g.*, again, if you make exceptions at your discretion in levying a universal tax. You can only be just by your rule if you treat all cases under its terms in the same way.

But there is another alternative: you may not break the rule, but *the rule itself may break down* by proving *itself* unjust. This is when it treats in the same way cases which for its purpose are different—*e.g.* if it levies the same tax on people who can afford to pay and people who cannot.

The reason for insisting on this distinction is to show how a rule can break itself, so to speak, by ordering very dissimilar cases to be treated in a similar way; and that this is at bottom the same injustice as breaking a rule by treating its similar cases in a dissimilar way. If you treat two quite different sets of cases in a similar way, you are *really* treating them differently for the purpose of your rule; *e.g.* if you give the same amount of food to a child and a man, the purpose or controlling rule being to nourish each sufficiently. In the end this "breaking down" will show how Justice proves itself an imperfect point of view.

It is noteworthy that Justice has a good side even in strictly applying bad laws. They would seldom survive if they were applied in their full rigour. President Grant said to the United States Congress: "If you make bad laws I shall enforce them."

Equity may seem to be contrasted with strict justice, as if it were not a rule. But it only means a more adequate rule; one that goes deeper into the

cases. No one would call it equity to treat two quite different cases similarly.

Then we come to this: Justice lies in impartial distribution of advantages and disadvantages to individuals. In that sense it is "individualistic." It depends altogether on there being individuals who have claims to similar treatment. The claim is urged, we said, by direct comparison of cases. A is rich, B is poor. Why? So it is much more impressive at first sight than a claim like that of patriotism or the common good, which requires you to give all you can and not compare your burdens or your advantages with those of others. These are demands on behalf of a unit which is not present to the bodily eye. Justice, as commonly spoken of, is a demand on behalf of a case which strikes the eye forcibly.

Justice is certainly not the highest point of view; but if it is in a sense the lowest of social claims, that is a way of saying that it is the basis of all social dealing. A universal human claim may be transformed by higher claims, but cannot be cancelled. Individual human beings have to be taken account of; each is one among others, having a bodily and spiritual life of his own, which cannot even be genuinely sacrificed or surrendered unless it is first his own to sacrifice or to surrender.

2. We saw there were two factors in Justice: first keeping the rule—that needs no further comment—and, secondly, the rule itself which is to be kept.

There are many possible rules, we saw, lower and higher—*i.e.* less and more adequate, according to the degree in which each of them takes account of people's circumstances and capacities, and so is less or more likely to be adequate—*i.e.* not to break down.

We will consider some of these. They are what

express people's different ideas of the standard according to which the individual's right to be recognised and considered should be given effect in a human commonwealth.

(i.) Equality. "All men are equal"; usually "equal by nature." This sounds like an attempt to make a rule out of the mere need of having a rule. Deal in exactly the same way with all men, and then you are sure of going by the rule you profess, which we saw to be the essence of Justice.

But we saw that a rule of Justice can *itself* break down if you apply it without modification to cases which differ beyond a certain point. And the equality of man was never asserted by serious thinkers in the sense that all men were so equal as to demand the same treatment all round. It was asserted with a perfectly good meaning by Roman law, by the English seventeenth century, and by Rousseau. And by being taken to mean too much, it has been deprived of the perfectly sound meaning which really belonged to it. No one meant that all men were equally good or equally capable. What they did mean, and rightly, was that all rational beings were "equal" in having within them a principle of self-government. Sooner or later the thinking creature will rebel against mere force. He will evade, or resist, or question it. Equality in this sense, as was lucidly explained, say, by Hobbes or Locke, is one with freedom or reason. It is *the* quality of man as such. The capacity of self-government is in him, and, on the whole, it will come out. He will, in the end, accept no law but one which recognises him, on the same footing with others who have the same capacity, as making it or assenting to it. The domesticated, I believe, is the highest animal, but the slave is the lowest man.

It is a practical and disputable question how far sheer equality may be pushed, and on what lines. It is plain that there cannot be all-round identity of function, at any rate in a civilised society; and, therefore, the apparatus possessed by individuals for their functions, what we call property, must be different. But this by itself does not suffice to prove that there could not possibly be, for example, equality of incomes. In as far as it is impossible, this seems to be a corollary of permitting free acquisition of property. We shall return to this. As to the general problem of equality and similarity in a community, it is well to keep in mind two texts of Aristotle, "No community can be constituted of similars" and "A community should be constituted of equals and similars so far as possible." Rousseau remarks that if equality is impossible in modern society, that is all the more reason for trying to promote it. There seems to be something in this. And then we shall see in Lecture III. that some inequalities may be and ought to be ignored—*i.e.* ought not to affect power or prestige. That is a suggestive topic.

(ii.) But it is really common ground that all-round equality is a rule which breaks down, and some kind of *proportion* has usually been advocated as the standard of Justice; that is, equality in the shape of equality of ratios; so that advantages permitted to individuals should remain in the same ratio to some other term, some feature found in the individuals. Plato and Aristotle are fond of insisting on this, that ~~true equality is equality of ratios—*i.e.* proportion.~~ The worst inequality, they say, is equal treatment of unequal terms—*e.g.* the same lifting force to different weights, or the same taxation to different taxable capacity.

We will look at some of the proportional standards of Justice currently discussed.

*a.* Advantages proportional to moral excellence. Existing society is often criticised for not fulfilling this standard; it is said not to bring to the top a good ethical type. In general it is a conclusive objection to such a standard that it cannot possibly be applied by man. There is no safe moral judgment except our own on ourselves, and not really that. You may say, "It must be a bad system that brings, *e.g.*, place-hunters to the top." But, first, does it? Can we know men's motives? And then, supposing it does, the men's *immorality* does not seem the right reason for condemning the system. Because many other faults are quite as *immoral* as place-hunting, faults which we should not think mattered nearly so much in a statesman—*e.g.* unkindness to one's wife. So it is not the mere immorality we object to, it is something else.

*β.* We seem to get nearer to it if we say "Advantages should be proportional to contributions to public good." The public good does seem a possible standard. But the same question recurs. Can we really judge what are the greatest contributions to the public good? Are we to go by labour expended or by value attained? It seems hardly possible to find a single standard by which to judge. You may have immense labour with very little value that we can detect, and great value almost by luck. A recognition of the individual on this basis would be arbitrary and uneven. And, in case we agreed on the really greatest contribution—*e.g.* the work of a great poet—are your "advantages" comparable with it or suitable to it? All you can give—rank, wealth, and power—seem too little; yet so alien in character

to the poet's service as to promise disaster both to the recipient and to the community.

γ. Proportion to the capacity for acquisition. This is alleged about and against our present system. Of course, it must not be assumed that all acquisition is at others' expense; it may be so, or may be the instrument of acquisition to them also. We shall hear more of this in the Third Lecture. It has been pointed out—*e.g.* by Durkheim—that in an old society all forms of contract are more or less socially determined, so that acquisition is more or less constrained toward the public good.

Waiving this for the moment, the rule has two merits. It can within certain limits be really carried out, which cannot be said of the others we have considered. And it is compatible with an automatic system of freedom in appropriation, avoiding continual discretionary interference, which is almost impossible in a huge modern community. It seems worth while to pay a high price for an automatic arrangement; but, of course, some prices may be too high.

δ. Proportion to necessities of individuals with a view to the realisation of human capacity in them. This seems to unite many of the good points of the other suggestions, and to be fairly workable. We should note the substitution of "necessities" for "merits," because necessities can be judged and merits cannot. And the former demand adaptation to the type of function, which the latter overlooks. Proportion to merits, even if possible, neglects the question whether any purpose is promoted by such an assignment. It may frustrate its own apparent aim. Advantages which the community can command are instruments, each of which has its special

value for some special end, and should be used in view of this. Power, *e.g.*, may be obviously an unfit attachment to ethical merit. But if you say not "merits" but "necessities," it is different. Power, *e.g.*, is necessary for certain social functions, and so, perhaps, is wealth. And note the substitution of "human capacity" for "public good," avoiding the possible error of measuring by *de facto* contribution to public service, which may be much short of a true human capacity. There is always the danger of dropping into the argument which Miss Austen so delightfully caricatures in *Sense and Sensibility*, proving that people who have little must need next to nothing. "What does a man need to make him a good scavenger?" But, then, it is also his function to be a man. The reference to "human capacity" bars that evasion. Only, if the rule is to hold, the word necessities should be construed to include the objects of activity as well as its instruments. Of course, in a sense they *are* its instruments, or its material. We must not rule out *ab initio* the desirability of, say, private ownership of capital on a large scale as a field of charge and responsibility. We shall hear more of this in Lecture III.

Looking back on all these suggested statements which more or less bear the character of Justice, we note a characteristic peculiarity in all of them. None of them can be said to be laid down or constituted or contrived exclusively for the sake of Justice, except perhaps the rule of equality, which is chimerical. We saw that no doubt a rule can be just or unjust in itself, and not merely in its impartial or partial observance, in as far as the cases it deals with in a similar way are really similar or really dissimilar. But this being just or unjust is not in general the

reason why the rule is made. Even in those social formulæ, public welfare is also aimed at; but in ordinary rules this is clearer. A tax, *e.g.*, is imposed in order to get money, not in order to treat people fairly or unfairly. It is a fault in it if it is unjust, because it contradicts the claim of human beings to be treated according to reason and right—to be treated similarly where the reason is similar, and dissimilarly where it is dissimilar. But that is a *condition* of all treatment of human beings, not in general the *purpose* of it, or not the immediate purpose.

You *can* have rules in ordinary use made *for the purpose* of Justice, I think, in two senses. (a) Often you have them made by way of amending rules made for quite other purposes, which are seen to involve Justice. When all men of military age were first appealed to to enlist, the purpose was, I suppose, purely and simply to get soldiers. Then it was noticed that this rule put very dissimilar cases on the same footing, and it was urged that there were some who ought to be taken before others. So a new rule was made that “a certain class must go first,” and this *was* made, I suppose we might say, for the sake of Justice—*i.e.* to carry out the proportion between disadvantages and the power to bear them, by neglecting which the first invitation, considered as a rule, seemed to break down. But still, all this was only a condition imposed on the positive purpose of the whole arrangement, which was to get soldiers. The condition was imposed by the inherent claim or right of human individuals to reasonable treatment—*i.e.* similar for similar, dissimilar for dissimilar. It is, we saw, the human being’s nature to ask why: and if you can give him a reason which is to the point, he is satisfied. But it is his right to be satisfied, and if he is not

satisfied he will be dissatisfied, and argue or rebel according to his character and the case. In other words, the management must spring, directly or indirectly, from himself. That is his equality, freedom, reasonableness, the "quality of man."

Then later it came to be thought that the attempt to distinguish cases was too complicated, and that equal sacrifice for all would be best attained by a uniform rule, a rough Justice. All this discussion about Justice may have been desirable or necessary ; but it was really a sort of appendage to the purpose of the whole proceeding—viz. to get soldiers.

In still the same sense it might be said that certain parts of the civil and criminal law are specially instituted for the purpose of Justice. I mean all those arrangements which are intended to obviate bias or corruption in judge or jury, or to secure that a poor suitor shall not be placed at a disadvantage. But it does not seem that Justice is the primary purpose of the whole system of law, because every law, excepting those which guard against corruption and undue influence, must surely have its primary purpose in some particular good to be secured or evil to be repressed, and these purposes cannot be directly got under the head of equality or fairness between man and man. The law, if I am right, exists not for the sake of Justice, but to make certain transactions possible which men are found generally to demand—*e.g.* transactions between landlord and tenant ; or, again, to prevent certain nuisances—*e.g.* smoky chimneys. But such laws being necessary to life, it is a defect in them if they are not both just and justly administered. You may say that all law is there to maintain rights, the rules of fairness between man and man ; and so is aimed at Justice. But still, there is always the

*special* motive for every law, which is its primary aim.

There is, however, another sense ( $\beta$ ) in which the whole system of social and political institutions might be said to aim at Justice, and that is if we allow ourselves to use the conception of "*Ideal Justice*."

For instance, a newspaper said, in commenting on the problem of the married men, "The problems which face us cannot be solved on any principle of ideal Justice." I presume it meant that it was practically impossible to frame a rule or a set of rules which would provide differential treatment for every different case. The social call was imperative, and furnished a rough rule of Justice—a sort of social lynch law—because there was a very large definite group, those capable of military service, who came under it quite simply. But an ideal Justice—that is, a comparative weighing of the difficulties of every individual case, and a nice adjustment of the obligation to serve to every inequality of situation and of mental and bodily fitness—that was an impossible thing. The rough Justice of the social necessity must in the main be acquiesced in.

Still, the newspaper implied that there is such a thing as ideal Justice, though it is very difficult to realise. You *might* take the whole social system as an attempt to do this—to arrange that for every difference or distinction in human capacity which seriously affected anyone's function and happiness, there should be found a different external furniture such as to adjust itself to that difference of function or capacity and give it scope. And then ideal Justice would practically coincide with a perfect social system. Everybody's advantages and burdens would be exactly apportioned according to what he needed for the function suitable to him. This would be our com-

pletest rule, but carried out with an impossible perfection. And still the function comes first and dictates the whole arrangement.

Now, if you let yourself be carried on and on by the demand for Ideal Justice and by watching how simple rules break down or break themselves, into demanding the right conditions for every function, where will you be at the end of it? You will have set up a new rule for every serious difference in individuals, and you will have got a complicated social system involving all sorts of reservations and distinctions, so that the character of a general rule will have vanished from it, and it will have taken on an appearance opposed to primary Justice—to any simple rule of treating people alike. We saw this beginning in the case of the married men's service, and how the attempt seemed likely to be thrown over as too difficult, and the first simple rule gone back to. Ideal Justice, we often say, is only for God to use, not for man. Or we say it is ultimately one with mercy or love or regard for the public good.<sup>1</sup> "Tout comprendre, c'est tout pardonner." Every strength and weakness is allowed for. It is not what we commonly mean by Justice.

So we find that practically there is a recognised opposition between the maxims of common Justice—the general rule of equal treatment of individuals—and the maxims of political efficiency or the public good or safety, or love, or mercy—anything in which the individual is absorbed. "Fiat justitia, ruat coelum" (Do Justice, if it ruins the country); "One to count for one and never for more than one"; contrasted with "Salus populi suprema lex" (which has won a bad reputation as the tyrant's plea; *cp.*

† These three principles are alike in scorning equality. They ask you for all you can, not for the same as your neighbour.

Committee of Public Safety in the French Revolution), or "Ye are members one of another"—*i.e.* thinking of yourselves as separate particular individuals *making claims*, you have only a very imperfect apprehension of what you really are.

It is a strange meeting of extremes in many cases; *Ideal* Justice—the supreme duty—or a pressing emergency, or a strong devotion to the community, or any overwhelming purpose, may make a rough call on the individual, very much like that which the first rude sense of lynch justice makes. The difference is that rough-and-ready Justice does not *know* what the right claim on the individual is, and lumps his case along with very dissimilar cases, as in taxation, which is unfair merely through the ruler's lack of economic knowledge or experience; while *Ideal* Justice, or the passion for social or human service, may *know* well enough the inequality it is imposing, but it does not *care* to insist upon it in presence of more important issues. If you can do it you must, never mind whether some one else could do it as well; and therefore, again, the man who recognises it finds its demand the hardest and sharpest claim he can conceive. *His* *Ideal* Justice holds that he has done nothing while there is anything left for him to do. We are unprofitable servants. But, then, with this you have given up what is peculiar in Justice. You have left the world of claims.

This is why, when you approach the great thinkers on the topic of Justice, you are apt at first sight to be puzzled. Instead of finding some direct rule operating by comparison of cases between man and man, you are met by such a sentence as this of Rousseau:<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> This is no doubt directed against Locke, who had maintained that the law of justice and reason was one with the golden rule, "Do

“C’est donc dans la loi fondamentale et universelle du plus grand bien de tous, et non dans les relations particuliers d’homme à homme, qu’il faut chercher les vrais principes du juste et de l’injuste. . . . En un mot, il y a mille cas où c’est un acte de justice de nuire à son prochain, au lieu que toute action juste a nécessairement pour règle la plus grande utilité commune ; cela est sans exception.”<sup>1</sup> That really dissolves away what we commonly call Justice. In the same way we find Plato, in his treatise “On the Commonwealth or on Justice,” identifying the law of Justice with the discharge by every member of his function as prescribed by the purpose of the whole, and he embodies within his systematic plan the hardest and sharpest contrasts of mode of living—the severest rule being assigned to the governing class to whom, in a sense, the whole city belongs. If you complain of this, he says in a very famous passage, it is like complaining that in colouring a statue you paint the eyes, which are the most beautiful feature, not with purple, which is the most beautiful colour, but with black. *For you must not make them so beautiful that they are not like eyes at all.* And so it is the whole system that dictates his functions to every individual ; and the law of Justice is that he should be what his special duty demands, however hard or humble may be the place so assigned. We may add that every sovereign community (and, as is commonly held, the ultimate ruler of the universe) reserves to itself the right of pardon, that is to say, the right of

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to others—” Rousseau has pointed out that, strictly interpreted, this will not hold. It would, for instance, not allow a judge to do his duty. The true end must operate harshly in some cases.

<sup>1</sup> First draft of *Contrat Social*, II. iv. Vaughan’s *Rousseau*, 495.

treating the direct justice of general rules as not being the final or highest law.

All this, it will be said, is commonplace and familiar, and has to a great extent been perverted, as in the doctrine of *salus populi*, to be a mere plea for tyranny, or in the most recent times for the absoluteness of the State, or of such a principle as nationality, in opposition to the rights of simple humanity whether within or without a given society. All this has its truth. I am merely making use of this recognised opposition to enforce the nature and urgency of our problem—which lies in the truth that the breakdown of simple rules is always inevitable, carrying you beyond the simple, direct justice of comparison of individuals; while in complex systems and high imperatives of public good or something even greater you have a goal to which you are obliged to go forward, but in which what we commonly mean by justice is too liable to be submerged without good reason, just because it is destined in the end to be transformed with the best of all possible reasons. This best of all possible reasons, if I am challenged to state it plainly, is that in the end the individual's true nature lies beyond his visible self—*e.g.* in religion the individual, as such, is absorbed. A "claim" becomes blasphemy. But, I repeat, I am not using these high principles to support one contention against the other, to advocate, *i.e.*, the absolute State against simple human justice. I am using them only to illustrate the difficulty and urgency of the problem in which all social dissatisfaction probably has its root—the problem of simple individualistic justice over against the imperative public welfare. The lines of solution which our discussion suggests appear to be two. In the first place, the claims of individuals based on Justice must

be recognised in the structure of any social system which is to be satisfactory ; and although by proportion, and not by sheer equality, yet by proportion to a standard which is necessary and unambiguous, and affords the minimum scope for using the public safety as a tyrant's plea. In the second place it is quite impossible to avoid recognising that there are higher claims than that of simple justice to individuals as such, whether we find these in the transformation of a direct rule of similar treatment into Ideal Justice, or in those greater commands before which the individual repudiates his separate claim and even his separate being. Only it is necessary to remember, as we saw above, that in order truly to sacrifice himself a man must first have possessed himself. It is true in the most literal sense that justice comes before generosity, though not above it. A man can only surrender what is recognised as his.

## LECTURE II.—OWNERSHIP AND MANAGEMENT

(We have been brought by the consideration of Justice to a plain statement of the problem which all social ideals must attempt to solve. There are individual rights, *prima facie* equal or tending to equality, and there is the imperative public good, enjoining functional differences with differences of equipment (what we call property) as their corollaries. These two features of the world, real hard facts, embodied in necessary arrangements and meeting us at every turn in law, history, and social relations, are what social ideals have to face and reconcile. They may be held, as we saw, to blend in ideal justice or in ideal good ; but in truth the characteristics of these two, though in principle reconcilable, are different, and so long as

we think more of justice, good loses something of its unconsidering unity ; while so long as we think more of good, individual right loses something of its hard equality. Nevertheless, the problem is to obtain the fullest measure of the two : to let neither become a pretext for disregarding the other, seeing that each is fullest where the other is most complete. "Fullest" in real truth, but unrecognisable perhaps to the normal eye."

I want in the present lecture to look sympathetically at two or three of the social ideals which are influential to-day among the most critical and least satisfied groups within our European civilisation.

We may start with popular Collectivism, and try to consider it at its best, and to note the points in it from which something is to be learned ; both the points within itself and its difference from other ideals. You must not think I am inclined to vote for it, if I speak of it with patience, in attempting to see it at its best ; omitting, if only to save our time, unessential popular criticisms. I suppose, of course, that you are pretty familiar with its outline, which I shall merely resume in a few words to give a foundation for our comments.

1. The idea is, as we know, that the means of production are to be in the exclusive ownership of the public—say, the State as the organised public. Then no private persons would, *as a matter of course*,<sup>1</sup> draw profit from commercial or industrial enterprise, nor indeed from loan capital invested in any such enterprise.

We can illustrate the effect of such an arrangement, and its limits, by referring in a word or two to what has become a commonplace, the causes which have

<sup>1</sup> See below on loan capital as a possible convenience to the State.

made it conceivable. While production and distribution were a matter of spades and handlooms, and blacksmiths' forges and shops in the lower rooms of the shopkeeper's house, and of village carriers' carts, no one would be likely to suggest the taking over of these things to be owned by the public authority. The divorce between ownership and management would be too hopeless. The public owner would have to appoint every worker to be manager of his own little business, and the ownership would collapse into a tax. This shows us at once the enormous importance of management, and suggests that the real utility of systems of ownership is to promote management which is efficient, and efficient in view of all the requirements concerned, which may be summed up in the two extremes from which we started, the rights of individuals and the public good.

The situation has been revolutionised by the growth of large-scale business and distribution, and by the concomitant introduction of the limited company. Huge masses of business have now, as it were, only one neck apiece, and management is connected with ownership only, so to speak, at the top. This divorce of management and ownership is a very serious matter, and cannot but influence both factors for good or evil. Of course, there is an immense amount of business—especially, I take it, the more active and growing business—where ownership and management still coincide, and the existence and function of this kind of business is one of the very important features of the problem before us.

2. But just to illustrate what we called the connection of management and ownership only at the top.

I never enter, for example, the Army and Navy

so-called Co-operative Stores in Victoria Street without thinking how like they are to a public department. If they were to become so, there is no change that I know of which need result so far as the great shop and its factories and its relations to its customers are concerned. I take it that all the employees, from the manager to the cash-boy, are on salaries or weekly wages. If they have any commission on sales or profits, that makes no difference of principle. It gives them no ownership of the business. If the undertaking were purchased or confiscated by the State, their position would not be necessarily or self-evidently affected. There would be some transaction between the Treasury and the *shareholders*, the nature of which would be all-important for *them*; but the clerks and the salesmen and the factory hands would not *prima facie* be affected either for evil or for good. It is arguable, of course, that the character of the management might in the long run be affected by the change. But there is no direct and obvious necessity for alteration. Thus, as has of course been pointed out over and over again, it is the large-scale character of modern industry and the frequent divorce of management from ownership that suggests Collectivism, and would greatly facilitate its introduction.

I may add that, assuming the extreme hypothesis of a general conviction arising in favour of Collectivism, I should not myself rely on the mere difficulty of transition—the alleged aspect of confiscation—to bar the revolution from taking place. If the system were approved as likely to be permanently valuable, I do not think that the difficulty of transition could or would or ought to arrest the change. Means of adjusting it to individual necessities for a time could readily be contrived.

Practically, then, the effect of establishing collective ownership with as little further change as possible—the popular idea of Collectivism as fashionable, say, twenty years ago—would be to make all the great businesses like what the Army and Navy Stores would be without shareholders but with an official board of management. The same with the railways, and the land, and all the bigger industrial and commercial concerns. The only difference in principle would be that every one in the great productive industries at least would be a salaried employee or wage-earner, as nearly every one is now. Only they would all be employees of public departments—members of an enormous Civil Service. And, of course, ultimately the service might be immensely reorganised and unified.

3. Note the resulting relation to what we commonly call private property. It need not be divided up and equalised; people's private avocations or industrial recreations, so to speak, need not be interfered with; employments that come nearer to personal service than to productive industry—gardening, tailoring, dentistry, the small skilled businesses—*e.g.* professional avocations—with their tiny plant need not necessarily undergo a change. But the *general* rule would be, I suppose, “no private production of commodities for profit.” It would be enforced much as the rules against Sunday entertainments for profit are or were enforced. In a sense, your freedom of action is not interfered with; you can have Sunday entertainments if you like and open them to the public, but you must not take money for them. I suppose the rule about producing wares would be the same. Difficulties no doubt would occur, especially if there were an animus in the administration. There

is Bradlaugh's question, "Will you print at the public press my criticisms and censures of your official system?" The answer ought to be, of course, "Certainly, if they are worth reading." And to suppose it would not be so is not fundamental criticism but malicious hypothesis.

Private property, then, need not be equalised or divided up or abolished. But in the main and in principle it could only be property in objects of consumption—I will return to this point—not in the means of production, certainly not in means of production used for private profit.

4. Therefore, in the main and in principle no one would be able to live without giving some such service as the governing power might either remunerate, or permit to seek private remuneration, as in the case of the professional businesses I spoke of. Thus there would be no difference of fortune except from difference of salaries, and this, whatever people might anticipate, would probably in fact represent current public opinion. Society might *look* much more uniform, or might look not so very different from what it does now. Fears have been expressed that the possessing classes might capture the machine, and that Dukes, *e.g.*, might remain much as they are now, as high bailiffs or State agents for large areas of territory. But all this, as also arrangements for sickness, holidays, old age, education, would be matters of detail depending entirely on the public authority. Obviously, if it were found advisable in the public interest, this authority might open accounts for loan capital with individual citizens. Such an arrangement might be a mutual convenience, and could easily be restricted within limits which would keep quite remote the domination of capitalism as alleged to exist to-day.

5. Now what, fundamentally speaking, do the advocates of such a system hold that the public stand to gain by it ?

Setting aside all ideas of the class war, all trifling and malicious objections, and supposing the system to be run as nearly in the public interest as an honest and capable bureaucracy could run it, two gains are anticipated which I take to be the sum and substance of the matter, while others, of course, follow from them.

(i.) To abolish in a great measure that mismanagement of the community's resources which comes under the head of mistaken personal expenditure. No doubt there is enormous misdirection of expenditure due to the magnitude of personal resources, though there is also equally or more enormous waste due to the mismanagement of resources which are severally by comparison small. The former would in the main be got rid of, and this would be a considerable social gain.

(ii.) Besides this, there is a much more controversial and questionable proposition, *the* main proposition of Collectivism, that the mismanagement of resources devoted to production of commodities, that is, of capital, would thus be put an end to. No one denies, I take it, that at present you have frightful misdirection in the expenditure of capital, owing to private caprice, irresponsibility, and, above all, to competition. There is no doubt that two competing railways between the same places may each of them by itself alone run sufficient trains to serve the public, so that half the trains run are sheer waste of the community's resources.

(iii.) They would claim further, as corollaries of these two fundamental gains, not an equal division

of property, but a more equitable system of salaries and wages. Waste being avoided, there would be more for all, and especially for those who now have too little. For the sake of argument, one may admit this, subject to what is to be said below. If it were so, it would be so.

(iv.) So with unemployment and all the hardships of poverty and neglect. Your bureaucracy has the whole province of labour under its eye and hand ; it has the whole productive resources of the community in its control. Surely by foresight and organisation it can wisely distribute labour, enforce precaution against hardship, prevent the first steps towards destitution. All this is speculation on the method of management of an untried system. It is not without plausibility. I shall state below the single point of principle that arises.

6. That is the roughest possible reminder of the nature of these proposals. They are in every one's mind to-day. All of us to be salaried ; all civil servants ; nothing inheritable except objects bought with our salaries ; the question of houses would settle itself pretty much as it does now in most cases. A man's children after his death might or might not be able to keep on the lease of his house, just as is the case to-day. And, as I said, it might be held a mutual benefit to permit a moderate savings bank account, so to speak, which might also be inherited.

Now let us look at the difficulties of principle strictly inherent in the scheme. We are not to presuppose any special weakness or class animus in the public authority. We are to take the plan on its merits, as if carried out by the best heads in the nation sincerely with a view to the public good.

The point might be generally stated, I think, in

this form, following a hint in an old but honest and direct criticism of the plan (Schäffle, *Quintessence of Socialism*).

An enlightened and honest bureaucracy is henceforward to direct for the public good a system of production and distribution. Hitherto our system has run itself, within a framework of social guidance, by means of the various motives and ideals of individuals, conditioned and largely determined by the need and desire of individuals for profits and for earnings. It is necessary for truth's sake to state the latter member of the contrast in this rather cumbrous way. To say "by means of the mere desire and need of individuals for profits and for earnings" would be absolutely untrue to fact. The sense of vocation is powerful from the top to bottom of the productive world, and is conditioned, not initiated, by economic necessity and desire. But it is economic necessity and desire that force the system to work—*i.e.* force the things that on the whole are wanted on the whole to be produced.

Now the point may be stated thus. How far, in order to make their system work, will the supposed administration have to imitate or reproduce the operation of economic necessity in directing productive activity to what is wanted, and diverting it from what is not, or is no longer, needed or in demand?

If, to put an extreme case, the operation of economic factors is to be imitated or reproduced quite exactly, and production directed or discouraged by economic means in sensitive agreement with popular demand, it would seem that there could be no change at all affecting either the fortunes of labour or the direction of capital. A certain amount of suicidal competition would be avoided—*e.g.* the railway department

would hardly compete against itself. But productive departments on the whole would be judged by their enterprise and success, so that they would drive hard bargains, mistaken ventures would occur as before, and social hardship, the system of what is called "wage-slavery," would not practically be mitigated. We shall see that this latter point is now admitted to be established by experience, and with it, I think, the doom of popular Collectivism is sealed. No one would agree to abandon an automatic system for one of complete authoritative supervision, if the compulsion of the latter is going to be content with practically no better results than the freedom of the former. If, on the other hand, the present operation of economic motive is to be very sharply modified by discretionary intervention with a view *either* to what is *bona fide* held to be the public good, *or* to the realisation of a greater measure of individual right or equality within the wage-system, will it be possible, unless through continual autocratic and discretionary interference, to direct labour and production to the points at which the public good demands their services? You will no longer turn men off as a branch of production slackens, or as you think it *pro bono publico* to shut it down; you will tell them to do something else. But will they do it, and how are you to make them? And are we all to depend on your judgment, and not on our demand, for determining what is to be produced?

7. Thus the fundamental difficulties of principle which attach to popular Collectivism centre round the question of management without effective ownership. It was, we saw, the incipient divorce of management and ownership that made Collectivism conceivable. And nominally this divorce, in itself,

I think, a bad thing, and demanding amendment (Lecture III.), is to be obliterated by Collectivism. Ownership and management are henceforth to be in the same body, viz. the public, and this seems to link them intimately together. But really the contrary is the case. The want of understanding between ownership and management, which characterises a limited company to-day, is not removed but enormously aggravated under the Collectivist scheme. The ownership, being generalised, is in practice abolished. There is no longer anywhere any special interest of ownership attached to the success or utility of special industrial concerns. Management has slid into the seat of general owner, and is itself general, as over against the special managing organisations, say the Trade Unions, by which production is carried on. Thus there is no special guide or guarantee either for the rights of the craftsman—the non-technical management is too generalised for that, like the Postmaster-General—or for the good of the public—the bureaucratic management is too narrow for that, like the War Office.

I will state the points which seem to me to arise inevitably, under three headings: adjustment; the *moral* of ownership; the provision of capital.

(i.) The problem of adjustment I have touched upon already. It is to adjust production to public need, and labour to production. The special necessities, rooted in a modified form of competition, which have hitherto, directly and indirectly, enforced this adjustment on all concerned, are *ex hypothesi* gone. Is it possible for the management itself to know, and to cause the productive world to execute, what is necessary for the public good and for the craftsman's security and independence?

It would no doubt be urged that by removal of waste in production a surplus far exceeding that of the present system might be secured, so that a certain slowness in adjusting employment might safely be faced; and that by a survey of demand, such as is now carried out in the working-class co-operative movement (see Mrs. Webb's excellent book, *The Co-operative Movement*), production can be guided otherwise than by mere experience of actual popular demand.

These points are certainly arguable. I have no doubt of the conclusion, but every one must judge for himself. I have no doubt whatever that a generalised management on behalf of the public as sole owner must find itself between the upper and the nether millstone—between justice on the one hand, especially and typically justice to the craftsman; and, *salus populi*, the welfare and economic convenience of the public, on the other.

It must be borne in mind that in industry creative management is everything. One man will make a fortune for himself and his employers, and deal liberally with his workpeople; another will sweat his workpeople, starve himself, and ruin his employers. There is far too much tendency to speak as if business consisted in cheating—the game of grab, we hear. The essence of business is creation. With this in our minds we may say a word on the *moral* of ownership.

(ii.) Before speaking of the *moral* of ownership in general, we should note the point that public ownership of the means of production may be held to satisfy a sentiment of justice. We have considered justice mainly as a problem of management; but there is no doubt that the recognised participation of all in

ownership of the community's capital would gratify a certain sentiment of equality, even if real access to the use of it remained as unequal as it is to-day. And Collectivism counts on this. But if no reality corresponds to the sentiment, it amounts to a fraud.

Now as to the *moral* of ownership in general. A completely new distinction would be introduced into the world of property by the Collectivist scheme; viz. an earmarking of all private possessions for consumption only. This is a very serious matter indeed. We should note the radical contrast with Plato's conception of Collectivism. For him, the responsibility of production remains in the hands of the producers; ownership and management are not divorced. His Collectivism lies in an austere rule imposed on the governing classes, who represent a political and ethical purpose superimposed on the productive strata of the society, but are themselves cut off from free consumption and from temptation to an ill use of power by a sort of monastic system. In modern Collectivism the accent is laid on free consumption for all; responsibility for production is not with the producer, but with the public authority; there is nowhere any check to the suggestion that all income is for enjoyment alone. Property bears no plain indication of an instrumental function, either in the producer or in the higher administrative class.

This clean cut between consumption and production endangers the whole character of private life. The continuity of consumption, production, and invention is severed. As it is, at any moment an invention or initiative springing out of a recreation or a private experiment may rise up into a new contribution to production. No one thinks of his possessions as being there simply for his enjoyment

and with no reference to the general output. His "things" are materials for activity, and whether they carry him into the public market or not is a matter of degree. A man conscious of his own powers or able to inspire confidence in others may all but sacrifice his life in obtaining resources, and may then throw them away on an audacious adventure, as Schliemann did at Troy, which may enrich the world for ever. No authority controlling production can do this for him. You cannot take hazards for a man as he can take them for himself. A man who has to begin by approving himself to an official authority is choked off at starting. Imagine Wm. Morris laying before a local board the first sketch of the pomegranate paper. Morris was rich; but what another man does is to live on bread and water till he can make some way with his invention or demonstrate it to some capitalist. In short, I believe in the old theory of property as a means of expression of the will. The idea of private property as earmarked for mere consumption, and as incapable of being transformed into employers' capital by a resolution of the will, seems to me a very serious matter for the *moral* of the community.

(iii.) The provision of working capital on a Collectivist system would be a matter for the management. It would have to be arranged for in the budget of the community. This seems difficult and perilous. All incomes being earmarked for consumption, and nothing that had once passed into an income being again available as a means of production, there would be a frightful waste, besides the severance of continuity between private life and productive activity. But I do not lay very great stress upon this; for it would be open to the public authority to arrange for

the contribution of loan capital on reasonable terms, and I feel certain that this would be done. I merely draw attention to the fact that the provision of capital is a social function, which is needed on an enormous scale, and which it is therefore in the public interest to remunerate. At the same time, it is an element in maintaining the continuity of life, both within a single lifetime and from generation to generation. I do not say that inheritance and bequest should be unlimited.

8. Popular Collectivism is most simply criticised by passing on to the consideration of later ideals. These take as their starting-point its admitted failure to give hopes of a change of status for the wage-earner, and the fact that, *prima facie*, it makes the management of production an affair of the State—*i.e.* of departments controlled by politicians. I cited in the Preface to Lecture I. a characteristic pronouncement of Syndicalism. It claims, so to speak, to be the incarnation of the class war, and it will not admit that the class war proper is advocated by any movement except itself. We saw what the class war meant. It meant at the lowest that the people of the workshops are to compel recognition, to become organic, to become a power, to be as good a class—as permanent, as self-nurtured, as independent—as the artists, say, or the students, or the doctors. The idea of the general strike embodies, so to speak, the virility and solidarity of this class-consciousness. They are to abstain from the compromises involved in democracy and in government by politicians. They are to live, like the early Christians, in a faith which, whether fulfilled or not fulfilled, will justify itself by the sublime fanaticism of its votaries. The self-sufficingness of the class is signed and sealed, so to

speak, for their mind by the gospel of the coming catastrophe and their self-preparation to play their part in it. Before the war they were anti-patriotic. I have not seen if they have modified their position since it began. They might reasonably urge that, though anti-patriotic, they might justly defend their country against a lower patriotism than its own. We saw in the passage I quoted that their temper excludes a rationalised social plan. The myth, or gospel, is wholly different from an Utopia.

To some extent we can enter into this mood and should learn from it. Things will happen as we make them happen by our work. Our intellectual plans and arguments are, I hope, a part of our work, but quite certainly they are only a part. What we all of us do is having social effects from day to day greater perhaps than what we think or say. And we have, or ought to have, a common faith: a faith in the strength of which we work, without expecting to see it realised in tangible shape. I think it a little commonplace as to say, as a great French writer who contributes to Sabatier's book has said, that this war must end the class war. If the class war means the affirmation of the class-soul in the class-gospel, it cannot wholly cease.

Yet another form of Collectivism—it does not, I think, call itself so—is again important as recognising that public ownership by itself is no cure for the injustices of which labour complains. It points out that labour has the same difficulties when the State, or the Municipality, or even the Co-operative Association is the employer, as when the private capitalist is so, and needs the Trade Union just as much. For it, as for Syndicalism, the wage system is the enemy, and the demand of labour is for freedom—for a certain

status—rather than for increased wages. It retains the demand for public ownership of the means of production, but separates management from ownership. The mere owner is the State, but the management rests with labour organised according to industries—not merely according to crafts, a matter of dispute in the labour world to-day. Industries are such enormous units as the coal-miners' industry, the shipping industry, the building industry; crafts are such units as carpentry, blacksmithing, plumbing, and the like.<sup>1</sup> The first step, it is urged, is to get Trades Unions organised according to industries;<sup>2</sup> next, to get them recognised as managing units of industry, for which the name of National Guilds has been suggested. Then the management of production is to be with the organisations of these units over against the State, which is the mere owner of the means of production, and in the settlement of prices speaks for the consumer, having as a weapon in its hands the power of taxation. This question of the representation of the consumer otherwise than by the mere higgling of the market in face of competing producers is certainly an important one; see again the account of such an arrangement in the working-class co-operative movement.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>1</sup> For a clear account of this intricate matter of "Trade Union Structure," see an article under that heading by Mr. G. D. H. Cole in the *Herald* for January 13, 1917.

<sup>2</sup> See *Labour Year-book* for 1916, article on "Industrial Unions and Craft Unions."

<sup>3</sup> Cf. again Miss Potter's (Mrs. Webb's) book on the Co-operative movement. It is one of Professor Patrick Geddes' extraordinarily ingenious *aperçus* that he correlates this characteristic of the co-operative movement with the possibility of a better architecture in our shopping streets than is now admissible. Where you produce for a known market, determined otherwise than by advertisement, it is not necessary to make the street your showroom by building

In terms of our problem we may say that here the social ideal is to secure justice—recognition, freedom, equality—for labour by assigning to it the main control of management, while direction to the public good is to be secured by public ownership, represented elsewhere than in the management, which, we are to observe, remains specialist, and not generalised like the ownership, as it is in popular Collectivism.

This ideal is of great interest to us, as recognising status—self-government, freedom, and security, in the productive world—as more important than wage, and as something which is not secured through public ownership *per se*. The plan, so far as it concerns the organisation of production, is founded on the analogy of democratic government. But this, rightly understood, involves very serious conditions. It is becoming plainer and plainer that democratic regulation cannot be successful on the basis of direct mass-government; that it never was so, and that its theory does not demand such a *régime*. To advocate any such method is to surrender democracy into the hands of its enemies, who are well aware of the advantage which inconsiderate theory offers them at this point. But, in truth, democracy can afford to delegate powers of administration in proportion to the breadth and freedom of its basis, and the reconciliation of rights with efficient organisation is here as everywhere the test of the ideal.

This reconciliation, we have seen, is not guaranteed by the mere union of management and ownership in the hands of the State. Taking this result with us, we can appreciate those ideals which make justice,

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your shop-front entirely of plate-glass. Thus the co-operative shops, in some places at least, display a decent and dignified civic architecture with a solid stone front.

in the shape of a free status and self-government for labour, the principal aim. But difficulties appear to arise as to the other factor of the problem—the public good—when we either with the Syndicalists preach the annihilation of the State, or with the “National Guilds” theorists treat it as a partial association—a society with a geographical basis, as opposed to the functional units—units of occupation—in which productive interests are centred. We feel ourselves oddly thrown back to the language of Individualism, when we are called upon to consider the State as only a part within the community.

All these suggestions have their lessons for us ; and we can hardly expect to produce as against them a more generally convincing Utopia. And in the concluding lecture we shall not attempt to do so ; but we shall attempt to come to an understanding upon the fundamental features of any society that man or woman can genuinely desire, and also to develop what we have learned both from others and from our own experience as to the place and limits of planning for the future—of “Utopianism” ; and as to the real forces and processes which are determining and must determine the social world that is to be.

### LECTURE III.—WHAT EVERY ONE WANTS

1. “What every one wants” includes two things at least : to satisfy the demands of justice by making possible an impartial development of human capacity, and to guarantee the public welfare by an efficient management, securing from individuals the necessary social performances. These we have seen to be the objects which determine the most recent social ideals,

as they did the earliest in the world. The differences between these most recent ideals depend on the relative amounts of attention bestowed on justice and on the common good, and those between the most recent and the earliest on the difference between belief and disbelief in the equality of man. But, in principle, these two necessities, justice and the public good, have inspired every sane sentence that has ever been written or spoken upon society or politics.

At a further point we come upon a paradox which it will be useful to us to develop. Would not every sane man and woman be further agreed in desiring the abolition of the class war, and an end of the suspicion which keeps classes apart? Yet we know that it is not so. The class war is the banner of a modern movement which defends itself in literature and commands a fairly wide sympathy in the labour world. What does this phenomenon mean?

2. The conception of class on which that of the class war depends is founded on the facts of function, and not, for example, on the superficial contrast of wealth and poverty. The workman's function of creative production, so I read the view, is held to be something whose nature is as yet unrecognised not only by the community as a whole, but by the producers themselves. It involves a claim and an antagonism which none but those familiar with it can appreciate, and which even these as yet do not appreciate. They have as yet no class-consciousness, and therefore no class-loyalty, no class-pride nor class-dignity. We saw in the Preface to these lectures the essence of the weakness alleged, and of the remedy advocated. They, the productive class as a whole, must learn to possess a common creed, a faith, or a myth, what we sometimes call in colloquial language

a gospel of their own. They must unite in a hope and belief that one day they will come into their birth-right, and they must embody this belief in a definite image which will guide and inspire their conduct. In the strength of this faith they must train and discipline themselves as soldiers train for war; they must fit themselves for freedom, for self-government, for the day when alien and selfish control shall be ousted from the workshop by the general strike. And there is more in this than a mere economic rebellion. They want to realise an *ethos* and a culture of their own; not to live on the ideas of the middle class at second-hand, any more than to wear their second-hand clothes. There may be more in it than all this, but there is all this at least, and it is something we can appreciate and respect. We note the difference of accent between it and popular Collectivism, our criticism of which has always been that it tended to spread dry-rot among the productive class.

Here we have much to learn. A class, as determined by its function, is dead if it has not its faith, its gospel, and its pride. It should not live at second-hand, nor copy the manners and ideas of others whose life is differently determined. It must live for a great deliverance, towards which it is always striving, and which, though, as dreamed of, it may never be realised, may yet lead to the realisation of something better than itself.<sup>1</sup> We may think of the Churches' belief in a religious restoration of mankind, of the student's belief in a triumph of his convictions, the artist's in an epiphany of beauty, and even of our own, the social workers', certainty that the more

<sup>1</sup> Goethe, *Hermann und Dorothea*: "Our very wishes veil from us their objects; the things we prayed for come to us, but not in the forms we chose."

excellent way which is our inspiration must some day and somehow find complete fulfilment. Feelings of this kind, which are not only justifiable but necessary, are at the root, I think, of the conception of the class war. There is something you have in common with your comrades of the same function, something you will fight for to the death, and which you do not believe that any one can understand except those who have experienced it.

3. When you come to confine it to a single class, and wholly to reject the unity of the human group within which it lives, the idea turns against itself. The very first thing which we are to learn from it, as its advocates point out with real insight, is that two can play at that game. We are told that the very point of the class war is to restore the virility of the middle class. All of us have our myth and our gospel, and, with all respect to others, we are not going to see it trampled on. You say that you can do without us but that we cannot do without you. The ultimate answer can only be "Try." And the trial never ceases. Man, as Kant has said, can get on neither with his fellow-men nor without them, and that is why he progresses.

But this brings to us a further point. The class war does not, as its advocates suppose, reject the unity of society. It establishes it. War means unity. The heat of conflict is a consequence of the central life which holds opposites in collision, always seeking and never wholly finding a *modus vivendi*. If the earth, Kant once more has said, were not a globe, but an endless plain, there need be no war between nations. It is the unity that makes the conflict.

And that this is so is easily seen in society. The mind of every class sees life from its own angle ; but

this by itself would not produce the bitterness of class conflict. This bitterness arises from the fact that every mind claims to be, and in some degree is, *the* social mind, and therefore resents the pretension of any other to represent the community in a superior or even in an equal degree. But for this very reason, though every class-mind is right to stand up for itself, it contains in miniature, besides its own, the features which are writ large in others, and therefore it is reinforced and expanded by contact with them. All of us, for instance, are to-day inspired in our own very different duties by the qualities of the Army. And thus we embody in ourselves the social unity which, from a class standpoint, we are tempted to deny. We deny it only because we claim ourselves to be the whole of it.

4. In looking closer at this question of the class-structure of society there is a fundamental point of method to be borne in mind. Utopias and ideals are valueless unless they recognise ineradicable tendencies of human nature. We shall find that Plato, for example, however widely his suggestions may seem to diverge from what we see in modern life, really recognises the profoundest tendency which through clouds of controversy and satire affirms itself to-day. Great principles are great powers; and if we are attracted by anything which gives no sign of being a power, we are probably wrong in taking it to be a principle. What we *might* hope to do is to liberate important tendencies from the errors which spring up within them or over against them, just because their significance is not simply and candidly admitted.

Now the most fundamental and ineradicable tendency of class-structure is the distinction between

wealth-production and personal service. It coincides on the whole—time and space forbid my particularising—with the distinction between the world of production and the world of action; in everyday language, between the world of business and industry and that of politics and the professions. On the whole, and allowing for the continuity between class-minds, what characterises the former class is the pre-occupation with bodily things, the capacity for production, acquisition, enjoyment, and control of them, and for steering a course in the personal relations which attach to them; while the professional classes are occupied with functions which are largely theoretical and, so far as practical, involve a large theoretical element. Theirs is, on the whole, a life of action and not of production; a life whose creations are not material objects, but solutions of problems in the realm of ideas or in the circumstances and relations of persons. And they have not the same command, control, and enjoyment of the material world as naturally comes to the productive class who are pre-occupied with it. In spite of what are called the prizes of the professions and of politics, their position to-day is that, on the whole, which Plato assigned to his guardians—that of men who work directly for the community on the basis of receiving from it just what is necessary for their function and no more. Of course I am well aware of the exceptions to this rule, and of the impossibility of making the distinction absolute. But if we consider the matter on the large scale we shall find that it is in the main as I say.

(And the point I am coming to is this: it is an ineradicable tendency that as wealth and its control and enjoyment go to the productive class, so power

and prestige go to the professional and political class. And this ineradicable tendency is also a fundamental principle, for it is essential to a decent society that prestige and ultimate power should not belong to wealth.

The tendency is disguised no doubt by social appearances, which it is necessary to see through. The wealth-producing class, as it exists to-day, is in a great measure deprived of comfort and security; but for all that it holds in its hands the productive functions of the community, and we can trace even to-day the recognition that bodily labour and hazard on the one hand, and the captain of industry's abilities on the other, demand and justify enjoyments which are neither open nor necessary to the bulk of what are disparagingly called "the intellectuals."

Again, the professional and the political class, exceptionally or for a time, may attain to wealth, but on the whole its life is simple and its claims are modest, as is right for a class which is busied directly with the central needs and the most serious interests of mankind.

5. [This is a state of things which, being, as I think, continually misunderstood, causes much confusion and bitterness, the root of which I find in the entirely groundless prejudice that material advantages are, or should be, distributed in society according to ethical or social merits. We are therefore apt to grudge such advantages to labour or to captains of industry, or again to suspect that they are claimed and desired on behalf of the intellectual professions. This suspicious attitude is very marked in Sorel. But if we view the matter rightly (see Lecture I.) this whole conception is preposterous. There is no question of merit or reward. The railway king

acquires wealth and houses and land, because on the whole he is able to handle things of that kind, and enjoys doing it ; and because he is capable and enjoys it, he probably does it *relatively* well. Men of science, artists, statesmen, would be apt to have their lives altogether spoiled if such responsibilities were cast upon them, and doubtless would in consequence spoil the lives of others. It is not merit but capacity for this or that function which determines on the whole the apparatus with which a man is equipped by the community. Even on this basis the adjustment is no doubt constantly abusive by exaggeration of a real claim ; but there is a real principle in it, and the tools go, on the whole, to him who can use them.

We may set aside, then, the groundless prejudice that success in wealth-production and command of material things indicates anything more or other than capacity for one special function within the community ; that *it* is a sign of merit, or merit a claim to *it*. We are able to understand how it is possible and right that power and prestige should belong in the main to those who deal directly with the public good as a whole, although, as Plato saw, their function, capacities, and enjoyments are widely separated from wealth and wealth-production. Like all fundamental necessities, this has a physical basis. No normal man or woman mainly concerned with wealth-production, manual or other, can possibly qualify for a great profession except by an exacting process which separates him from his wealth-productive activity. A man may go back from the ministerial Bench to the Bar, but, if he has done his duty as he ought, he cannot go back to the factory or the mine. The highest professional man, who is called with a touch of irony the professional politician,

has to-day, what Plato assigned him, the finest, the hardest, and the least rewarded profession in the world. And in spite of its own prejudices, and without knowing why, society is forced to recognise the prestige attaching to the great professions, and to this the greatest of them.

Even a skilled economist may misjudge the probable effect of a special economic measure in a very complex society. But a serious man or woman cannot well be mistaken about the type of community which he desires to see in being. And it is the latter question rather than the former that I am trying to think out to-day.

We have just seen that political leadership is a function unsuited to the wealth-producing world as such, whether in its captains or in its rank and file. Politicians are representatives, and we think of representatives as members of the world they represent. But in the nature of things this can only be true in part. To be a representative is a function in itself, and demands, if seriously undertaken, a very special training and capacity—a need which in any man who aspires to be a political force is very gravely intensified.

On the other hand, those Socialist critics of popular Collectivism appear to have much reason on their side, who inveigh against the direct organisation of industry by the political leaders acting for the State. In the interests of justice and free human development, industry demands for itself a recognised status and a high degree of self-government—a control of management and conditions wherever the ownership may be. A single instance will explain, as well as a whole chapter, what it should have power to avert. A first-rate bricklayer, who under a first-rate builder and a first-rate architect had just laid first-rate drains

in a house, told the owner that once, when compelled to work for an inferior employer, he had been using some precaution—working with a spirit-level, I think—which he held essential to proper drain-laying; and the employer came round and asked him what on earth he was about—“We have no time to lay drains in that way.” I need not explain to such an audience the double and treble reactions of such immorality upon individuals and upon the community. I do not see how anything but a development of Trade Unionism in the direction of self-government is to be of effective service here. It represents what I call the claim of industry to management, wherever ownership may reside.

We noted this claim in Lecture II., and we saw that popular Collectivism does not guarantee it. With the considerations of that lecture before us, is there anything further we can say about desirable relations of management and ownership?

The distinction which forced itself upon us throughout Lecture II. seems to me to govern the whole problem. It is the distinction between managing ownership and ownership divorced from management. We had assumed indeed that production is to be more and more self-governing. This must be so, it appears to me, as its quality becomes higher and its creative effort more intense. Once more the principle is first visible as a physical necessity. The management must come back to the skill. Going forwards, then, from this principle, it would seem as if the most desirable form of ownership were that of managing ownership; when the owner of the means of production is also the inventor and undertaker, and is himself a mainspring of the skilled self-government—in other words, is in heart and soul and mind one with

the labour organisation and inspires it. Such ownership we think we ought to see, but we do not see it perfectly, in the working-class co-operative movement ; and we see it, I suppose, in the early stages of great undertakings, while they still are animated by the inventive and creative spirit that originated them. Such a creative spirit, I take it, both must and can blend itself with the self-governing system of industry. And if ownership could all have been of this class, Collectivism, I should suppose, would never have been invented. For it, we say, is a mere pretender to the unity which here is an actual fact.

But we saw in Lecture II. that modern production is always deviating from this type. It soon becomes too huge for individual ownership of the productive unit, or effective partnership in it, to be possible. But when ownership becomes multiple or co-operative it inevitably slides beyond the managing organisation ; the sleeping partner or the shareholder makes his appearance, and ownership becomes a new kind of thing. Then ultimate control is divorced from management, and the owner becomes, as it were, an absentee landlord ; and too frequently Keats's words come to be applicable :

Half-ignorant, they turned an easy wheel,  
That set sharp racks at work, to pinch and peel.

This, as we saw, is the problem that set going the schemes of Lecture II. And it does seem to me that they brought out a genuine point. For the reasons I gave, I am against State ownership. But if and since there is to be some kind of ownership distinct from the management, as in every limited company, then I agree that management—the self-government of labour—ought to be very strong.

The modern difficulty springs out of ownership divorced from management. We saw in Lecture II. how the problems arise. I will explain my point by help of a personal experience. When I first met the problem of non-managing ownership, feeling acutely the investor's responsibility both as part employer of labour and for the general results of his business, I was inclined to the view that there should be no ownership that was not blended with management; that is, that no man ought to hold an investment in an undertaking without entering personally into the labour conditions of the enterprise and its bearing on the general welfare. And I still think there is something in this, and that limited companies—it is my old contention—should be obliged to publish in their reports certain details regarding the life of their employees and the results of their enterprise.

But it soon became clear to me that modern specialisation of function would not admit of such a forcible reunion of the rôles it had put asunder. Every man might exhaust his life in amateur directorship, and effect no good by it, while hindered by it from being effective in anything else. The investment market, I recognised (assisted by some observations of Mr. P. Wicksteed <sup>1</sup>), is within certain limits a social necessity as such; that is, as collecting capital for enterprises, and as enabling individuals to adjust their resources to a plan of life by exchanging present power of consumption for future income. This is, within limits, a bargain which meets a social need, and is profitable to both sides. It is worth noticing how this arrangement avoids the cut between consumption and production, which we found to be a

<sup>1</sup> Who, of course, is in no way responsible for my application of his argument.

sinister feature in Collectivism. Every one has thus a potential interest in production, and the varying margins of income, instead of being monotonously earmarked for consumption only, become social values available for production and for the general good.

This consideration suggests that the ineradicable tendency of the modern world to separate ownership from management is a principle which must be accepted for a certain stage in the development of business.

But, as it seems to me, our discussion shows that three reservations on this acceptance are indispensable.

First, the earlier stage of business, in which management and ownership coincide, before a concern is ripe to be "taken over" by a limited company or a public authority, is of special social value; and it would be against public policy to generalise, at its expense, the later stage in which they are separate.

Secondly, what we might call absentee ownership—the position of the shareholder class—which is quite a late and peculiar development of ownership, should, so far as public policy and opinion can assert themselves, be made to take an inferior rank in the control of production. It seems to me that one would view with satisfaction every approximation on its part to the position of mere loan capital; that is, of capital borrowed at a settled rate of interest, and without any claim to control over management.

Thirdly, the detailed control of production, where ownership is separated from management, should be closely bound up with producers' organisations in the interests of justice to the individuals engaged in production. It seems to me that the freedom of investment, as a social convenience, is only defensible on some such condition; that is to say, if the detailed

care for the status and well-being of the producers, which, as we saw, it is chimerical for the individual owners of investments to attempt to exercise, can be relied on as within the power of the productive class itself. To speak plainly, if investors did not know that powerful labour organisations are at least beginning and attempting to supervise the conditions of labour and to stimulate Government activity in inspection and regulation, I hardly see how they could sleep in their beds. For personally they know nothing at all of the conditions under which their employees are living.

Thus as regards management and ownership a variety of systems would be current together, and would, I am inclined to think, give openings for necessary and complementary modes of welfare and satisfaction. Justice would be secured by the strength of the producers' organisations, and it would be recognised that the career open to talents—which would be maintained in the interest of inventive progress and the public good—does not by itself satisfy the just demands of the producers' class-consciousness as a whole. We have seen in the Preface and elsewhere what it is that true class-feeling demands, and that every class, as determined by function, has such a feeling, and insists on its satisfaction. There would be the truest private ownership wherever it was fused with management, while the wide distribution of the more facile and less responsible form of ownership which is divorced from effective control would favour competition, so far as demanded by the public interest, within the wealth-producing world itself. Public ownership, we have seen, is absentee ownership at its worst. If absentee ownership is, as it seems to be, inevitable owing to

the element of expansion in modern business, at least its wide distribution would preserve some elements of widespread initiative and competition against undue enhancement of price.

6. Our subject is supposed to be "social ideals," and in the last few paragraphs we have thrown out suggestions regarding some features of the future. But the value of ideals, considered as schemes of society in the future, as Utopian formulæ, is itself a problem which is not new to us, and in which recent Socialism finds a strange meeting-point with ourselves. I cited some of its phrases in the Preface: "No dogmas or formulæ; no vain discussions on the society of the future." M. Sorel tells us,<sup>1</sup> on Brentano's authority, that when our Comtist Radical, Professor Beesly, had published an article on the future of the working class, Karl Marx wrote to him that hitherto he had taken him for the only revolutionary Englishman, but in future he should hold him to be a reactionary; for any one is a reactionary who makes programmes for the future. Programmes—so at least M. Sorel expands the idea in terms suggesting Bergson—programmes can only be made by patching together bits of the past; but the future, I understand him to imply, will be all of a piece, though of course continuous with the past. This future for him involves the great deliverance, the revolution; but still the attitude to ideals and Utopias has much in common, for example, with what I urged in an address to the Society (*Charity Organisation Review*, February 1915) as following from the nature of our work.

We shall find it instructive, I hope, to press this point further. The social progress, with which we

<sup>1</sup> P. 185 above.

are dealing, is too large and deep and concrete to be contained in any one's sketch of an ideal. It is the whole solid world of life, breaking out into bud and branches at every point, and including while transforming the growths of previous years. Compare, for example, the world of social care and regulation half a century ago with the same world as it is to-day. You could hardly count the changes ; but if you had counted them, and more or less estimated their direction, your comparison would not be half completed. The real point is, surely, that the social consciousness is being transformed *pari passu* with the emergence of new social creations ; and new social creations are emerging at every point in the social world.

Now to avoid misrepresenting facts, I must say that all this new creation, so far as it works by compromise with the State and points to social unity and peace with the help of the middle class, is just what our advocates of the class war detest and despise. To them it appears as the silliness (*niaiserie*) of philanthropy, as a substitution of ruse for violence, and they think that, of the two, honest and unmalicious violence is to be preferred. Understanding this quite clearly, I still say that we meet them, fundamentally, on their own ground. The new social creations and the transformed social spirit are not merely principles but facts ; and not merely facts, but powers. The social process is greater than any one's formula ; and what we have to think of is how causation is working, and how we can throw ourselves into it in union with the real forces of the day. It is true that if our views are quite short and our insight quite superficial, we shall stultify ourselves like inconsiderate charity. Still, it is better to think of our task as discovering and meeting genuine social necessities than as

imposing on the social process a goal contrived out of our own heads.

Thus, for example, it may make much more difference to the future what we do than what we say or even think. How we manage our household, how we spend our money, what we care for and pursue in our actual daily life, what we read and what amusements we enjoy—all these things are causes in the social process, and very conceivably may be operating to other ends than what we call our ideals. I do not believe that we can tell how a present social phase will turn out ; but so far as we join in the process with a right sense of the values of the principal things in life, we must be contributing an element which will make for betterment in the result. Work thoroughly done with care and sympathy will not be lost ; but no one can tell in what precise form it will survive. Such a break as should really obliterate the work of the past would be fatal indeed, but it is also impossible. Man is dependent on his tradition ; and those who are most pledged to novelty are for that very reason obliged to borrow most from the past. Because you can have nothing new unless you start on the shoulders of the past.

What I am trying to say is really very simple ; it is that when we are taught to swear that salvation depends, so to speak, on this, that, or the other special arrangement being originated or preserved in the future, it would be wiser to reflect on the immense mass of experience and method developed during the past, and especially the past half-century, and to feel sure that though we cannot say exactly what will come out of it, yet all this growth of mind and method—say in the case of children or in the relief of distress—cannot possibly be obliterated.

But if this is our point of view, our ideals will be present to us rather as a set of values, a faith, or a gospel of our function than as a clear-cut scheme of what is to be. We shall, as a great writer has said, remember "What the world is, and what we are." We shall try to understand it, and co-operate with it, rather than to remould it. We shall seek for what is deepest in it, knowing we shall find there a power which will respond to what is deepest in ourselves. And by taking these deepest things as our guide and criterion, we shall always be working in a direction which will at once be practicable and good.

To take an instance, economic equality will appear rather as a "regulative idea" than as a rigid condition. So long as, while striving for equality of opportunity, we insist, as of course we shall, on combining with it some measure of freedom in the development of capacity, there will necessarily result certain relatively advantageous positions as between family and family. Even if economic continuity by inheritance should be greatly diminished, the wiser and more energetic family will always confer upon its members an advantage which will have an economic aspect no less than one that is social and educational. In a progressive society there must and will be, as there ought to be, those who take the lead and those who bring up the rear. In the confusion and distraction of to-day the invention of modes of life is more important, perhaps, than any other invention. And the pioneers in such invention, whether in the professional or in the wealth-productive class, and however slight their economic resources, will always hold a position of pre-eminent security and stability.

7. As the typical guide, which is capable of a wider interpretation than might appear, I should be

inclined to select the well-known opposition between art and luxury ; and I select it with the more emphasis that high and respected authorities have not always acknowledged it. The question is whether in framing our lives we are guided by foolish fashion and tradition, and accumulation of what the market most easily affords, or whether we set before us the ideal of human service, the expression of genuine needs and likings, and rejection of what belongs to neither of these classes. The pioneers, I believe, will find it unnecessary to choose between the life of the rich and the hardly less repulsive life of the poor. There will be, as there always, I suppose, has been, a continual effort after simpler and more reasonable forms of life and of association ; and along with mechanical invention and the revival of architecture there will be progress towards living which may be simple without being sordid, and beautiful without being extravagant—the immortal motto of the Athenian, “ Beauty with frugality, and culture without luxury.” Art, we remember, means expression ; luxury means accumulation, and is essentially unexpressive.

And I deny, if it is suggested, the criticism that in thus talking of lofty things we are shirking the fundamental economic problem. If nothing is produced but what is wanted for a genuine “ expression ” or a genuine necessity, the healthiness of the economic system is in the main secure. Waste is the economic enemy ; and with such a production waste is precluded and the status of the workman assured. Art, M. Sorel tells us, is an anticipation of the character of the highest production on which the productive class can fix their hopes.

I ventured to call this lecture “ What Every One wants.” What I had in mind was the familiar point,

that what we want in the sense of what would satisfy us if we had it, is not the same thing with the everyday objects of our desire. We saw from the beginning that prestige instinctively rests with the activity which begins to take us beyond material necessities. We have just carried the matter one step further, in taking art, as the character of precisely self-expressive life, for our typical guide in social aspiration. But if we were to speak without disguise of the true ultimate guide and the desire of humanity, we should find ourselves dealing with matters which you might think out of place in such an argument as the present. And they are dangerous matters, easy to misinterpret, and when misinterpreted fertile of hypocrisy and of social and political evil. But, none the less, it is true that there is an ultimate guide for social ideals, and a universal desire of humanity, meaning by that the only desire whose satisfaction would be satisfactory. And this is out and away beyond the State, and beyond the social community itself, even if we take that, after the growing tendency of the day, as something wider and deeper than the political fabric. And yet, though beyond society and the State, it is not indifferent to them, nor they to it. And when we are pondering the gospel of our function, or plunging deeper into social causation in order to affect for the better the unknown future to which the whole process is tending, I do not say these great ideas should be reflectively present to us, but I am sure that if they do not on the whole express our leading aims and purposes, then those purposes are not what they ought to be. I summarise them in a passage from an Aristotelian writer, which I have often quoted before, but which I cannot cease from quoting, because it seems to me to sum up the complete truth of

the matter. It is necessary to remember, in interpreting it, how little the Greek had our habit of circumlocution, and how we have seen that every class and function in a community is tinctured with the spirit of every other.

“So whatever choice or distribution of worldly resources, whether of bodily qualities or of wealth or of friends or of other goods, will be most helpful towards the contemplation of God, that is the best, and that is the most beautiful standard of organisation; and whatever arrangement, whether by defect or by excess, hinders men from glorifying God and enjoying Him; that is a bad arrangement.”

To bring out the full meaning of this passage in its bearing on the life of a community, I will cite a few words of interpretation:

“You do not, in the view of Plato and Aristotle, when aspiring to intellectual excellence and to religious contemplation, tread a separate and diverging path from that of the ordinary good citizen. You follow his path, but pursue it further, and what the saint or the poet or the thinker may attain at the end is only the quintessence of what every citizen has been practising from the beginning,” and, I will add, except as the inspiration of that common life, loses nearly all its substance and value.

[*Note on p. 248.*—If art should come to impart its character to the main productive activities, would the antithesis indicated above (p. 234) between the productive and professional classes continue to hold good? I answer that it would be progressively decreased in intensity, and the harmony of the social mind would increase in the same ratio.]

## XII

### A MORAL FROM ATHENIAN HISTORY

THERE are two problems of human life in communities which have eternal interest. The first of these is how far the higher achievements of life are determined by material conditions ; the problem, in short, which, though by no means new, has been forced upon the world afresh through what is known as the economic or materialist view of history. And the second is how far the truest greatness of man is bound up with national self-assertion involving the forcible maintenance of unity in societies against disruption within and hostility without. The problems are, perhaps, the same problem repeated at two different levels. The first, it might be said, asks how far the forces of nature control the destinies of man ; the second, how far the relatively natural force of society, its ability to threaten and to exercise physical compulsion, is an agency essential to its highest functions.

On these two problems, it has always appeared to me, very important suggestions may be drawn from the history of Greece. The schism which has hitherto existed between modern sociology and classical studies has had the effect of depriving the theory

of society of a set of examples which display, in the clearest and simplest shape, the connection between determinate physical conditions and a singularly lofty social achievement.

In general, and with reference to both problems, we are to note the very high individuality of the Greek race, and the greatness of the results which it achieved within narrow boundaries of space and time. Thus on the one hand the effects are highly determinate, and on the other hand the conditions, both material and political, are tolerably simple and limited; so that both conditions and effects are capable of a fuller correlation than is usually possible in sociological inquiry. And the subject of the present lecture has been suggested by the fact that both as regards material and economic conditions, and as regards the type and degree of political cohesion, the minds of Greek statesmen and thinkers reflect the circumstances of their world with extraordinary directness and precision. We seem to see the policy of this and that great mind growing out of the soil and the geographical relations, and completing and emphasising their suggestions, just as wild plants or cultivated crops, or even the dwelling-places of man, follow and mark the lines and surfaces of a favourable habitat.

1. As regards the connection of Hellenic life and character with soil, climate, and geography, we may start from an interesting antithesis which makes itself felt in the simplest economic interpretation of history. Is a very fertile country, or one which demands much care and labour for its returns, more favourable to civilisation? Neither side of the alternative, of course, cuts off the connection between conditions and character; but at the same time a certain bias as to the

relative importance of factors in the problem reveals itself in the answer which we give. Buckle is inclined to insist upon the fact that the oldest civilisations belong to countries of extreme natural fertility,—India, Babylonia, Egypt. But it seems also important to point out that progressive civilisation, in the modern European sense, has seldom if ever arisen outside the temperate zone. A nature that affords occasions for struggle, producing definite achievements by success, does more for man in the end than one that seems to do all. Professor Geddes has pointed out how the conditions which induce parasitic degeneration are “freedom from danger, abundant alimentation and complete repose, etc.; in short, the conditions commonly considered those of complete material well-being.”<sup>1</sup>

The sides of the above antithesis correspond with the marked feeling of the Greeks as to the material basis of their own life when contrasted with that of the Asiatics with whom they came in contact. From the Homeric description of Ithaca, “a rugged country, but a good breeder of men,” to the saying of the Spartan in Herodotus, “Poverty is always at home in Greece,”<sup>2</sup> a whole series of anecdotes and observations—brought to a climax in the splendidly imagined interview of Solon and Cræsus—show a deep-rooted sense of the sparingness of nature in Greece as compared with her bounteousness in Asia. More particularly, no doubt, the Greek mind was influenced by

<sup>1</sup> *Encycl. Brit.*, art. “Parasitism.”

<sup>2</sup> Herodotus, vii. 102. The whole passage illustrates the Greek feeling in question. “In Greece poverty is native and virtue is artificial, being achieved by wisdom and the strength of law; and by its help Greece defends herself against both poverty and despotism.”

the immediate contrast between the territory of Greece proper and that of the Greek cities of the Levant, which in the age of mature political experience were always tributary either to Greece proper on the one hand or to Persia on the other. The real reason for their defencelessness was rather their position on the coast-line of a continent than the mildness of their climate or the wealth of their territory; but it is remarkable to find an agreement between the historian and the physician that an energetic and spirited disposition could not be expected in a climate so pleasantly tempered.<sup>1</sup>

Not that the Greeks of Greece proper were discontented with their own country. On the contrary, they believed it to be the best in the world as a breeder of men, whose type was equally remote from the untamable rudeness of Northern Europe and from the cringing trickiness which they ascribed to the Asiatic.

And it is true that their territory had an extraordinary aptness, of which its inhabitants were partly aware, to suggest and respond to definitely specialised forms of civilised achievement.

The maritime character of Greece proper, the ethical and intellectual importance of which was first, I believe, pointed out by Winckelmann, the great student of Greek plastic art, is too familiar to be enlarged upon. It is enough to note how it is suggested by the character of Greek territory—a coast-line of bays and peninsulas, the latter carried on in lines of islands; much like portions of the Scotch coast, where you send a boat if you need the doctor or minister as naturally as elsewhere you might send a carriage. Look at the peninsula of which Salonika stands at the north-west and Mount Athos at the

<sup>1</sup> Herodotus, i. 142. Stein's note, quoting Hippocrates.

south-east angle ; note how it reproduces on a small scale the outline of the Morea ; and then read its history during the lifetime of Demosthenes, how, as an isolated bit of Hellenic ground, it was the first to fall under the dominion of the non-Hellenic <sup>1</sup> powers.

Consider again the cantonal character of the Greek territory ; how the greatness of the several states followed from the size of the plains which were enclosed within their respective mountain walls ; and how the structure of the Achæan league, the earliest Federal Government, was prefigured by the row of valleys, attached to each other side by side and not rounded into a centralised unity, which made up the state of Achaia. A classical example of this kind of study was given by the historian Curtius in his great work on the Peloponnese ; and those who desire an object lesson in the correlation of character and circumstance might do worse, if prepared to familiarise themselves with Greek history, than take him as their guide.

The position of Greece proper in the Mediterranean, and in relation to the Levant and the islands of the Ægean, is no less significant for history than its internal structure. The whole country is, so to speak, turned towards the East. The bays and natural harbours of Greece proper, and the lines of islands which guide and encourage the voyages of early mariners, lie to the East ; and the basin of the Ægean, as the well-known opening sentences of Curtius's history point out, is rather a bond <sup>2</sup> than a

<sup>1</sup> This illustration, as all in these remarks that is worth anything, I owe to my teacher, Mr. W. L. Newman, of Balliol, the editor of Aristotle's *Politics*.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. the relation of the Hanse towns to the North Sea, pointed out by Professor Geddes in lectures.

division between Europe and Asia. Here in this predetermined focus of life, commerce, and ideas, continuous with the Euxine, with Asia Minor, and with Syria, Egypt, and Cyrene, we have the central area of the Greek dispersion, the basis of leagues and empires under Athens, Sparta, Alexander, and Rome, forming a homogeneous world of civilisation, the field of Hellenistic and of Greco-Roman culture, and ultimately the seed-plot of Christianity.

Turning to our immediate problem, the natural endowments of Attica in particular, in relation to the conceptions of Athenian statesmen, we note in them simply an intensification of the characteristics belonging to Hellenic ground as a whole.

First of all we have to observe the central position of Athens in the world of maritime commerce of the fifth century B.C. She lay in the centre of the waterways of the Mediterranean much as England lies in the centre of the maritime world to-day; and her natural harbours, of ample extent according to ancient standards, though not comparable with the vast harbour spaces of London, of New York, or of modern Marseilles, made it possible for her to use her position to the full.

In the next place, the internal resources of Attica point in the same way to an artificial—a commercial or industrial—type of life. The soil was not first-rate cornland, and no large population could have been maintained upon it by agriculture. The home corn-supply was probably enough for from half to two-thirds<sup>1</sup> of the year, when the population was at its

<sup>1</sup> It is interesting to see Socrates putting this question to the young would-be statesman as one of the first things he ought to know. But the young man has not given it his attention. *Xen. Mem.* iii. 6, 13.

maximum; in the United Kingdom the supply of foreign wheat began to exceed the home product about 1870. What Attica did possess was a good soil for olive, vine, and fig culture,<sup>1</sup> an inexhaustible store of the choicest marble, a supply of clay adapted for pottery, a sea well stocked with fish, a flora which gave the choicest honey, and above all, silver mines, from which a considerable revenue was drawn, and owing to which the Attic silver coinage had a general currency like that of English gold, and Athens could always pay for her imports in specie if commodities suitable for export were not forthcoming.

Now the instructive point is that we observe, from the beginning of recorded history, a perfectly definite grasp of these conditions in the minds of Athenian statesmen. It would lead us too far to furnish details of the legislation and government of the sixth century B.C. But it may be taken as well known that the great legislator and the great prince who are the prominent figures of that century at Athens felt themselves to be dealing with a community whose future lay in industry, commerce, art, and letters. The admission to citizenship of foreigners exercising a trade, which is ascribed to Solon's legislation, stands out as an act of far-sighted liberality against the policy advocated in many quarters even to-day.

By the end of the sixth century, then, what we may call the suggestions of nature had already found their response in the Athenian mind. Athenian sculpture and building were fast rising into fame; Athens was becoming noted for pottery and for other products depending for their value upon skill in

<sup>1</sup> The soil of Greece requires irrigation, and it is interesting to see the process going on to-day just as it is described by Homer.

manufacture, such, for example, as olive oil ; and the silver mines were producing a revenue to the State and to individuals, though the later and fateful application of that revenue had not yet been devised. Further, the city had already stations and factories oversea, and more particularly had laid on the region of the Hellespont the grasp which it afterwards tightened with economic results of the highest importance.

Thus the mind of Athens is from the beginning a mind racy of the native ground and the native sea ; and when we look at the cutting and setting of the marble blocks and drums on the sacred hill of Athene, we feel that above all things we have to do with a people to whom the working of marble and the building of walls and columns came as naturally as farming to an Englishman or horse-breaking to an Australian.

Omitting many things which would illustrate our point of view if it was possible to go into them—for example, the decisive democratic reforms which closed the century in question—let us look for one moment at the inherent logic of the Athenian mind as its world shaped itself further in the two great fifth-century statesmen, Themistocles and Pericles.

In the first thirty years of the fifth century, or thereabouts, the attempt of the Persian Empire to extend itself over European Greece was defeated, very greatly by the services of those poorer classes at Athens who formed the crews of the Athenian war-galleys.

Now, according to the story, which there is no reason to doubt, the existence of this powerful fleet of galleys was first made possible by the success of Themistocles in persuading the people to abandon the annual distribution per head of the silver revenue and apply it to building year by year a certain quota

of ships. And the creation of this powerful fleet involved three closely connected results: first, the defeat of Xerxes and the liberation of the Levantine cities from his power; secondly, the maritime supremacy of Athens among the Greeks, and consequently her leadership and ultimately her empire; and, thirdly, the intimate and inherent connection of the democracy at home and the empire abroad, inasmuch as the latter rested on the skill and energy of the maritime populace who rowed the galleys.

But such a war fleet, not to speak of the commerce which it was to support, needed a defensible harbour. Here, again, the mind of the statesman revealed itself at the critical moment as penetrated with the individual and determinate capacities of his native territory. The selection and fortification of the headland of Peiræus with its three natural harbours, one of them a bay three-quarters of a mile in its greatest length, may seem no very gigantic conception to us who reckon our wharf frontages by miles and miles. But it was enough to secure a sea-power to Athens adequate to deal with anything that could be brought against it within the Greek and Phœnician world, and it presented itself with extraordinary felicity as the complement of the other capacities of Attica and the condition of their being effectively realised. The harbour town which grew up round the new harbours was the favourite work of Themistocles. It was to Athens what the East End is to London, because of its including the harbours and docks, the commercial and democratic centre. Themistocles, we are explicitly told, thought the Peiræus more valuable than Athens itself, and constantly advised the Athenians, if they should ever be overborne in a war on land, to take refuge in its fortifications and hold the sea.

In this there was something of the peculiar stamp of Themistocles's mind : a want of balance, of completeness, characteristic of one who, it is said, was not of full citizen birth, and reminding us of his answer, when invited to join in the music at a party—this being an ordinary social accomplishment of an Athenian gentleman—that “ he could not fiddle, but he could make a petty town into a great city.”

However this may be, if we summon before our mind's eye the appearance of Attica, say, ten years after the repulse of Xerxes, with Athens and Peiræus both successfully fortified by Themistocles's suggestion and contrivance, and the growing energies of the city making their mark triumphantly in art and industry, in war and external politics, we shall perceive in every characteristic of the busy scene at once a gift of nature and the stamp of great intelligences, working, through the logic of events, as a single intelligence.

And now, bearing in mind that we are only selecting a point here and there out of a mass of material, let us turn to Pericles.

Comparing his characteristic policy with that of Themistocles, we find it written on the face of the country by the famous Long Walls, impregnable fortifications extending a distance of five miles from the fortified city to the fortified harbour. Pericles, then, was resolute to sacrifice neither element of Athenian life, neither power nor splendour, neither democracy nor the pride of culture. He was determined, as it seems, to give a national value to his ancient city, which had such capacities for magnificence and refinement ; and to do this he was aware that he must weld it into inseparable unity with the instruments of its maritime supremacy.

And in the great works by which he gave this imperishable value to the life of his city we may trace once more a wonderful continuity between the gifts of nature and the creations of genius. Pericles, of course, was not the first to deal with that rocky elevation in the centre of the Athens of his day, which became under his direction the most glorious sanctuary of art in the whole world. From time immemorial its surface had been used as a fort or palace or both ; it had, indeed, been the ancient city. And in the course of centuries, by the work of kings and statesmen, the sloping rock had been built up and levelled into a spacious surface, bounded by sweeping curves, supported upon huge retaining walls, whose varied workmanship indicates the succession of generations occupied upon the construction.

So, then, when we see to-day the vast marble floors, the walls and columns, with their blocks and drums fitted to a hair's-breadth, standing on a spacious and grandly outlined surface, we should call to mind that while part of this surface is the living rock, part of it again is the work of man.<sup>1</sup> And we may say without a paradox that if the greatness of Athens is in one sense a gift of nature, yet the central endowment of its nature, the very ground in which its glory is rooted, is a creation of the national mind.

Thus the life of Greece and of Athens is an emphatic object-lesson in the relation of natural data to genius and character. A great life is, as it were, the flowering of nature in the medium of great intelligence. The highest genius does not make the least but the most of the nature which is its world. Aspects

<sup>1</sup> The Parthenon, with its thousands of tons of marble, showing no trace of settlement, stands at one side on the living rock ; at the other, on thirty to forty feet of made earth and foundations.

and characteristics of material things, which are silent to others, tell their secret to the gifted race or to the great statesman. But in making the most of nature, we must not forget that genius transforms nature. Nature, we may say, ceases to be mere nature when it becomes "a world" for mind. Its rough circuitous selection is replaced by an ideal selection which is rapid and direct. Its imperfect forms of unity are replaced by the forms of intelligence, making possible, for instance, such a transformation as that of the animal brood into the human family. The very surface of the earth becomes, as we have seen, not, indeed, something which is other than nature, but a larger nature charged with mind.

[The error of commonplace materialist views of history seems to lie in the old blunder of separating two inseparable factors and then trying to substitute the one for the other. Mind and its world are inseparable correlatives; the wealth of its world is the wealth of mind, is its very substance, and the driving force of its logical or ethical operation. Mind, it might be said, is the world taken as alive and focussed. "Circumstances" are "what stand around"; they stand around a centre; the centre is the unity of consciousness, and when we speak of "circumstances" we are already within a sphere which is not merely "natural," but transformed by presentation to intelligence. Cut the correlatives apart at a line which must be arbitrary, and the world or circumstances are dead, and the mind is nothing. And then it is natural to exclaim that here is nothing left but dead circumstances, material data, conditions; and they must be the essence of life, for we can find nothing but them in life. This is because at some arbitrary level of their unity you have killed them by dissociating them

from mind, and now you say that they "really" are what they happened to be when you killed them. But in truth they are not a dead structure, prior to mind; they are a living fabric whose variety, as penetrated with a conation towards unity, is the mainspring of mind itself. Such an economic factor as the "standard of life" shows in a moment how futile is the attempt to represent economic conditions as mechanical or material, in the sense in which material or mechanical means external to intelligence.]

The Greek thinkers knew better. They knew that the function of the statesman is to elicit the idea that lies in the conditions, as the artist finds the statue in the marble. They knew that the matter of life is not alien to the aims of mind, nor a fetter upon it, but rather is the individual form or idea in its less explicit phases, pressing forward and springing up into higher shapes of unity. And they knew that economic structure is not a sort of iron framework or foundation, affecting life but unaffected by it; but is simply one way in which the characteristic unity of any system of life expresses itself, partaking of the nature and degree of completeness of the unity attained.

The idea to be got rid of is the idea that specialised circumstances are a fetter upon individuality and genius. Homer and Shakespeare, for instance, are characteristic individual voices each of his country, race, and climate. Do we wish that it were not so? Do we think that they would be more themselves if they were not? What is the world there for if it is not, with all its rich individuality, to come to utterance in mind?

2. With the Periclean works on the Acropolis we pass naturally to our second problem, the place of force in the maintenance of a national unity. For

all this splendour of Athens, all the culture and comfort of the democracy, meant imperialism ; the position of a national capital maintained by force.

I will try to summarise the familiar story in a few lines. After the repulse of the Persian invasion by the services of the rowers, and at the cost of a retirement which left the property of the wealthy classes a prey to the enemy, Athens had become, by the force of events, head of a naval alliance, offensive and defensive, against Persia. In time, as the object of the alliance was attained, a tendency grew in the allied cities to commute their personal services for money payments. This commutation Athens accepted, following, it is said, a far-sighted policy. But she would permit no further relaxation of obligations ; and, in short, within a lapse of twenty years the alliance was transformed into an empire of some five or six hundred tributary cities, held together by overwhelming force, the fleet of the alliance being now simply the Athenian fleet maintained in part at the cost of the allies, the treasury being at Athens and under Athenian officials, and the Diet or Congress having ceased to exist. The splendour and comfort of Athenian life was greatly dependent on this relation. Athenian commerce "followed the flag." The corn trade was concentrated at Peiræus. Athens became the judicial and political centre of a large part of Greece, and was necessarily, therefore, a place of constant resort, besides being, in consequence of the Periclean works, partly paid for by the "tribute," a centre of artistic industry.

Undoubtedly there was a serious risk of selfishness in this state of things. Every Athenian citizen might be the better in purse and was the better in prestige because of the empire. A few sentences from a

contemporary pamphlet, obviously written by a shrewd anti-democrat, and not the work of Xenophon, among whose writings it has come down to us, will tell us more than pages of inference and discussion : <sup>1</sup>

Some people think that the Athenian democracy is ill-advised in forcing the allies to come to Athens for their law-suits ; but others reckon up the advantages which this brings to the democracy ; first, they get their fees as jurors throughout the year out of the costs ; then, again, they can sit at home and control the allied cities without sending out ships ; for they favour the democrats and ruin the other side in their law courts ; now, if the allies had kept their law work at home, as they dislike the Athenians, they would have ruined those of their own people who favour the Athenian democracy. In addition to this, the Athenian democracy profits by the system in the following ways. The percentage (harbour dues) at Peiræus is increased ; every one who has lodgings to let is advantaged ; so is every one who has a horse or a workman (slave) to hire out ; the public attendants are profited by the allies coming to town. . . . The shortage of the corn crops, which depends on the weather, matters less to a sea power than to a land power. For the shortage is not all over the world at once ; and the corn from the districts where there is a full crop comes to those who have the sea power. . . . Whatever desirable product there is in Sicily, in Italy, in Cyprus, or in Egypt, in Lydia, or in Pontus, or in Peloponnese, or anywhere else, it is all concentrated into one spot by the operation of the Athenian sea power. . . . So, too, as regards sacrifices and temples and festivals and consecrated grounds ; the democracy understands that it is impossible for each individual of the poorer classes to have sacrifices and banquets and temples of his own and to live the life of a great and beautiful city ; and it has devised how this difficulty

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<sup>1</sup> *De Republ. Athen.*, C. 1, 16.

may be overcome. For they conduct their sacrifices on the method that great numbers of victims are provided by the city at the public expense; and it is the common people that banquets and has the breaking up of the victims. And so with gymnasia and dressing-rooms and baths. Some of the wealthy have these of their own; but the democracy itself builds on its own account many gymnasia and dressing-rooms and baths, and is better off in these respects than the few and the wealthy.

Then follows a passage pointing out that all the various requisites for shipbuilding—metals, timber, flax, etc.—are not produced in any one country, and that consequently the city which has sea power is the only one which can make sure of having them all at its disposal, and can hinder any other country from acquiring them, and so from creating a fleet. We should note in addition that the free entrance to the theatre for those who chose to claim it was a characteristic point of Pericles's policy towards the democracy.

His idea evidently was that the citizens of Athens should accept the great position which was open to them, and should make themselves worthy of it by energy, justice, culture, and bravery. He would tread on the dangerous path of profit from dependencies, partly direct but especially indirect, so far as to secure the realisation of conditions which would make these qualities possible for all Athenians. There are signs that if he could have found political forms adequate to the creation of a citizenship of the empire he would have tried to make use of them. But the thing, whether attempted or not, was impossible, and he turned to the other pole of government; not to be representative, or based upon consent, but to be worthy and efficient. That the immediate objects of the alliance were carried out under the Athenian

Empire is certain. No hostile ship nor any pirate showed its beak in the eastern Mediterranean while Athens retained her power. No account was rendered of the tribute, but the work was done. And if the artificial pre-eminence of Athens in trade was oppressive to the greater powers among the subject states, it was probably advantageous to the lesser. The trader from a small island would do better for himself at Peiræus, than if there had been no such central market, and might also obtain better justice in the Athenian courts against a member of a powerful state than he could have done apart from such a system.

Probably the position of Athens, attained at the cost of a certain aspect of selfishness, was far more deeply connected with her services to the world than has generally been admitted. The question is not merely whether the works on the Acropolis were paid for by the tribute of the allies. It affects the whole concentration of experience, the whole brilliance of life and variety of intercourse, and sense of political headship, which gave its peculiar note to the Athenian mind. Plato belonged to the Athens which had been imperial as characteristically as Ruskin to imperial England. The work of Athens was national, not merely in the cost and style of her buildings—the Parthenon was a Doric temple—but in the varied and representative quality of her thought. Even Sparta, the silent sister, bequeaths her spirit to us through Athenian writings. Athens, said Pericles, was the school of Greece; and it is worth observing that the four great cultured nations of the world—France, Germany, the United States, and Great Britain—are to-day maintaining schools at Athens. It is a great thing that men and women who mean to play their

part in modern life should think it worth while to-day to put themselves in contact for a time with the spirit and memories of the Greeks.

"I have lengthened out my account of the city" because it is important to approach our problem in no half-hearted spirit. It is easy to pretend, of course, that the services rendered by Athens to the world might equally well have been achieved without the aspect of force, absolutism, and selfishness, which by universal consent attached to her empire. To me this seems quite incredible, and the suggestion savours of running away from the difficulty. Her services rested on a basis of national unity; and when men's minds were wedded to the politics of the city-state, it was inconceivable that national unity should find a genuine political expression. It was a choice between such a unity—brief and fragile—as could be realised by force, and the privation of those achievements which Athens has given to the world. And we must say, I think, that Pericles was right, and that, if the choice was what it seems to have been, it would have been wrong and cowardly to take any other part.

But are we, then, subscribing to the gospel of "blood and iron"? What is the theoretical justification of the judgment I have suggested if it is not that for a laudable end you need stop at no oppression? And as all ends are laudable to those who desire them, it would be held to follow simply and absolutely that might is right.

I venture to put forward an explanation which at least would give room for applying criticism to such an evangel. Force, it may be suggested, is necessary and permissible in inverse ratio to political maturity. The substantive capacity of a race or people for unity

and achievement may be much in advance of the formal development of their political consciousness. Then, if force is applied to break through to the latent unity and realise the full powers of the group, its members will not be more aggrieved than somebody always is under the most reasonable self-government. The force is justified or not, and on the whole is justified or not even for those subjected to it, according as it breaks through to a life worth living—a substantive unity of will—or fails to do so. For example, it can hardly be said that the subjects of Athens resented a strong ruling hand when her rule was at its best. The errors and weaknesses incident to absolute rule brought the system to an end, and it is well that this should generally happen, and that absolutism should be incapable of permanence.]

[But what is justifiable when the political consciousness is immature, is monstrous in face of a developed political capacity. Force, indeed, I believe that there will always be in a state, as the mere fly-wheel of the machine, to ensure regularity and carry out what has become automatic in the general mind. But absolute government becomes irrational in as far as self-government becomes possible. Self-government, however, depends on the permeation of men's minds by forms of political co-operation adequate to the task imposed upon the community. Minds which are not thus permeated are as solid a barrier against unity as a range of mountains. What was a statesman to do with five hundred towns, united for common defence and possessed of a markedly national mind,<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> When the dependencies of the imperial democracy are of a different race, and on a different level of political capacity, from the democracy, we have a complication which did not exist in the case of Athens.

which had no conception of representative government, and would have rebelled if a common citizenship had been imposed upon them ?

If men cannot work out the obvious problems of the time for themselves, owing to the inadequateness of their mental machinery, some one else must and will do it for them. But they learn, in time, to deal with their own affairs, and I trust that our conclusion, therefore, is not so bad as it might seem. We accept, indeed, the priceless gift which Athenian statesmen gave us, without turning up our eyes and regretting that they won it by force ; but we understand for ourselves that the alternative to violence is education, and that absolutism<sup>1</sup> becomes progressively less justifiable as men's minds become capable of expressing themselves effectively in the forms which constitute true political unity. ]

<sup>1</sup> Absolutism, I mean, of the ruler ; not " absolutism " of the constitutional state as a whole, which is discussed in the following paper.

### XIII

#### THE FUNCTION OF THE STATE IN PROMOTING THE UNITY OF MANKIND <sup>1</sup>

I WISH to present a brief positive account of the theory of the state as I understand it, more particularly with reference to the state in its external relations, and the conditions essential to federations or a world-state.

It seems to me that much misconception is prevalent as to the views which in fact great philosophers have held upon this problem. But I do not wish to raise mere questions in the history of philosophy, but to meet the issue as it seems to me to stand to-day. The ideas which I express are therefore my own, in the sense that no one else is responsible for the form I give them. But, to the best of my judgment, they represent the Greek tradition as renewed by Hegel and by English thought.

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the lectures by Professor A. C. Bradley on "International Morality: the United States of Europe," and Mr. B. Bosanquet on "Patriotism in the Perfect State," in *The International Crisis*, Oxford University Press, 1915; and Lord Haldane's Montreal address, "Higher Nationality." In speaking of the critics, I have had in mind, besides the writers in the Aristotelian *Proceedings* for 1915-16, Mr. A. D. Lindsay's lecture in the Bedford College volume, *Theory of the State*, and some remarks of Professor Jacks in *From the Human End*, together with the general reaction against what is supposed to be the "German" theory of the state.

In considering any problem affecting the state I take the primary question to be how self-government is possible. For anything which interferes with the possibility of self-government destroys altogether the conditions of true government. The answer is drawn, I take it, from the conception of the general will, which involves the existence of an actual community, of such a nature as to share an identical mind and feeling. There is no other way of explaining how a free man can put up with compulsion and even welcome it.

Here then we have the universal condition of legitimate outward authority. City-state, Nation-state, Commonwealth, Federation, World-state, it makes no difference. Behind all force there must be a general will, and the general will must represent a communal mind.<sup>1</sup> All other contrivances for government are external and tyrannical.

1. This is the reason of the unique relation between the state and the individual which is caricatured by critics as state absolutism. Of course the state is not the ultimate end of life. The ultimate end, if we avoid religious phraseology, which would probably furnish the truest expression of it, is surely the best life. I understand by the state the power which, as the organ of a community, has the function of maintaining the external conditions necessary to the best life. These conditions are called rights. They are the claims recognised by the will of a community as the *sine qua non* of the highest obtainable fulfilment of the capacities for the best life possessed by its members.

Now the relation between the state and the individual is the external equivalent of that between

<sup>1</sup> See Lord Haldane's address referred to above.

the community and the individual. And it is a unique relation, because there is no other body that bears the same relation to the individual's will as that community which is represented by a state in the external world.

This can be said with as much precision as human affairs admit, because there is reason to expect that the community which organises itself as a state will be for every group the largest body which possesses the unity of experience necessary for constituting a general will. There is, as we shall see, no other body at all comparable with it in intensity of unity. "A national purpose is the most unconquerable and victorious of all things on earth."<sup>1</sup> And the individual's private will, we must bear in mind, is certainly and literally a part of the communal will. There is no other material of which his will can be made. If he rejects the communal will in part, he rejects it on the basis of what it is in him, not from any will of his own which has a different source. This is the ground of the duty of rebellion.

This unique relation between the individual and the community which the state represents—it may be a nation or any other community—is what seems to me to dominate the whole problem. It is further determined when we add the consideration that the state is an organ of action in the external world. In this sphere, which is its special sphere as an organ exercising force, it may really be called absolute, that is, if power extending to life and death and complete disposal of property can be called absolute. This does not mean that it is the whole end of life,<sup>2</sup>

<sup>1</sup> A. E., *Imaginations, etc.*, p. 107.

<sup>2</sup> Hegel in one place calls the state an end-in-itself, when he is contrasting his view of it with the reduction of its purpose to the

nor that it is the only object of loyalty.<sup>1</sup> It means, as I understand it, that, being the special organ of arrangement in the external world, corresponding to that particular community whose will *is* our own will when most highly organised, it has the distinctive function of dictating the final adjustment in matters of external action. This is the only sense in which I have called it absolute,<sup>2</sup> and the ground is obvious and simple. It lies in the tendency of the world of action to bring into collision factors which, apart from action, might never conflict. However purely non-political two associations may be, and however cosmopolitan, if they claim the same funds or the same building they must come before a power which can adjust the difference without appeal. And if such a power were not single in respect of them, obviously there could be no certainty of adjustment without a conflict between the two or more powers which might claim jurisdiction. Cases like that supposed are frequent, of course, with churches.

Thus there are two connected points, which, I think, the critics confuse under the name of absolutism. One is the power of the state as sustainer of all adjustments in the world of external action, on the ground which has just been explained. The other is the unique relation to the individual of such a community as is at present exemplified by his nation-state, because it represents, as nothing else in the

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protection of property or the right of the stronger. He regards it as having in it some of the end of life, viz. the embodiment of liberty ; of course, not the whole end. It is for him the basis of the further more specialised achievements (art, philosophy, and the like).—*Rechtsphilosophie*, Sect. 258.

<sup>1</sup> See below, p. 283.

<sup>2</sup> *Philosophy of the State*, ch. viii. 3, and Introduction to 2nd edition.

world does, that special system of rights and sentiments, the complement of his own being, which the general will of his group has formed a state to maintain.

It is the result, I take it, of these two grounds of unity co-operating, that in times of stress the state, as the organ of the community, will suspend or subject to conditions any form of intercourse between its members and persons or associations within or without its territory, and will require any service that it thinks fit from any of its members. It does, in Mr. Bradley's words, "with the moral approval of all what the explicit theory of scarcely one will morally justify."<sup>1</sup> That it does not exercise such powers to anything like the same degree in ordinary times, and that it recognises the rights of conscience even in times of stress, flows from the fact that its primary end is the maintenance of rights, and it will override no right by force where an adjustment is possible compatibly with the good life of the whole. And of this possibility it is the sole judge. What it permits, it permits by reason of its end, and no theory can stand which will not justify in principle its habitual action in time of stress.)

2. "The state," as I understand the words, is a phrase framed in the normal way, to express that one is dealing with the members of a class strictly according to the connotation of the class-name. If a plural noun is used, there can be no certainty whether we are speaking of characteristics which belong to the class-members as such, or of circumstances which may occur in each of them for independent reasons. "The state," in a word, is a brief expression for "states *qua* states." I confess that I am a good deal surprised that nearly all recent critics have stumbled,

<sup>1</sup> *Ethical Studies*, p. 166.

as it seems to me, in this simple matter of interpretation.<sup>1</sup> Would they find the same difficulty in the title of a book on "the heart" or "the steam-engine"? It would be urged, perhaps, that a heart does not imply other hearts, but that a state does imply other states; but if the thing implies other things its name implies the reference to them.

(And, indeed, the whole *raison d'être* of our theory is to show why, and in what sense, there must be states wherever there are groups of human beings, and to explain for what reasons men are distinguished into separate adjacent political bodies instead of forming a single system over the whole earth's surface.

Our theory has told us, for example, that states represent differentiations of the single human spirit (Hegel), whose extent and intensity determine and are determined by territorial limits. They are members, we are told by Plato and Hegel, of an ethical family of nations, so far, at least, as the European world is concerned; they are characterised—it is Mazzini's well-known doctrine—by individual missions<sup>2</sup> or functions which furnish for every state its distinctive contribution to human life. They have a similar task to achieve, each within its territory allotted by history, so Green

<sup>1</sup> Hegel pointed out this ambiguity, *Th. des Rechts*, Sect. 258; cf. also A. C. Bradley, *International Crisis*, p. 47. With the phrase "philosophy of men," which is offered as a counter-example as against "philosophy of the State," we may compare the two expressions "knowledge of man" and "knowledge of men." The former means something like philosophy; the latter means the knowledge of individual peculiarities and defects, gathered by the experience of a worldling. The former belongs to Plato or Shakespeare, the latter to Major Pendennis.

<sup>2</sup> The term I have myself selected to describe the ethical unity of a nation-state (*Phil. of State*, p. 321).

argues, and the more perfectly each of them attains its proper object of giving free scope to the capacities of all persons living on a certain range of territory, the easier it is for others to do so.<sup>1</sup> Obviously they are co-operating units. This is throughout the essence of the theory. )

Now it is not, I think, unfair to point out that my critics, dealing unguardedly with "states" and not with "the state" or with "states *qua* states," have on the whole founded their account of states not upon what they are, so far as states, but just upon what, *qua* states, they are not; upon defects which appear unequally in the several communities, consisting in those evils which the organisation of the state exists in order to remove, and does progressively remove in so far as true self-government is attained. Such evils are war, exploitation within or without, class privilege, arbitrary authority, discontent directing ambitions to foreign conquest and to jealousy of other states, the doctrine that one state's gain is *ipso facto* another's loss.

3. Space and time do not permit me to discuss, what I should be interested in discussing at some length, the continuous relations which extend beyond the frontiers of individual states, their importance compared with that of other continuities which are co-extensive with the area of the states and constituent of them, and why it is necessary to recognise, in spite of the former, separate sovereign political units which undoubtedly, while imperfect, tend to break down at the frontier, in a regrettable way, the continuities which pass beyond it.<sup>2</sup> Broadly speaking, the

<sup>1</sup> Green, *Principles of Political Obligation*, p. 170.

<sup>2</sup> This problem is suggested by the opening sentences of Curtius' *History of Greece*, with reference to the unity of continental Greece

reason lies, I take it, in the exceptionally intense unity and concreteness of certain group-minds,<sup>1</sup> in which innumerable continuities coincide, while other continuities, which extend beyond the group, nevertheless do not coincide with any marked rival unity.

4. It follows from our theory, as we saw, that the normal relation of states is co-operative.<sup>2</sup> Their influence on each other's structure and culture is mainly a question of wants and materials. The characteristic dealing with them depends after all upon the national mind, as we see in the contrast of Athens and Sparta, the two leading states of one and the same civilisation. It is a curious fallacy in the disparagement of the state that the recognition of a debt to foreign culture has been pushed so far as to suggest that nothing great originates in any state because everything is imported from some other.<sup>3</sup>

Further, it follows that the maintenance of this normal relation, or its attainment where unattained, depends on the right discharge by states of their internal function—the maintenance of rights as the conditions of good life. War, as Plato showed, is not

and Ionia, or by the natural unity of the basin of the North Sea (in the Hanseatic League). The case of England and Scotland, compared with that of England and Ireland, repays study.

<sup>1</sup> See above, p. 272. I do not say "national" minds, because I observe that the phrase is used with various unduly restricted meanings; cp. Lord Acton, who considers nationality a mere physical kinship. Plato shows the right line, surely. The group must have the same myth, i.e. the same consciousness of unity. It does not matter how they got it.

<sup>2</sup> Hobbes, it must be remembered, with kindred theorists, is far removed from the philosophy of which we are speaking.

<sup>3</sup> Compare the malevolent gossips in *Middlemarch*, who referred the husband's book to the wife's special knowledge, and *vice versa*, so that they did not need to give credit to either for the books they wrote.

of the essence of states, but has its causes in their internal disease and distraction, leading to policies of "expansion." Therefore, in this sense, to begin with, we want more of the state and not less. In order to reinforce the organisation of rights by other states, the main thing it has to do is to complete its own. This fundamental truth none of the critics seem to have observed, and to have emphasised it appears to me a very great merit in our philosophy.<sup>1</sup> The fundamental principle is that states *qua* states are—"the state" is—the human mind doing the same work in different localities with different materials. Obviously, in as far as it succeeds, its efforts assist each other.

5. Thus every state as such—that is, "the state" is "the guardian of a whole moral world," maintaining the peculiar contribution of its community to the total of human life and of human mind. We shall see why this double expression is necessary. And it is very important to observe that this moral world includes a whole distinctive attitude to life and humanity. It is an attitude *of* the community, but *to* the world. Thus you cannot get away from it. All individuals share it, more or less, and every relation of the group, external or internal, is brought to a meeting point within their consciousness, and elicits a response from it.

It is easy to discern how such guardianship on the part of bodies so highly individualised, so deeply

<sup>1</sup> Cf. especially Green, *Principles of Political Obligation*, Sect. 167 ff. The root of venom in the present conflict lies surely in two things: (a) In the mediæval condition of the Prussian franchise, which the Monistic League of several hundred thousand members, with Ostwald at its head, was pledged to see reformed, and (β) the false political economy of "your gain is my loss," which such an internal situation promotes.

conscious of a function and as yet so imperfectly organised, may lead, from time to time, to differences which can only be resolved by force. It is a profound mistake, I am convinced, to direct the moral of the present calamity against the communal sense of a function and a mission; against, in a word, the belief that a community has a conscience. Yet this belief is the root of the doctrine caricatured under the name of state absolutism. It seems to me foolish to take a hostile attitude to a general truth because it displays the root of serious evils. For, indeed, what displays their root is the only indication of the remedy. The true moral is, surely, not that a community should have no overmastering purpose, no consciousness of a mission and no conscience, but simply that its conscience should as far as possible be enlightened. Enlightened consciences, I venture to assume, cannot bring actions into conflict. But, being internally ill organised, and correspondingly biassed and unenlightened, communities enter into conflicts from time to time with their whole heart and soul, just because they *have* consciences and *have* moral worlds to guard. It happens naturally to them as to private persons that they throw their whole sense of right into what is wrong. In order to produce a disastrous collision, we must bear in mind, the aspirations of two communities need not be in conflict at every point. It is like two trains running side by side, where an encroachment of an inch is enough to produce a calamity. Aspirations may be irreconcilable in practice which have a very large factor of agreement. This factor is the ground for hope, which consists in their being, after all, aspirations of communities which possess reason and conscience. Reconciliation of them by harmonious

adjustment, though impracticable at certain moments, is never inconceivable.

Now it is surely plain that no power on earth can deal with such a cause of conflict, except something that enables the biassed and erroneous factors of the conflicting claims to be eliminated. And this can never be done by external force, but must mainly depend on a better organisation of rights by every state at home, with a consequent correction of its ambitions and outlook on the world. A healthy state is not militant.

But the mischief is, that the popular mind, observing that the present trouble has arisen through aspirations in others which we pronounce perverse, is inclined to attribute to a false philosophy the whole conception of national aspirations as representing the conscience of a people and its overmastering sense of duty. Men do not reflect that precisely such aspirations are determining their own group-action at every step. They say, as our critics are saying, that the theory of the unity of a people in the moral consciousness of a pre-eminent duty, and the principle of its expression through an organ supreme in practical life, are absolutism, and ought to be weakened or abandoned. The unique obligation of the private person to the community as incomparably the fullest representative of himself is to be put on a level with isolated abstract obligations arising in the course of this or that special relation, although it is on the communal mind that the task of harmonising them must ultimately fall. In short, the whole moral status and moral being of the community is to be indefinitely but considerably lowered.

All this seems to me to point exactly the wrong way. We all know, in modern society more especi-

ally, that we pay for the existence of great organising agencies by the possibility of their conflicting. But that does not make us desire to weaken them; it makes us desire to amplify their members' faith in them, and to get them to do their work more completely. The remedy for disorganisation is not less organisation, but more. All organisation, of course, brings a concurrent risk of conflict. You bring claims together, and you find points which for the moment cannot be adjusted. It is a flat contradiction to maintain that the state is morally responsible, and also that it must not face an actual conflict where its conscience is concerned. Even within the community, where obligations to the common will are so high and so determinate, the conscientious objector will follow his conscience to the end, and if we believe him to be sincere we all respect him for it. Why should the community, an individual in a far deeper sense than the citizen, being the nearest approach to a true individual that exists upon the earth, be expected not to follow its conscience? The clause on which I have just insisted is, as Rousseau pointed out,<sup>1</sup> the fundamental issue. (The point to be remembered is that the individual only has his individuality through the social consciousness. The nearer he approaches to being himself the more he approaches identification with the communal mind.<sup>2</sup> This mind can only be expressed as what the individual would be if he possessed in completeness all that his actual consciousness implies regarding the group-life. If he sees reason to rebel, it is still as a social duty. It cannot be in virtue of some right of his own, as he would be, *per impossibile*, apart.)

<sup>1</sup> Rousseau, *Contrat Social*, I. vii.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. Bradley's *Ethical Studies*, Essays II. and V.

No doubt, when there is strife between communities, a wrong is being committed somewhere. But the way to right it is not for the conscientious group to make a rule of yielding on points which it holds fundamental to its function.

Now I think that the critics of our theory speak uncertainly here. Is our fault in saying that the community which asserts itself through the state *is* a moral being, and *has* a conscience, or is not a moral being and has not a conscience? They seem to me in effect to say both at once. But only one can be true.

It is clear, I think, that we are accused of denying the moral responsibility of the community which has the state for its organ. But it can hardly be doubted that we are also accused of putting this moral responsibility much too high. Thus the critics find themselves driven to treat the community which is a state as a mere association of individuals, which cannot possess an organic moral conscience nor general will. Though in one passage disclaiming individualism,<sup>1</sup> the argument breathes its spirit. If you call the state an association, you speak the language of individualism, and still more so, if you speak of individual rights which can be asserted

<sup>1</sup> In Mr. Cole's paper. Mr. Russell, I think, does not disclaim it, seeing, if I understand him, no common mind in men capable of a common will. I am prepared to receive what comes from him with great respect, and I agree with his disbelief in the likelihood of an international authority being established after this war; and I take it that he agrees with me that *Si vis pacem, para bellum*, is self-contradictory. But his view of the state and its aim seems to me just introspective in the bad sense. It represents the conscious reflections of minds unappreciative of the actual work done in legislation and administration. It is quite extraordinarily akin to Horace Walpole's attitude, *e.g.* letter to Sir H. Mann, November 2, 1765.

against it, and of the individual judgment as ultimate. To call it an "association" is contrary, I think, both to usage and to truth. The word is, I presume, employed intentionally as paradoxical and aggressive.

It is really, then, the moral being and moral responsibility of the state which we affirm, and which the main attack desires to undermine. The opposite suggestion, that we do not recognise the moral responsibility of the members of a group for its action, is, as we shall see, a mere misconception, derived from the fact that we observe the moral action of a community not to be capable of being criticised by the method of comparison with that of an individual. //

(The unique position of the state springs, as I said at starting, from the fact that it is moulded, as no mere association is, by and for the special task of maintaining in a certain territory the external conditions of good life as a whole. Its territorial area adjusts itself to that unity of communal experience which is most favourable to the maintenance of an organised will, so that it tends to cover the largest area within which, for a certain group, the conditions of such an experience exist.)

It is an error, I think, resting on a confusion regarding the sphere of the state, to suggest that obedience to it can conflict with the existence of loyalty to associations—I refuse to say *other* associations—at home or abroad. The state's peculiar function is in the world of external action, and it does not inquire into the sentiments of men and women further than to establish the *bona fide* intention which the law includes in the meaning of an act. But whatever loyalties may exist in the mind, the state will undoubtedly, when need arises, of which it through constitutional methods is the sole judge, prohibit and

prevent the expression, in external acts, of any loyalty but that to the community which it represents. Absoluteness in this sense is inherent in the state, for the reason which we have noted.<sup>1</sup>

• But even for loyalties which we inwardly cherish, and which appear to us irreconcilable with the concrete communal will, we pay a severe penalty in a felt contradiction which is a constant sore in our mind. It forms a continual demand for reconciliation by adjustment, and so for a new response and an enlarged and not restricted operation of the social consciousness, which if it passes into action will reflect itself in a new and ampler initiative on the part of the state. Every conflict as a matter of course is a stimulus to fresh reaction.

6. So much for the *rationale* of the so-called absolutism of the state, which is in the main a caricature of its position as sole organiser of rights and as guardian of moral values.

I believe that the principal difficulty which is felt about the view which I am trying to explain arises from its denial that the moral obligations of a state can be deduced from the consideration of those which attach to a private person under what are taken to be analogous circumstances.<sup>2</sup> This difficulty seems to depend on the crude belief that morality consists in the observance of abstract absolute rules, unmodified by relations and situations, such that you can paint the world of outward actions, as it were, with two colours only, right and wrong, which will stand

<sup>1</sup> Pp. 272-3, above. Even the duty of rebellion is not in principle a limit upon this power; for it does not rest on a non-social right, but on a recognition that the state is divided against itself.

<sup>2</sup> See Professor A. C. Bradley's lecture, above referred to, pp. 62 ff.

fast for all moral beings under all conditions. I do not think it could possibly be felt by any mind which had once grasped the point that duty is a systematic structure, such as to bring home its universal demand, in a particular and appropriate form to every moral being according to its conditions, and that the best brief summary of it is "to be equal to the situation."

When this is grasped, I think that the moral criticism of our view is easily seen to rest on mere misunderstanding. We assume *ab initio* that the state has a mission or a function, a contribution to make to the life of the world such as no other body or person can pretend to. The question is whether comparison with the moral task of a private person can throw light on our judgment of what it does or of what it ought to do.

A word on the case of the private person himself will, perhaps, make the matter plainer. Even his morality is ultimately a very different thing, not from what common sense recognises, but from what popular theory assumes. There is no such thing in ethics as an absolute rule or an absolute obligation, unless it were that of so far as possible realising the best life. In every action the moral agent confronts a conflict of duties, and has in some degree to steer an uncharted course. Every situation is in some degree, however slightly, new; and his moral duty is to be equal to it, to deal with it, to mould it, in accordance with the moral spirit which is in him, into a contribution to the realisation of the best life. There is perhaps no act that we can think of which, if we do not set it down by definition as an act of the bad will, could not conceivably be a duty. The room for immoral casuistry is infinite, and there is no security but to grasp so far as possible the actual obligations,

which in accordance with the ethical spirit acquired from social discipline and applying itself anew in a similar sense, are plainly incumbent upon the particular moral agent. With all the aids of moral convention, of a life organised in extreme detail within a framework of social and legal obligations, of the communal sentiment engrained and embodied in his habitual will, the private individual has still in principle a new morality constantly to create, though in practice, assuming *bona fides*, he has in general little difficulty in discerning his duty at the moment. A strictly moral judgment of others is scarcely open to him at all.

Now turn to the community organised as a state. In quiet times, and over a great part of its conduct, its course, like that of the individual, may be considered as plainly marked.<sup>1</sup> But at any moment some huge new problem may crop up, involving, one might say, a whole philosophy or prophecy of the future history of the world.<sup>2</sup> Suppose the British Empire confronted by an opponent or by an international Peace League or Tribunal with some proposed regulation which it (the Empire) judged fatal to sea power.<sup>3</sup> Is it not plain what we mean by saying that there is no organised moral world within which a course of duty under such conditions is prescribed to the state? Even assuming a disinterested tribunal—which at present would be quite impossible—who could determine with authority the

<sup>1</sup> I am quite aware of the immense amount of international co-operation, for desirable ends, which goes on in normal times.

<sup>2</sup> Conflicting philosophies of history are ultimately, one might say, the root of bitterness between the Germans and ourselves. They sincerely think one course of things best for the world, and we sincerely think another. We are fighting for our faiths.

<sup>3</sup> The hypothesis is taken from *The War and Democracy*, p. 376.

effect on the world's future of any such regulation? Of course such a question is not justiciable. But when you get beyond justiciable questions you are in the ocean of speculation as to elements of future welfare. As to the really effective type of world-wide authority, I will say more below.

But at present the point is this. In the case supposed the unit in question has one great certainty. It has the moral world of which, so far, it has been the guardian, which is the source of the mission or function which its conscience and general will recognise as its own, and of the view of humanity and the world at large which it holds to be the highest. *If* it believes itself to see clearly that the proposed regulation must destroy or gravely endanger that form of good life and that attitude to humanity with which it has so far identified itself, it will possess in this conviction the only definite element in this moral problem. I do not mean that it must be so in the case of every innovation; but it very well may be so. In as far as it is so, the consideration of this certainty would probably present itself as an overwhelming ground of action.<sup>1</sup> There is nothing here analogous to the tissue of obligation within which the individual lives. It is not the mere absence of a sanction that makes the difference; an external sanction cannot affect your own moral obligation. It is partly, no doubt, the absence of an external order on the maintenance of which you can rely; but it is still more, and more intimately, the absence of a recognised moral order such as to guide the conscience itself.

In the case suggested it is proposed to reshape the

<sup>1</sup> See Professor Bradley, *loc. cit.*, comparing the right of a state and of an individual to sacrifice themselves or risk their own suppression.

world; and it may well happen that in dealing with the proposal the unit has no guide but to defend the best thing it knows. This is what we mean by saying that it is the guardian of a whole moral world, but does not itself act within a moral world. Say, if you like, that it is within the society of states. But the life of this society, as a whole, has up to the present no moral tradition, imposing adapted and appropriate obligations on all units, comparable with the social consciousness which constitutes the whole basis and material of the normal individual will. In any case analogous to that just supposed, it is not likely to afford any help whatever. There is no middle term, so to speak, between the unit which has to act, and the general obligation of realising what is best—none, that is, except the form of good life with which the unit is already identified. And we have seen that its special form of good life, being a moral consciousness, is not merely a self-contained habit of conduct in the members of a group, but is an attitude and moral outlook which, though existing in them, has for its object the whole world, and is determined by the view and spirit which the group has evolved for itself, implying its conception of the best thing for the world. Devotion to humanity as a best, as a supreme quality, is, unless and until the organism of mankind becomes actual, better represented by the moral world of the highest communities than by anything common to the whole multitude of mankind.<sup>1</sup>

7. After these explanations, I hope it may be hardly necessary to refute the charge of immorality brought against the thesis that a state simply cannot do all immoral acts which a single human being can. We have seen that morality is relative to the special

<sup>1</sup> See p. 291, below.

obligation of the particular moral being, and it is obviously also relative to his capacity for action. Now a community simply cannot express its will directly, as a man or woman can, in a bodily act. To act is to make a will pass into fact, and how a community can do this is an old question and not an easy one. Rousseau held that nothing but a law, a decision dealing with something of general interest, could be an act of the sovereign power, and, in the main, I believe he was right. It is plain surely that even a mere aggregate of men cannot commit a single bodily act as one man can. It may be answered, "They may be accomplices before or after the fact." But we should consider what would have to be proved to bring in a nation as accomplices in a breach of the Decalogue. An act of attainder is, I should think, the nearest thing to murder by a state, and such an act, like all privilegia, is, I believe, now considered abhorrent to the spirit of law.<sup>1</sup> Surely it is better and even more impressive to recognise obvious distinctions and call things by their right names. The fundamental point is in the defective individuality of human beings. If a man could be inspired by the whole living system of the communal mind, then the community as active—the state—might be fully responsible for what he does. And in practice we make a great distinction, which nothing else can account for, between the degrees of its responsibility for the sayings and doings of its different agents. A Cabinet minister acts for the state in a different degree from a police constable. For, as any man or woman's mind is always but a fragment of the general mind and will, it is plain that the community which acts

<sup>1</sup> Cf. the decision of the Athenian Assembly to put the Mityleneans to death, and its recall.

through them can only answer for as much of their act as represents the degree of its will which it can fairly be said to have succeeded in communicating to them ; that is, in practice, for their appointment and dismissal, their instructions, and the general system under which they work. And the recognition of this is enough, and more effective in practice than an attempt to impute something more, which would always fail. "Power can be delegated, but not will." You may order special acts to be done by another, but you cannot transfer to him the general exercise of your will.

I admit that recent events have done something to show that the responsibility of a community for single wicked actions of men may be more intimate than I had thought possible. But I still think that all this will look very different when the conditions of such action come to be criticised in cold blood. And in any case I have rightly stated the hypothetical conditions of such responsibility.<sup>1</sup>

{ If agents thought of their duty more in terms of a community's obligations and less in terms of private conscience, much evil would be avoided. It has been the private conscience that has been responsible, very largely at least, for religious persecution and active intolerance of all kinds, which have been not an advantage, but a distinct obstruction to the community in its function. }

8. I will pass on to the question of a wider loyalty, or a larger political unit than those which centre in the nation-state.

It is natural to infer from the social organism to an organism of humanity, and to look for the supreme authority or object of devotion in this as the in-

<sup>1</sup> *Phil. Theory of State*, p. 324.

clusive unit. But here, again, is a difficulty in the facts—a double difficulty, which our theory is framed to meet, and which its critics seem not to have heeded.

The first thing that strikes us is that, in fact, at present there *is* no organism of humanity. For such an organism, consciousness of connection is necessary. Mere causal connection exists in the mere physical world. And putting aside the question of past and future human beings, will any one say that even the existing multitude of humanity possesses any connected communal consciousness whatever? But if not, there is at present no community outside those which speak through the state, which can at all pretend to be a moral purpose or to be endowed with a conscience.

And secondly, considering as an aggregate all the human beings on the earth's surface, we can find in them no common character in which the values to which we are devoted as the qualitative essence of humanity are adequately represented. I do not say that something of humanity in the highest sense is not present wherever there are human beings. (But it is plain that neither the main values which govern our aspirations to the best life, nor the valuation of them, are possessions common to mankind. It is not to the multitudes of all mankind that we go for "love and beauty and delight.") At their best they are possessions of particular communities, and form elements in the diverse moral worlds which states exist to guard. Thus, to put it bluntly, a duty to realise the best life cannot be shown to coincide with a duty to the multitude of mankind. Our primary loyalty is to a quality, not to a crowd. If you see the two as one, it is by faith only, and at any given moment they may conflict. This makes the moral alternative between, say, the self-defence of a highly

civilised state and submission in the interests of the whole world's peace, a really tragic crisis, and entitles us to say that there is nothing in the interstate world to guide its units in moral choices.

It is not unnecessary to guard ourselves, as we are doing, against the assumption that humanity is a real corporate being, an object of devotion and a guide to moral duty. This formed the central doctrine of Comtism, and, seeming to correspond to a natural expansion of our interest, tends to make us fancy that we apprehend an ultimate visible community to which our devotion is due, and with which we can have a will in common. It is conceivable, of course, that such a community may one day come into being. But there are suggestions which point elsewhere. M. Romain Rolland has spoken of our only dwelling-places being our earthly fatherland and the City of God.<sup>1</sup> I do not know whether by the second phrase he understands a visible community. The antithesis seems to suggest a different idea, and the truly complete community, which religion, for instance, assumes as ultimate, cannot possibly be that with which the Comtist confused it, the multitude of human beings either alive at any given moment, or including all that have been and that will be.

However this may be, whatever may prove to be the extent of the effective unity which at any time may be realised among mankind, the condition of its realisation, if our theory is sound, admits of no dispute. The body which is to be in sole or supreme command of force for the common good must possess a true general will, and for that reason must be a genuine community sharing a common sentiment and animated by a common tradition. With less

<sup>1</sup> See *The War and Democracy*, p. 13.

than this the supreme authority must become an administration of general rules, external to the needs and consciences of the communities which it is meant to unite, and incapable therefore of appreciating the more serious problems which will confront them, or those needs of their lives which demand a certain social structure. This is why I view with apprehension the tendency to minimise the function of the state which is current to-day, owing, as I believe, to a too special explanation of causes which led to the present conflict. The first thing needed is the better adjustment and maintenance of rights within the communities which form states at the present moment. That is to say, the more complete discharge of their functions by existing states, and, if need be, the formation of new ones, adapted to similar tasks. More of the state, that is, and not less, is required within communities. And so, too, without. If larger units are needed and can be realised, they too must fulfil the conditions of states. Here, also, more of the state is needed, and not less. Leagues, alliances, united states, which have not the spirit of true communities, carry the germs of disruption within them, and the probability, as Hegel explained, of antagonism without. External antagonism, and not a deep-seated general will, is, as a rule, their binding force. Here I am thoroughly at one with Mr. Russell as to the improbability of an international authority being created as an outcome of the present war. I confess that I see something of the same danger in the unit which has been spoken of as the commonwealth—say, the British Empire in its present stage of development. For it is its essence, as I understand the doctrine, that its constituent members are to be on an unequal footing, unified

only by a reign of external law which leaves their national consciousness untouched and unreconciled.<sup>1</sup> I cannot believe that this is satisfactory. If the members remain heterogeneous and unequal, there is no general will. If the point is that they are to be trained to freedom and equality, then it seems to me to matter little whether in the end they go their own way in peace, or choose to form an effective unity with the other members, which shall be a true state. But the "commonwealth" as described is neither one thing nor the other, and is justified, I should have said, only by its possible future.

9. Thus it seems clear to me that the organisation of rights can only be complete in a community which satisfies the conditions necessary to the possession of a general will; that is to say, a very high degree of common experience, tradition, and aspiration. Such communities are not now to be found except in the nation-state. The commonwealth of nations alluded to above does not, I believe, fulfil the condition in respect of the dependencies included in it. But I do not suggest that larger units than nation-states can never come to fulfil these conditions; only that, if they do, they must have achieved a unity comparable to that which we now experience in nationality alone. I do not say this is impossible to be realised at some remote period even in a world-state. But in so far as it is not realised, any unitary authority which it may be attempted to set up will be superficial, external, arbitrary, and liable to disruption.

And this contemplation of remote possibilities is

<sup>1</sup> Lord Acton, *Freedom and other Essays*, p. 290; see *The War and Democracy*, p. 370. Lord Acton does not use the term Commonwealth in the sense referred to by the latter writer. It is discussed, of course, in Mr. Curtis' works.

making people neglect the plain facts and the nearer remedies. Whatever may happen in the future, there is nothing in the world to-day that can compare for a moment in power and intimacy and concreteness with the type of corporate being which we call the nation-state. The organism of humanity, though conceivable, is at present as we saw a mere possibility, and the idea of it contains a serious contradiction between quality and totality.

A system of nation-states or of commonwealths (I have said why I cannot recognise the distinction as one of principle) each internally well organised, would not perhaps give us all that a world-state might give us, but it would place the world in a wholly different ethical position from that which it occupies to-day. It would involve, I assume, universal freedom of trade and intercourse. Interference with this I take to be the result of internal distraction, giving rise to the doctrine of "your gain my loss," which is the principal source of war.)

(There is no reason that I can see for considering it a defective arrangement that world-wide relations or associations shall pass under the dominion of different sovereign powers in different regions of the earth. It seems to me that a very doubtful assumption is made when we are told that economic relations have outstripped political relations. This is actually to assume that there cannot be friendly and efficient co-operation between different political bodies in respect of world-wide relations. It is a pessimistic view, for which our theory recognises no ground whatever. Each local power, we consider, has expressly evolved itself from the need and demand for an organisation of rights in a certain territory. And it is quite arguable that every world-wide relation

or association—say, for example, the Roman Catholic Church—is better protected and developed by co-operation with such a local power in every region, than it would be by a world-wide political unit. The fear that this will not be so is itself a relic of that barbarous suspicion directed against foreign communities which belongs to the identification of states with agencies for war and exploitation.

The case of relations to units outside a state makes no difference of principle. It is quite plain that if our mind and will are to be at one with themselves, our loyalty and co-operation with, say, an international labour movement or an association in a foreign country, must be reconciled with that system of our mind which is our national<sup>1</sup> consciousness and conscience. If not, there must be a constant sore in our moral being, and, of course, there are many such sores, and while we live in this world they are not likely altogether to cease.

But there is no reason in principle why a system of states, each doing with fair completeness its local work of organisation, and recognising, with or without active modification, the world-wide relations which pass through them, should not result in a world as peaceful as one under a more unitary system, and much richer in quality.<sup>2</sup> Those who think it cannot be so, must believe that states are naturally at war,

<sup>1</sup> I take the term "national" as adjective of any sovereign community which has a general will.

<sup>2</sup> I cannot see the least relevance in the suggestion that our theory requires relations which pass beyond the frontier to be suppressed (Lindsay, *Theory of State*, p. 101). The group-mind, we saw, is a species of world-mind, and has not the group for its sole object. All external relations, therefore, are focussed in it along with the group-relations proper, and constitute, of course, a demand for unification by a response.

and do not, so far as I can see, understand what the nature of the state is, nor how a group-mind (like every mind) is an attitude to the world at large, nor for what reasons it is that communities are apt to be hostile.

I do not think it necessary that such a system of states should form an explicit federation. Federations are apt to be unsuccessful unless they possess, like the United States of America, an obvious and increasing tendency to assume the national type. Those who think federation necessary for the sake of a central force, obviously believe in force rather than in friendship. But without friendship the force is dangerous, and with it, perhaps, hardly necessary. I am assuming that the experience and tradition of states remain as they are to-day, too highly individual to permit of a thoroughly common mind and of a true general will, but that they remain peaceful neighbours with their full national differences, because they have every reason for friendship and none for enmity, and are united in all sorts of common enterprises.

It seems to me an advantage of this conception that it leaves room for the widest diversity in the contributions of the several communities to the life of the world, and it confronts the difficulty which arises as we saw from the fact that the higher gifts of humanity have hitherto, at any rate, sprung from localised minds, and have not been characteristic of mankind at large nor acceptable to it. It might be that this is the law of life; and that reciprocal good will, with understanding and appreciation, even intensified by the sense of foreignness and mystery, are all that the different types of mankind are ever to have in common; that the great gifts are still to be, as they have been, achievements of diversely

intensified life-centres, which seem to leave the rest behind.

The opposite ideal, that of a world-state, is, of course, conceivable. The point of interest is, I think, whether the identification of spirit and experience necessary as the basis of a general will could be achieved without the sacrifice of the valuable individual qualities of national minds.

Is our love of local peculiarities—of local dialects, for example—purely an obscurantist superstition; and how far do local styles and traditions of beauty depend upon conditions like those of local dialects? Certainly it appears as if anything ought to go which keeps people barbarous and makes mutual understanding impossible.

This analogy of language, I think, is helpful.<sup>1</sup> We should desire, I suppose, to preserve the languages of the world in all their glory and individuality, but that they should become for mankind a means of entrance into each other's minds and not a bar to it. If we compare this ideal with that of a universal artificial language, we shall see perhaps the true distinction between what we desire and what we should reject.

But the problem still returns upon us. Will the high civilisation of the future be a single thing, fusing into one the individualities of all regions and of all former nations? Or will national and local genius develop new internal resources, and even diverge into fresh and several types of greatness, instead of merging in a homogeneous character?

I do not think that the future of political organisation can be treated apart from the consideration of questions like these. And there is a homely remark which occurs to me as very relevant. Many people

<sup>1</sup> Cf. *Philosophical Theory of the State*, p. 330.

are very good friends apart who would quarrel if they kept house together. Is not this likely to be true of nations ?

And, in conclusion, I wish to draw attention to an assumption of popular philosophy which I suspect of having a serious bearing upon current ideas of the international future. I mean the popular belief in a progress of the species which is to end in a condition of the world that shall compensate for the wrongs and sufferings of the past ; in a word, in the evanescence of evil. We have had it explicitly argued by Herbert Spencer ; and there is hardly any popular writing about the future which does not assume it. Now I am inclined to think that the notion of a necessary advance towards the inclusion of mankind in a single political body is an offshoot of this naive form of optimism. The nature of consciousness in retaining the past as a basis for the future, together with its imperative demand for improvement, does make it fairly certain that man must tend on the whole to add to his moral and social achievements. But it is clear, I think, that any progress of future generations towards happiness could not compensate for the wrong and suffering of the past, and therefore this widely operating motive for assuming its likelihood must be dismissed, while in itself the evanescence of evil seems altogether self-contradictory. Therefore, while I believe in a nobler future, I do not believe in any simple advance towards comfort and tranquillity.

Another ancient superstition comes to my mind which illustrates the same popular tendency. The idea of a Millennium—of the reign of Christ on earth—passed gradually into the more modern conviction that at least the whole world was one day to be

brought 'under the sway of Christianity, or perhaps of Western enlightenment as typified by nineteenth century science.<sup>1</sup> All this, I take it, is gone by. The development of opinion has been in the contrary direction. The best Churchmen will admit, I believe, that to a great extent at least the peoples of the world have already the religions that suit them best. And we all see that the gospel of Western science, valuable as it is, has no exclusive claim to be the doctrine even of civilised man. A number of great systems, very profoundly differing in life, mind, and institutions, existing side by side in peace and co-operation, and each contributing to the world an individual best, irreducible to terms of the others—this might be, I do not say must be, a finer and higher thing<sup>2</sup> than a single body with a homogeneous civilisation and a single communal will.

And what about war? It is certain, to my mind, that evil and suffering must be permanent in the world, because man is a self-contradictory being, in an environment to which he can never be adapted, seeing that at least his own activity is always transforming it. And in principle there can be no reason for treating war as an exceptional case, as if presided over by a special devil apart from every other form of wrong. Neither the possibility of eradicating war, nor the incidental good that comes of it, can reasonably be discussed, as they commonly are, apart from the general problem of evil in the world. While man has a conscience, and things he values above life,

<sup>1</sup> *E.g.* of Positivism, as Comte held.

<sup>2</sup> Cf. the sentence from A. E., quoted above, p. 272. I do not mean that the nation-unit is final. But I think any change would be a grave loss which did not, if it had to go, give us something as rich in qualities in its place.

and yet his conscience is liable to err, the root of war exists. Issues may arise between group and group which cannot be compromised. Within the state itself, which is cited as the convincing analogy for a universal reign of law, both civil war and individual rebellion remain possible.

But man is bound, with this evil as with any other, to do what he can for its removal. And I do not doubt that its occasions may be immensely diminished by the reform of states, and their reconstruction in certain cases, and by, what this will promote, a truer economic creed.

The critics' confusion of the character of the state with the vices of states has led them into hopeless dilemmas. They argue from these vices that it should be weakened, while admitting a character which implies that it can hardly be too strong. It is quite impossible to unite a demonstration of growing demands on the state for organising activity, with a demonstration that its rank and authority already demand diminution.

It is quite impossible to unite a demonstration that the state has a conscience and moral responsibility with a demonstration that it shows itself non-moral when it throws itself heart and soul into its individual duty.

Ultimately, it seems to me, the critics' error is just that which they believe themselves to be attacking. Having misconceived the real spring of organisation and enlightenment, they are driven to put their faith in external force.

## XIV

### THE WISDOM OF NAAMAN'S SERVANTS

“ My father, if the prophet had bid thee do some great thing, wouldest thou not have done it? How much rather then, when he saith to thee, Wash, and be clean ? ”

WHEN the greatest forces of human nature are operating to the public danger, there are always, I presume, two main lines of action between which the friends of order have to choose. They can oppose the threatening elements from without, or they can approach them from within. They may suspect the operative forces, and endeavour to obstruct them; or they may trust them, and aim at modifying the influences which make them dangerous. The former attitude relies on external regulation, and ultimately on force; the latter, on loyalty to supreme values, and ultimately on freedom. I do not deny that in both attitudes some complexity and compulsion are inevitable; but in the former they are at a maximum, and characterise the principle; in the latter they are at a minimum, and are purely instrumental.

I believe that to-day the civilised mind, especially as expressed through men of theory and learning, is perplexed between these two attitudes in respect to the forces which make for war. Such a force, of overwhelming intensity, has disclosed itself in the

spirit of communities possessing a peculiar kind and degree of unity, commonly identified with states, or at least taken as represented by them, each to each, in practical affairs. The hope that the danger of war would be diminished as the grosser personal interests of monarchs and statesmen ceased to be among its causes, has no more been fulfilled than the kindred hope that representative self-government would *ipso facto* bring happiness to peoples. Granting that nations are still in part deluded into war by their rulers, there is yet no room for doubt that at times a central principle of their own consciousness acts violently in the same direction. Thus, if we consider the state as the executive unity of a people, we must admit that the spirit of the state is a force of human nature which is found on occasion to make powerfully for war.

And when this is admitted we are thrown into the dilemma which I began by urging. We are forced either to repudiate the spirit of the state, and work towards fettering it without or enfeebling it within ; or to seek to apprehend its true place in human nature, in order to offer it the satisfaction without which it remains a danger.

A modification of the general dilemma has intensified our bewilderment to-day. Always, when human nature wars upon itself, prejudice and perversion are at work upon its particular motives. But here and now they have been at work on the very principle of the group-will or spirit of the state itself ; and have partly poisoned it at the root, and partly convinced the world that it is poisonous in itself. The idea is not simply that the spirit of a state is apt to be perverse through selfishness and ignorance ; that is a human failing which we can readily recognise and

endeavour to control and amend. But the mischief lies deeper to-day. It is that one of the selfish perversions which are setting human nature at war consists, not in contending, as all disputants are liable to contend, that an unimpeachable principle supports their own very doubtful claim ; but in misrepresenting the nature of the unimpeachable principle itself. For it is argued, not merely that human nature, being liable to err, is prone to go to war ; but that to be at war is just what human nature means and demands. We all knew that we were apt to fight for our own hand ; but we hoped and believed that our habit was wicked and mistaken, and that some day we should give it up. But when one of the disputants tells us, or we believe that he tells us, not only that we all fight for our own hand, but that it is right to do so and no one can do otherwise, the mischief is raised from the level of a fact to that of a principle.<sup>1</sup> Not only is the great central force of the group-will polluted in a particular case, but there is an attempt to represent it as tainted in its essence.

Thus in the great dilemma the scales are loaded. If we accept the state as a fundamental fact and central force of human nature, we are held to be bound by the doctrine which takes it to be essentially militant. And to this we may incautiously assent. The two ideas have been audaciously identified, and our writers do not question the identification. The very idea of "the state" has taken on an enemy colour.

Hence the dilemma from which we began regarding the militant forces of human nature, comes to be

<sup>1</sup> "We all know that young men must go to the devil," Jowett is reported to have said, "but it is intolerable that they should make a theory about it."

governed by a new assumption, namely, that the spirit of the state is essentially a war spirit. It follows that we must set aside the alternative of co-operating with this force as potentially moral and rational; and what is left of the dilemma recurs<sup>\*</sup> under one of its former branches. "*As this force of human nature is harmful, are we to behave towards it as powerful, but malignant, or as an unreal creature of theory? In the former case the only hope lies in forcible regulation; if the latter clause is true, what is needed is a new social analysis and criterion to establish the state's limitations.*"

This dilemma in its new form, ignoring the positive function and principle of the group-will, governs the attitude of our theorists to-day. All of them believe at least that what is needed in dealing with the state is some degree, moderate or not, of disparagement, obstruction, and limitation; something opposed to its positive development into the flower of its inborn function.<sup>1</sup>

I will return below to the secondary and conditional values of the proposed limiting contrivances—peace-leagues, federations and "commonwealths," or the world-state. What I am arguing just now is that taken by themselves, as following from a doctrine aimed at restricting and disparaging the vital group-will, the vaster they become the more enormous are

<sup>1</sup> The attitude of our thinkers to nationhood is very curious and instructive. Some are frankly hostile; many who are aware of the value of the principle, wish nevertheless to get away from it to some less intense form of state unity, e.g. the "commonwealth." All trust ultimately in some external combination. They do not see what appears to me so obvious, that the point is to find support, say, for your peace policy, in a solid and persistent communal will; and that this in the nature of things can only be done through a unity as intense as that of a nation, even if more comprehensive.

the hazards they bring with them. Is it not a principal condition of our trouble to-day that huge federations and alliances have extended far beyond the power of any existing vital and intimate group-will to control them? If these huge systems of bodies encroach on one another's track by a single inch, disaster becomes inevitable. They have not the sagacity nor flexibility nor single purpose of a true communal mind and will. We are told that economic relations have outstripped political organisation. I see the danger rather in this, that political and interstate organisation has outstripped the mind of the vitally coherent community, which finds through it but an inaccurate and insensitive expression. Very probably it is well to extend the area of interstate or federative organisation. But the extension is only nominal if a vital will and sentiment of unity is not expanded *pari passu* with it. Yet our thinkers are preoccupied, it seems to me, with ideas of mechanical extension, and are hostile on the whole to the only force which could endow their creation with genuine unity and a power of fine adjustment.

No one of our publicists of to-day, so far as I am aware, has made an unambiguous attempt to challenge this whole prejudice and biassed dilemma regarding the state, and to point out not only that there is a different line which is truer and more natural, but that this other set of ideas is of the profoundest practical importance in its bearing on peace and the welfare of mankind.<sup>1</sup>

For in fact, in this will of a community, we are really dealing, as we first assumed, with a fundamental force of human nature, but it is a force primarily

<sup>1</sup> See T. H. Green, *Principles of Political Obligation*, Sect. 166, and *The International Crisis*, 1915, 46 ff. and 132 ff.

rational and moral, not militant at all. It is, in truth, the same thing as conscience; it is the desire of social man to bring order into himself and his world. This is why it makes him fight so furiously, whether he is right or wrong. It is, in principle, man seeking his birthright.

Now, if we once recognise what it is that we are dealing with, it is plain what we have to do. We have to enter upon the task of satisfying this claim of man. And, being human, we do *ipso facto* attempt it. The only real question is whether we are attempting it in the right way or the wrong. The clue to the right way is given by what we have said, and in principle, one would think, it could not be missed. And if, as I have urged, nearly all our writers have missed it, this is because they are looking for something less kindred to the group-will, and therefore more artificial and more ambitious. Whereas the point is really that if man has a tolerable set of rights and duties in his community he is in the main satisfied, and starts fair and unbiassed towards the outside world. If otherwise, he is distracted *ab initio*, and at war with himself and others, seeking especially by unfair means abroad what he cannot find by fair means at home.<sup>1</sup>

Thus the simple fact is that the spirit of the community, brought to consciousness and practice in its executive organ, the state, is the great moral force of the world. Like every moral force, it can, when biassed or perverted, make wrong its right.

<sup>1</sup> I suspect that harm is done here by an idea that duty must be "altruistic." If my memory serves me right, a little book called *Le Devoir présent*, speaking for the French Ethical Societies, after saying excellent things about the duty and functions of nations, ended up with the remark that France might find hers in—Central Africa! I simply gasped.

But the confusion of such perversions with its nature explains how it comes to be misconceived.

Now the point of this simple way of looking at the matter is that the primary objective of the community's will is normally the attainment of values in the life which it moulds freely for itself. This is so, because the organisation of rights within its own fabric is a work which belongs first and foremost to the home community which lives in doing it. But the community's will being one, governed by the interests which it really cares for, must affirm the same type of behaviour in external relations as in home affairs. The only difference is that its field of action abroad is primarily under the control of others, and not under its own. Hence the connection between these two regions of the same endeavour is inevitable but differentiated. What the group does at home, in the basis which it creates for its action, is the clue to what it will do abroad, and the principal cause of it, but is itself more free and complete.

For there is no one but the group-mind to organise rights at home, while there is, at least nominally and presumably, some one else to do the work in every region abroad. It is for this reason, and not as a matter of caprice, that we maintain the distinctive function of the community through its practical organ the state, to be chiefly and centrally the guidance of its own internal relations. This is not a nihilism of external relations; it flows from the plain positive type of interdependence which obtains between the two provinces, owing to the secondary control which is all that the home group possesses in the one, as contrasted with the primary control which it possesses in the other.

Now states are dangerous to each other by reason

of their biassed consciences, and biassed consciences come of inequality<sup>1</sup> in the community. No state can exhibit an unperturbed conscience abroad which is not bent on freeing itself from sinister interests at home, and on making itself an equal instrument of the best life for all its members."

Therefore I urge that the way to peace and security is simple in principle. If it is intricate in detail this is due to the complications which past evil policies have engendered. But the royal road to peace is to do right at home, and banish sinister interests and class privileges from the commonwealth. Then the inherent aim of the state will be clearly displayed, and will operate causally throughout in the sense of its habitual objective; and its entire operative machinery, within and without, will stand solidly on the purposes which consecrate its common life. Such an attitude will not leave us without a foreign policy, but it will leave us without what a foreign policy is often taken to mean.<sup>2</sup> It will leave us without plans for outwitting and circumventing other countries, and securing gains which we hope and believe to be at their expense (and which in some cases may really be so), and ruining their trade and industry. I fervently trust that this country has not of late pursued such adventures. That it has talked of them, and still talks of them, is certain; and no less

<sup>1</sup> I use the term inequality in a general sense for differences between citizens for which there is no relevant social need.

<sup>2</sup> T. H. Green once remarked to the writer, with reference to some example of what is called an enterprising foreign policy, "I would *almost* go so far as to say that a government in this country which appeals for support primarily on its foreign policy, stands self-condemned." Of course he did not mean that we were not to have purposes and machinery abroad; but that all this was to be instrumental to the same supreme aims which should be plain in our home life.

certain that in as far as it does enter upon them it is giving a militant meaning to every combination of powers in which it may participate, and promoting the temper which is the native atmosphere of war.<sup>1</sup>

Now, to be instrumental in building up a life directed by and to such supreme values as are implied in the account just given, is the inherent aim and "nature" of the state. To say that "the nature" of "the state" is an ideal in the sense opposed to a fact, and that we have no evidence what it is—as distinct from the vices and narrownesses of "states," is really to say that you cannot distinguish a function from its derangements. The state has a nature as much as the brain or the railway system—what we mean to imply when we use the word, and what is present in particular states in so far as they succeed in being what analysis shows that they claim to be, and pretend to be even when they are not. And more; you may make a good state or a bad one, or a good state into a bad one, but you can no more make the nature of the state other than it is,<sup>2</sup> than you can make a pony-carriage the same thing as a motor-car, or good the same as evil. If it means anything to be a citizen, to recognise civic relations and the interdependence of rights and duties in a life with common purposes, and if the community is more of what it claims to be where these things are more completely present, and less where they are

<sup>1</sup> Cf. Bernstein in *New Statesman*, October 14, 1916: "Militarism is in Germany most intimately connected with the fiscal question. The class which is interested in high import duties is the same which is also interested in the present form of militarism. You cannot uphold the policy of high import duties without perpetuating the worst forms of rivalry and strained relations between respective nations—which would again make for militarism."

<sup>2</sup> See A. C. Bradley, *International Crisis*, 1915, p. 48.

present less completely, then the nature of the state is an everyday fact of civilised life, as easy to recognise as that of a law-court or a university. It does seem an open secret to the eye of civilised man that in proportion as "states" show more of "the state"—in proportion as communities develop an orderly political system—the organisation of rights goes forward.

I recapitulate in a few words. The relation of the state to war is simple and obvious. Its spirit is the human consciousness at its intensest pitch—the content which more than any other makes man's mind a mind. It may, as man constantly does, set its heart upon something that involves fighting; and then, as we said, it fights furiously, because, right or wrong, it fights as for the right, and so has the weight of moral convictions behind it. But, as we have seen, it is not its nature to grasp at objects that involve aggression; this is merely an incident, common to man because of his frequent failure to appreciate the things that can be had without fighting. These things themselves again may at times need armed defence, not in themselves, but in the external conditions of their maintenance, and such defence may come within the function or mission of a state; the duty which a state truly conceives to be called for under certain circumstances. Thus the state may be engaged in war by its own wrong, or by another's. But the full nature of the state is in the maintenance of the best life, of life embodying supreme values, in the self-governing community. And so far as its action reveals such a principle there, and is true to it in external relations, so far the state is realising its "nature," in antagonism to selfishness and aggression. The soundness of external relations therefore depends

first and foremost not on powerful and skilful combinations of states or communities, but on the spirit of equality, and the recognition of the best things in life, within the social and political system at home. This is what I call, as a preventive against war, the wisdom of Naaman's servants; and it is expressed otherwise in the same book, "Seek ye first the kingdom of God and his righteousness, and all these things shall be added unto you."

But now we can go further. It is one thing to regard concerted combinations of powers as a security in themselves, and altogether another thing to employ them as instruments and expressions of a solid pervading purpose. Once you have a vitally coherent community, intimately bound together by feeling and type of experience, and allegiance to the same values and aspirations, then you possess the constituents of a true general will, and how you go to work to realise its aims become a purely practical matter. At present the difficulty is to find such common constituents throughout any area exceeding what has usually been called the territories of a nation. How far in fact there could be a true general will in a whole, such as has been called a "commonwealth," whose essence is to include dependencies on a lower level of culture, or again in a Peace League or a World State, is a problem for the future. What I desire to emphasise is that the whole question is wrongly approached unless we understand that we are speaking of fundamental questions of fact, problems of human nature which a theory can only be sound by recognising, but cannot, if it finds them inconvenient, modify or explain away. How can an effective unity of or within mankind come to exist? And the answer is, by devotion to the things

in which man, at his best, is at one. The mind of a community which is at one with itself is the type without approximation to which all leagues and combinations must be sources of danger.

Neglect of this simple wisdom brings about a curious meeting of extremes. Not merely the extreme Pacifist, but the moderate and statesmanlike advocate of a Peace League, may be found, unless he carefully guards himself, to be joining hands with the extreme militarist. Minorities, we are told, must learn to give way, as the individual once had to learn within the state. Yes, but unless the substantive objects of the will that yields are to be guaranteed in the will that prevails, the analogy fails absolutely, and the interstate relation comes back to force, while that of state and individual rests on will. In fact the suggestion of a separate obligation as between internal and external relations reproduces in politics the opposition of egoism and altruism, which has been banished as meaningless from ethics. These arrangements *ab extra*, not manifestly derivative from supreme objects of the communal life, have in them no immanent guide nor constructive spirit, and respond very unready to the influence of what a high-minded community really wants to be done. All who are satisfied with machinery of this kind are practically together in being votaries of force,<sup>1</sup> for take away the general will and nothing but force is left.

<sup>1</sup> As I write (Nov. 11, 1916) there comes an apt illustration. Germany, Herr Bethmann-Hollweg assures us, will be glad to take her place at the head of an international peace league. Now I do not want all the assent that such an example will bring me. If you are not going to scrutinise the quality of the unity to be constructed, why not set Germany at its head? If you are, it must grow out of a pervading will.

And the tactlessness to which this trust in mechanism leads! Here, for instance, is a huge empire, the growth of successful centuries, dominating a quarter of the earth's surface, and likely, by no fault of its own, as it urges, to dominate much more. Now without, I will not say apology, but without any pledge and explanation of readiness to meet the convenience and interest of other peoples, or suggestion of how it might be done, the peace-maker, speaking for this empire, will propose some form of arrangement aimed at making it less likely that countries in future will have to fight for their possessions. Is it not plain that as things stand to-day, such proposals for the ending of war must to less fortunate powers look like the behaviour of a player who, after a run of luck, desires not only to leave off playing, but to be seen safe home by the company?<sup>1</sup>

All this is of course obvious in fact. But the reason for it has not, I think, as a rule been made clear, and it is on this that I am anxious to insist, as following from what I have said.

All action is force, when it is not recognised to spring from the supreme objects truly desired in common by those whom it affects. Thus, you may find several communities desiring peace. And they may make a league to enforce it. But their "general wills" taken together are not one will,<sup>2</sup> that is, they have not in common the same principal objects, or

<sup>1</sup> I agree that our position is very difficult. But I think the least we can do is to recognise where our advantages are galling to others, and contrive every conceivable step to remove the annoyances. It looks to me as if Viscount Grey was alive to this necessity.

<sup>2</sup> Hegel is blamed for saying this. But surely, up to now, this is a great fact, of the kind which philosophy stands or falls by stating truly. He does not say the wills could not become one, and we are showing, on a basis derived from him, how they can.

views of life, and therefore they are likely to diverge in their desire for peace, under different conditions. Peace thus proves to have been a side issue to many of them, and really to have been desired perhaps for the sake of profit, so that if a chance of more profit by a successful war should suddenly appear, peace will no longer be preferred. Thus the apple of discord could easily be thrown among such a league, because there is no solidity in the unity of their wills, nor the same fineness of quality in them all. Their real bond was force.

If, on the other hand, there were to exist, in one or more communities, a prevailing general will, that is, a concordant sense of supreme objects which, by a plain derivation, demanded a certain concerted action—in favour of peace, for example; then there would so far be a solid foundation for practical steps towards international or cosmopolitan unity. It cannot be done by setting up a machinery, though to do it would need a machinery. This would be the consequence, not the cause. It can only be done by making evident in the inner life of groups a devotion to the great ends of humanity, such as to offer a sure foundation for precautions to be taken in their relations with each other against the obstruction of those ends which all of them genuinely desire and mould their lives upon.

This is why I have ventured, in the present volume, to consider social methods and ideals in intimate connection with the true fundamental patriotism and the function of the state in promoting human solidarity.<sup>1</sup> In the view I desire to present, the whole complex of a community's behaviour within and without is a single thing, determined by the nature

<sup>1</sup> Cf. also *International Crisis*, 1915, p. 151.

of the objects and satisfactions which, consciously or unconsciously, it has at heart. With a true sense of values and a devotedness to those things which are not diminished by sharing, it is not too much to say that we should be safe against the more disastrous form of conflict and exploitation within and without.

If we had the wisdom of Naaman's servants, we should concentrate our efforts on thus cleansing our patriotism. Not that this would involve a policy of non-interference outside our own borders; although, as we have in substance argued above, it is a very extraordinary thing to observe those who are most opposed to war demanding a policy of adventure, based on a permanent threat of armed interference, which transcends, I should imagine, in audacity any enterprise ever dreamed of by Napoleon.

But although we know that to put in act our higher patriotism we shall have to take steps in concert with other communities, and affecting others still, the unity of whose wills with our own nothing but participation in such a patriotism can guarantee, yet "non-interference" must in a certain typical sense remain our ideal of international conduct. We must again insist that for every community there is only one territory in which the duty of organisation falls primarily and in principle upon itself, and that territory is its own. All uninvited action elsewhere is duplication of others' action, or interference with it. The presumption against such acts may of course be defeated by special circumstances, but *prima facie* it is fatal. On the whole, then, it is in home policy that the mind and aims of a state are plainly revealed, and its basis of action established. In external relations it expresses itself always under some obstruction. But the mind is the same in both.

This must not be construed as a limit on cosmopolitan intercourse and co-operation. As I have pointed out in Essay XIII., the idea that this is so implies irrational distrust of communities other than our own. There is not the smallest reason why, under such a policy as is here outlined, every individual and society should not find communication and co-operation with every other on the earth's surface as easy and convenient as within his own country. This would be more probable, not less, if the special facilities in every region are controlled and adapted by an administration native to that region and of special competence for it. The main difficulties in these matters come from regulations in restraint of trade, which are necessarily also regulations in restraint of human intercourse.<sup>1</sup> But these are in principle irrational.

I regard it as fortunate, though it may be imputed to me as a fault, that in the first of these addresses, five years ago, I made use of Fichte's language to express what is fundamental in patriotism. Judgments of Fichte highly inconsistent with my estimate have been published since 1914.<sup>2</sup> As I read the matter, they form a part of the misconception to which I referred above, by which the philosophical recognition of the group-will as the central force and right of human nature—a recognition impossible to refuse, alike in logic and in fact—has been treated as equivalent to a doctrine that the state is above morality and is militant in essence. It would be impossible here to attempt any complete analysis of Fichte's

<sup>1</sup> With the best will in the world, it is impossible to prevent the experiences of travellers in passing customs' barriers from being at times quite inhuman, as the writer has himself observed.

<sup>2</sup> Vaughan's *Rousseau*, ii. 518-526. Sorley, in *Theory of State*, 1915, p. 34 ff.

life-long effort to utter adequately his complex political creed. He wrote much that was unguardedly borrowed from historical generalisations which have only a partial truth, though not at all a negligible one, such as the idea that a civilised state in contact with uncivilised ones cannot help extending its borders ; or the idea that the bringing new blood into Europe by the christianisation of the Teutonic nations conferred a unique benefit on the world. The moral of these facts he drew out in his rhetorical manner, and no doubt overestimated.

Nevertheless, and although Fichte was by no means at the top of the political philosophy of his time, I must think that our savants, and the modern Germans too, if they say the same things, have here committed the error which I analysed above. They have treated the recognition of a primary life-force as one in principle with the perversion which fixes on it a militant character. And they fail to observe that by thus welding the two ideas together they themselves are carried into the atmosphere of that hostility with which current opinion to-day regards that great central force of law, organisation, and morality which expresses itself most definitely in the state.

Any one who reads Fichte, and still more Hegel, whose doctrine was less overdrawn and one-sided—but still any one who reads Fichte, with an eye to the direction of his advance, and to the factors which strengthened with his development—sees that for him the state, which is man's nature as executive in a self-governing community, is in the main an embodiment of freedom and a means to the development of personality.<sup>1</sup> And by Fichte especially both true

<sup>1</sup> Cf. I. H. Fichte (son of the great philosopher) in Fichte's *Werke*, vol. vii. p. xviii.

national greatness and abiding peace among the countries of Christendom are foreseen as the remote results of an education which he conceives as gradually supplanting all necessity for government by force. What I have cited from the *Reden an die Deutsche Nation* is only a fraction of the wise and splendid thoughts which they contain. And it seems to me to be due to a misconception bred of temporary resentment if we ignore both their particular greatness, and the fundamental trend of German thought in that period, which was simply the recognition of that central fact of human nature on which I have been insisting.

In my belief the essential foundation of all sane political thinking is the supremacy of absolute values in the self-moulded life of the community. And not Plato himself has insisted on this necessity with more single-heartedness than Fichte.<sup>1</sup>

<sup>1</sup> Fichte's views passed no doubt through very quaint stages, though always in the one direction. About Hegel's attitude, on the other hand, there can be to the serious student no doubt at all. The state is for him on the level of "objective mind," of law, order, and morality. Towards "Absolute" Mind—that is, what appears in Religion, Art, and the higher regions of thought—it is related as a substructure or foundation, not exactly a "means," because it is the earlier part of the same growth. Obviously, in respect to such a view, you can manœuvre such expressions as means and ends just as you please; and obviously also the view incorporates the plain fact and common sense of the matter in refusing to separate factors as "mere means" or "mere ends."

The selection of texts and phrases is wearisome and unconvincing. But I feel bound to point out one or two matters usually misrepresented or ignored. Hegel, it has been said, calls war "a game." This, I take it, depends on a paraphrastic rendering by Wallace, *Encycl.* Sect. 547. The sentence merely says in the common idiom that in war the independence of states is at stake.

It may be as well also to mention here Hegel's passionate and crushing criticism on the doctrine of the right of the stronger (*Rechtsphilosophie*, Sect. 258), which I never see alluded to in any current

It is this conception of patriotism as one with the social ideal, and of both as representing our best ideas of humanity and our devotion to their service, which is the spirit that connects together the studies which are here collected. The simple doctrine which they repeat in various forms or applications, is that nothing can guide us right but a genuine devotion to the great eternal values, and that if we can succeed in clearing the vision of these from confusion and caricature, and applying it as a criterion in all social relations, we shall not go far wrong either in our life within the community or in our international behaviour. An example on which I rely—one only of innumerable cases—is that which I have all my life striven to enforce, the love of art, and the opposition of beauty and refinement on the one hand to luxury and sensuous pleasure on the other (Lecture III. of No. XI.). How would such a feeling and recognition help us in practice? If wide enough and strong enough, there is nothing it might not do. It might change our social stratification, reform our economic system, wipe out our drink bill and make London a paradise, and make us love and understand the minds of other nations. There is nothing, I repeat, that cannot be done by a change of interests; there is very little indeed that can be done without it.

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estimate of him, partly, I imagine, because it is contained in a long footnote in small print. And, following Mr. A. C. Bradley, we should observe the audacious verdicts in the same sense which enter into Hegel's estimate of Napoleon's achievements. "No greater victories were ever won; no greater genius was ever displayed in campaigns; but also the impotence of victory was never set in a stronger light. . . . Superior force from without can effect nothing enduring." *Philos. d. Geschichte*, pp. 540, 542; *International Crisis*, p. 76.

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